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In 2018, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that to avoid an 
increase in the temperature of more than 1.5-2.0oC by 2030, as the Paris Agreement proposes, 
a reduction of global greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions of between 25-45% is needed. To 
achieve this, most of developed and developing countries have submitted their nationally 
determined contributions (NDCs), but further work is needed to achieve another goal of the 
Agreement: making financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHGs and climate-
resilient development (UNFCCC, 2015). 
 
In this context, this thesis analyses the extent to which developing countries are 
mainstreaming climate change in their public budget to comply with national and 
international commitments, and what factors promote and hinder such processes. Using a 
fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) and two case studies (Mexico and 
Colombia), the study found that developing countries, at least in Latin America, are more likely 
to mainstream climate change in their public budget if there is international support in the 
form of Overseas Development Aid (ODA) or climate finance. While the thesis identifies 
international cooperation as a promoter of climate change mainstreaming in the planning and 
budgetary processes, also it highlights how dependence on fossil fuels in the public finance 
cycle is a major constraint on such processes. 
 
The thesis suggests that while international cooperation remains key to promoting national 
climate action in developing countries, this will not be enough to achieve transformational 
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CHAPTER 1. EXPLAINING CLIMATE CHANGE MAINSTREAMING IN THE 





The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report published in October 2018 
declared that humanity has to cut 45% of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2030 to avoid an 
increase of more than 1.5oC in average global temperature and to avoid irreversible negative 
impacts in ecosystems and societies (IPCC, 2018). The report reaffirmed and highlighted the 
relevance of urgent action from both developed and developing countries, to accelerate 
mitigation and adaptation actions to tackle climate change.  
 
The Paris Agreement resulted from five years of negotiations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) and it has recognized both developed 
and developing countries obligations to tackle climate change, based on common but 
differentiated responsibilities and capacities. On this basis, states have established and 
committed to Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Furthermore, the Agreement calls 
for financial flows to be made consistent with a low greenhouse gas emissions strategy. 
 
In this context my thesis aims to examine whether developing countries can make these 
commitments and so: under what conditions are developing countries willing to mainstream 
the climate change in their public budgets as a way to comply with national and international 
climate goals, such as the NDCs.  Moreover, what are the factors that promote and hinder such 
processes?  
 
A key question is whether the provision of USD100 billion agreed by parties of the UNFCCC in 
2010 is enough to address the challenges that climate change is bringing to humanity and the 
planet or whether further mobilization of climate finance is needed? In this context, the public 
finance system of developing countries will also have to play a vital role in delivering the NDCs. 
Some developing countries, including Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) countries, have 
already proposed some conditional and unconditional measures in their NDCs, the first 
subjected to international support and the second, which will be implemented with their own 
resources. 
 
In order to further explain the rationale behind the selected question and to describe how this 
research will be conducted, this chapter is divided into five sections. Section one lays out the 
research puzzle and the context of the research, providing an analysis about the role of 
developing countries in the international regime of climate change. Section two explains the 
 10 
research question and provides a literature review to locate this research in the broader 
literature. Section three presents the argument and the theoretical approach. It also describes 
the research design and the methods used, which are Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
comparative case studies using qualitative methods. Section four explains the original 
contributions that this thesis makes to the literature before outlining the thesis chapters are 
outlined in section five.  
 
1.1. Research puzzle 
 
The UNFCCC argues that tackling climate change should be based on such principles as 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities among states’, 
according to Article 3.1 (UNFCCC, 1992). This Convention recognizes the historical 
responsibility of developed countries to reduce emissions and also to support developing 
countries in their endeavours to deal with the effects and impact of climate change.  
Nevertheless, there is also a growing debate about the urgent and proactive roles that 
developing countries should take in addressing the problem of rising temperatures around 
the world, because the growing emissions in the developing countries are also a threat to 
achieve emission stabilization in the atmosphere. There is a growing consensus that action by 
developing countries is needed too. Stern (2012) argues that developing countries are on a 
path of increasing their emissions towards 2030 by which time around 70% of global emissions 
will come from the developing world. 
 
The signing of the Paris Agreement is also recognition that the role of developing countries is 
crucial if the established targets are to be achieved. Although this agreement does not set 
specific targets for developing countries, it suggests in Article 2 a collective target to stabilize 
emissions to avoid an increase in temperature of 2oC and ideally 1.5oC (UNFCCC, 2015). To 
reach this target the signatories were required to submit voluntarily NDCs that will guide their 
participation in the global commitment. 
 
As of March 2020, the Interim NDC Registry reported that 189 countries have submitted their 
first NDC, including most of the developing countries that are members of the UNFCCC; while 
four have submitted their second (UNFCCC, n.d.1). However, clear and decisive strategies and 
implementation pathways are absent.  Furthermore, some developing countries have 
included measures within the NDCs that are conditional, which means that such measures can 
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only be achieved with international financial support, while some of them also included 
unconditional measures that can be achieved with national means of implementation. 
 
In this context, my research aims to investigate and analyse the conditions that promote 
and/or hinder a state’s capacity to mainstream climate change in planning processes, and 
particularly in the public budget and subsequent expenditure, that each year reflects the 
priorities of the state. My argument is that while the support from developed countries 
remains crucial, as is stated in the Paris Agreement (Article 9), flows at the global scale might 
not be sufficient to fulfil the developing countries needs and commitments, therefore 
developing countries also need to better incorporate and ideally mainstream climate change 
in their public budget to invest in mitigation and adaptation measures as part of their daily 
priorities. In this sense, the allocation of public budget is critical, since it represents the 
amount of resources available to deal with the designated priorities at the national level. If 
developing countries do not integrate climate change as part of their budgetary allocation, 
there is a risk of non-compliance as regards their NDCs. 
 
The analysis of climate change has been studied not only as an environmental issue in isolation, 
but as a problem that has impacts in other development areas. In this context, the role of 
public budget for climate change becomes extremely relevant. While some developing 
countries point to other priorities such as poverty, insecurity, unemployment that dominates 
their national agendas, there is evidence that climate change will also impact and compound 
these traditional problems because it threatens the national security of countries (Miklos, 
2018). 
 
A key factor is that if developing countries aim to have further international support, they also 
need to demonstrate effective actions at the national level, which creates a conditionality that 
can also influence the quantity and quality of such international cooperation. This suggests 
that there is an important relationship between the reception of international cooperation 
and the allocation of public budget at the national level, which this research will analyse in 
depth.  
1.1.1. The complexity of climate change  
 
According to the IPCC (2013), the main scientific body in charge of monitoring the phenomena 
of climate change,  
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…warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many 
of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia. The 
atmosphere and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have 
diminished, sea level has risen, and the concentrations of greenhouse gases 
have increased (p. 4).  
 
The IPCC additionally pointed out that, “almost the entire globe has experienced surface 
warming” (IPCC, 2013, p. 5).  Another crucial declaration that the IPCC has shared is that the 
likely cause of this increased warming observed in global average surface temperature from 
1951 to 2010 is the “anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other 
anthropogenic forces together”, which means that “human influence on the climate system is 
clear” (IPCC, 2014, p. 2). 
 
After years of monitoring the climate system, the IPCC has identified the need to implement 
measures to reduce emissions (mitigation), and measures to reduce vulnerability (adaptation) 
in an urgent way to be on time to stabilize emissions in the atmosphere. In its 2018 special 
report demanded by countries during the COP21 in Paris, France, the IPCC has stated that 45% 
of global emissions must be cut by 2030 in order to avoid an increase of 1.5oC in global 
temperature. The scientific body has confirmed that if countries stabilize by 20% and not 45%, 
the increase in temperature could be 2oC or more, producing irreversible impacts in 
ecosystems and societies (IPCC, 2018).  
 
According to the IPCC, climate change “involves complex interactions between climatic, 
environmental, economic, political, institutional, social and technological process” (IPCC, 2001, 
p. 78). Accordingly, the change in climate and its resulting impacts result from inter-connected 
issues, which emanate from actions and decisions by different sectors. Gupta & Grijp (2010) 
commented that most sectors are likely to be affected by the potential negative impacts of 
climate change, and measures to adapt would need to be integrated into sectorial plans 
beyond the environmental sector and beyond the state. Previously, international discussions 
on climate change were seen as “an abstract global future problem with a technocratic nature” 
(Gupta & Gijp, 2010, p. 9), because for many years, the state was the only actor making and 
taking decisions on this regard. Though the role of the state remains central, increasingly there 
are calls for wider participation in climate discussions by non-state actors in order to deal with 
the problem effectively (Gupta, 2007). 
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Climate change thus presents a distinctive level of complexity in the international system 
owing to the cross-cutting nature of its causes and impact. This level of complexity requires a 
rethink of the pathways that are critical to tackle the problem structurally and across different 
sectors at the international level, but also at the national level.  In this sense, in this thesis, I 
examine the international climate regime, specifically, the UNFCCC and its Paris Agreement 
and the logics they propose, to then analyse the role of developing countries in that regime.  




The UNFCCC is the central international body in charge of facilitating the creation of global 
agreements to collectively deal with climate change. Correspondingly, its goal is to achieve: 
… stabilization of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system … (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 2) 
 
Historically, climate related negotiations have been contentious because of the multiple 
points of views and interests that exist among the 194 countries that are signatories to the 
Convention. Further complicating these negotiations are the different levels of state 
responsibilities regarding GHG emissions and capacities to respond to the threats from and 
causes of climate change. 
 
According to the Preface of the UNFCCC (1992), “the largest share of historical and current 
global emissions of GHGs has originated in developed countries” (p. 1). However, the 
Convention points out that the “per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively 
low and that share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet 
their social and development needs” (UNFCCC, 1992, p. 1). The question here is to what extent 
developing countries can continue growing their emissions if the IPCC clearly called for a 
global cut in emissions. Based on this, my thesis aims to understand the role of developing 
countries and the ways they can mainstream climate change in their planning and budgetary 
process to respond to this goal. These challenges are at the core of international climate 
negotiations.   
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In order to differentiate actions, the UNFCCC allocated countries in annexes. Annex I consist 
of the developed country parties that are committed to adopting and implementing national 
policies on climate change - limiting the anthropogenic emissions of GHGs and protecting and 
enhancing GHG sinks and reservoirs. Crucially, according to the Article 4, they must also 
calculate and report on their emissions (UNFCCC, 1992). Annex II consists of the developed 
country parties that shall provide new and additional finance resources to meet the agreed 
full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under 
Article 12 of the Convention (UNFCCC, 1992).  
 
A third group of countries is the Non-Annex I, where all developing countries are included. 
Although this group is not obligated to reduce emissions, it is called upon to develop policies 
and measures to reduce emissions and to reduce vulnerabilities at the domestic level.  The 
fact that Brazil, China, South Africa, and other emerging economies where the GHG emissions 
are growing, belong to the Non-Annex I classification, lies at the core of the debate on party 
responsibilities. The position of the United States of America, for example, is that emerging 
economies should also take responsibility for reduction in emissions. However, the Kyoto 
Protocol signed in 1997 1  did not allocate targets for developing parties; while not all 
developed countries comply with the reduction of emissions (Keohane & Victor , 2010). 
 
The UNFCCC regime has been the subject of several studies that have questioned the 
effectiveness of its processes and results. According to Keohane and Victor (2010) this climate 
framework is a complex regime. Instead of a comprehensive regime governing a collective 
effort to limit climate change, the regime prior to the Paris Agreement was a loosely coupled 
set of specific regimes lack of coherence, accountability, effectiveness, determinacy and 
sustainability (Keohane & Victor, 2010). 
 
In this sense, the lack of success of the Kyoto Protocol, and the lack of progress in the 
reduction of global GHGs, led to the latest international treaty on climate change, which is the 
Paris Agreement. 
 
The Paris Agreement 
 
 
1 Entering into force in 2005, the Kyoto Protocol was the first attempt to establish reduction responsibilities, 
asking developed countries for a reduction of 5.2% of 1990 GHG levels by 2012. 
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The Paris Agreement, signed in 2015 by 195 countries, aimed “to strengthen the global 
response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and 
efforts to eradicate poverty” (2015, p. 3). According to Article 2 of the Agreement, it aims to 
do so firstly, by “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels”, which requires the reduction of emissions in several sectors such 
as energy, transport and forestry, among others (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 3).  Critically, and most 
pertinent to this thesis, is that the second goal of the Agreement advocates, “making finance 
flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient 
development” (UNFCCC, 2015, p. 3). Although it does not specify which financial flows, it 
suggests that all financial flows should work consistently to address these issues.  
 
The global approval of the Paris Agreement was considered an important success in the 
international negotiations according to authors such as Stavins and Stow (2016). Others, such 
as Keohane and Oppenheimer (2016), agree that the Paris Agreement marks a decisive break 
from the unsuccessful Kyoto regime, establishing a pledge and review system under which 
states will offer NDCs. Nonetheless, they argue that this successful negotiation was achieved 
“at the price of vagueness of obligations and substantial discretion of governments” (Keohane 
& Oppenheimer, 2016, p. 146). 
 
Although since 2015 there have been efforts to tackle climate change in developed and 
developing countries through the NDCs, a study conducted in 2019 by the United Nation 
Program of Environment (UNEP), suggest that the pledges allocated in the NDCs so far are not 
enough to comply with the goals of the Paris Agreement, and instead they “would lead to a 
global mean temperature rise of between 3.4oC and 2.7o C by 2100” (UNEP, 2019, p. 5).  
 
It is worth understanding some of the key elements of the Agreement as they relate to 
developing countries, as well as the actions that have to be taken at the national level to 
comply with its goals.  
1.1.3. The role of developing countries in the climate change regime  
 
Recent studies show that emissions from developing countries are increasing significantly and 
that, in order to comply with the goals of the Convention to stabilize emissions, it is necessary 
to promote low carbon strategies in developing countries as well (Stern, 2012; UNEP, 2019). 
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This view has been primarily promoted in countries whose economic growth is increasing GHG 
emissions, such as China, India, South Africa and LAC countries such as Brazil and Mexico.  
 
In 2009 it was stated that “if current trends remain unaltered, the contributions of developing 
country emissions to total GHG stocks in the atmosphere should grow from around 20% of the 
world total in 2000 to 45% by 2030” (Stewark, et al., 2009, p. 100). According to Bailey and 
Compston (2012), although the per capita GHG emissions of these countries are still relatively 
low compared with those of industrialized countries (both currently and in cumulative terms), 
their high rates of economic growth and large populations have led to steep rises in their 
emissions, to the extent that it is widely acknowledged that effective action against climate 
change is impossible without the active participation of major emerging economies. In that 
sense, there is growing pressure to create low carbon pathways in developing countries, to 
leapfrog the traditional development achieved by developed countries (Perkins, 2003) in 
order to avoid an increase in the planet´s temperature of more than 2oC. 
 
The Paris Agreement has thus moved further by articulating the roles of both developed and 
developing countries. To this end, Article 4.3 of the Agreement established that “developed 
countries should continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission 
reduction targets. Developing countries should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts and 
are encouraged to move over time towards economy wide emission reduction or limitation 
targets in the light of different national circumstances” (UNFCCC, 2015). Although the 
Agreement does not establish legally binding emission reduction obligations to parties it 
recognizes the necessity for countries to submit and review their NDCs as a minimum but 
attainable commitment. 
 
The NDCs were proposed, “to initiate or intensify domestic preparations...towards achieving 
the objective of the Convention as set out in its Article 2…” (UNFCCC, 2014). These 
contributions may include: 
… Quantifiable information on the reference point (including, as appropriate, a base 
year), time frames and/or periods for implementation, scope and coverage, 
planning processes, assumptions and methodological approaches including those 
for estimating and accounting for anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions […] and 




For climate change practitioners, as well as academics, the submission of the NDCs has been 
a major subject of study because these stated contributions are seen as an opportunity to 
achieve the success of the Paris Agreement (Keohane & Oppenheimer , 2016). Nevertheless, 
most developing countries pointed out the necessity of climate finance to implement these 
actions, and to reduce GHGs and nurture resilient development.  
 
The drafting and reporting on NDCs by developing countries were a laudable achievement. 
However, the anticipated cumulative value of NDCs may not be reached if developing 
countries lack the necessary financial resources to implement their stated contributions. In 
this context and acknowledging what the Paris Agreement says about the role of the 
developed countries as the leaders of the climate finance mobilization, the role that 
developing countries have to play in order to be part of the climate action is highly significant.  
Building greater domestic financial capacity, which links climate policies with domestic 
budgetary considerations, is crucial to better enhance transitions toward a low carbon and 
sustainable development. 
 
Low carbon development is a concept that has been analysed by different authors. According 
to Urban and Nordensvard (2013, p. 5), it refers to “the use of less carbon for growth, which 
includes switching from fossil fuels to low carbon energy, promoting low carbon technology 
innovation and business models, protecting and promoting natural carbon sinks such as forest 
and wetlands…”, a definition that is consistent with what De la Torre et al., (2010, p. 128) 
defines as low carbon.  Transitions, however, are not automatic. Rather, they are processes 
that need significant amounts of investment to transform not only the way that things are 
done, but also the technologies and practices that need to be implemented.  
 
1.1.4. International climate finance flows and needs 
 
As previously explained, since the creation of the UNFCCC, it is clear that financial resources 
are needed to invest in mitigation and adaptation measures to deal with climate change. 
These resources called “climate finance” are one of the pillars of climate action.  There is no 
international agreement, however, about what climate finance means. The Standing 
Committee on Finance (SCF) has created an operational definition that points out:  
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Climate finance aims at reducing emissions and enhancing sinks of GHG, and aims 
at reducing vulnerability of, and maintaining and increasing the resilience of, 
human and ecological systems to negative climate change impacts (SCF, 2014, p. 
19). 
  
In the last decade, there has been an effort to measure the amount of climate finance that 
has been flowing primarily from developed to developing countries as part of their 
commitments under the UNFCCC, which is why the SCF conducts a biannual assessment of 
climate finance flows (SCF, 2014; SCF, 2016; SCF, 2018; OECD & CPI, 2015). These reports 
showed that climate finance has been increasing, however, the gap that exists between the 
needed financial flow and the mobilized financial flow has also increased. According to the 
UNEP at least USD500 billion annually are needed to fulfil only adaptation needs (UNEP, 2016). 
Since Article 3 of the UNFCCC points out that developed countries are the ones that have to 
provide financial support for developing countries (UNFCCC, 1992), a commitment was 
established under the UNFCCC to transfer USD100 billion annually by 2020 to developing 
countries (UNFCCC, 2009). 
 
A report conducted by OECD and the Climate Policy Initiative found that the mobilization of 
climate finance was respectively USD52 and USD62 billion in 2013 and 2014 (OECD & CPI, 
2015). This report was criticized by developing countries that questioned the methodology 
used by the OECD and the information underpinning the calculation, because according to the 
G77+China (a negotiation group) the results were too high compared to what developing 
countries had actually received (Roberts & Weikmans, 2015). 
 
The SCF found in its Biennial Assessment and Overview of Climate Finance Flows that “the 
estimated global total climate finance increased from a high bound estimate of USD650 billion 
for 2011–2012 to USD687 billion for 2013 and to USD741 billion for 2014” (2016, p. 4) and 
that finance increased 17%, according to its report in 2018. An important part of the analysis 
conducted by the SCF is that while 70% of the finance has gone to mitigation actions, only 25% 
has gone to adaptation actions, which creates an imbalance in the allocation of financial 
support (SCF, 2016). The SCF has pointed out the limitations of the estimation because the 
absence of a methodology universally agreed upon to measure and report climate finance.  
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In response, a negotiation topic was established related to the creation of modalities for 
accounting for climate finance in the context of the UNFCCC. Although technical issues were 
discussed and agreed upon during the COP24 in Poland, a relevant issue was not solved: to 
what extent climate finance has to increase and how to ensure that is new and additional of 
official development aid? This topic, which will be further discussed in this thesis, is not solved 
yet. 
 
Furthermore, the financial gap that exists imposes a challenge to make financial flows 
consistent with a GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. While the Agreement 
recognizes the role of developed countries in the provision of financial support, in its Article 
9.5 also references that “other parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such 
support voluntarily” (UNFCCC, 2015). There is no definition about what “other countries” 
means, but it is also related to the issue of “differentiation”, which according to Pauw et al.,  
(2014), means that all countries are responsible for climate change but at the same time they 
have different capacities to contribute to climate change mitigation. 
 
In this sense, as the SCF has proven, developed countries have increased their financial 
support. The flows towards developing countries have been increasing with Latin America as 
the third largest recipient after Asia Pacific and Africa (SCF, 2018). The role of international 
cooperation in developing countries has been crucial for the development of climate policies, 
and this is one of the key findings of this research that will be explained in next chapters.  
 
Whether climate finance is part of traditional aid support or is additional is still a matter of 
debate. In this context, I examine the role of developing countries in dealing with climate 
change, particularly those that are also responsible for GHG emissions, and that are highly 
vulnerable. While developing countries require the international support, they should not 
simply wait for this support, because resources flowing internationally are not enough to deal 
with the problem in all developing countries and further mobilization of different sources of 
finance is needed.  
  
In this sense, this thesis analyses the role of the public budget of developing countries as a 
key source of finance to deal with climate change. The thesis, however, is not suggesting that 
public budget by developing countries can solve the problem alone, because it has been noted 
that “there is not enough public money” (Interview 5FGM) but rather, the thesis argues that 
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while international support remains important to fulfil climate commitments, those flows will 
not be transformational if public money in developing countries does not also mainstream 
climate goals.  
 
1.2. Research question 
 
The central aim of my research is to provide evidence about the conditions that motives the 
mainstreaming of climate change the budgetary processes as a way to comply with national 
and international commitments on climate change. As parties to the Paris Agreement, 
developing countries have committed to their NDCs but these do not make clear under what 
conditions these countries are willing to act effectively or invest sufficient resources to deal 
with a problem that many developing countries have claimed is caused by developed 
countries. Currently, the literature does not make strong links between the shared burden of 
climate change and the role of developing countries in making available public finances to 
address its ensuing effects. Owing to this gap, this research aims to answer the following 
question:  
 
Under what conditions are developing countries mainstreaming climate change in their 
public budget to comply with national and international climate commitments, such as the 





1.3. Literature Review  
 
This research aims to contribute to the academic literature on public climate finance from the 
developing country perspective, which is an evolving field in the context of climate change. 
The research builds on two premises. The first one concerns the role of developing countries 
in combatting climate change, since my argument is that while the role of developed countries 
remains necessary as major emitters of greenhouse gases as well as climate finance providers, 
the development pathway established by developing countries is as critical and important to 
achieve the GHG emissions stabilization. If these countries follow the same pathway as 
developed countries, the increased GHGs will lead the world towards a temperature increase 
of more than 2ᵒC.  
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The second premise is related to the actual role of the state within developing countries. 
While there is a growing debate about the need to have different actors dealing with climate 
change, my argument is that the role of the state remains relevant, and that the elaboration 
of policies, legislation and particularly the allocation of public resources to combat climate 
change are critical. 
 
In this sense the research situates itself in two different areas of study: on one hand, climate 
finance academic literature and, on the other hand, public finance literature. Therefore, the 
aim is to contribute in the area of study of public climate finance from the developing country 
perspective.  
 
Some scholars have studied the necessity to mobilize climate finance using several sources, 
instruments and channels to complement public (Chirambo, 2017). Others such as Metz 
(2009) have studied the shared burden of climate change, emphasizing that while developed 
nations should carry the major the burden, developing countries have to take advantage of 
the fact that many measures could have negative costs, such as energy efficiency in buildings, 
transport and industry. The author points out that “we do not have the luxury of time to enter 
into a global agreement where developed countries move first and developing countries follow 
on behind” (Metz, 2009, p. 44).  The question that the author raised is how the reduction of 
emissions could be fair to developing countries with their lower incomes and limited 
responsibility for current climate change? 
 
Roberts and Weikmans (2017), point out that it is necessary to identify the financial needs of 
developing countries but also to understand the effectiveness of international climate 
finance, because this is not always transparent. These scholars further discuss the importance 
of clearly defining the relationship between climate finance and the ODA flows, in attention 
of what the UNFCCC says about climate finance as “new and additional” sources of finance 
(UNFCCC, 1992). This means that while the proposal is to look for further contributions to 
developing countries related to climate finance provision, some developing countries are 
wondering where the actual support is that developed countries are meant to provide 
(Roberts & Weikmans, 2017).  
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The debate regarding the additionality of climate finance within ODA is still on-going in the 
context of the UNFCCC and is a topic often discussed in the context of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, some scholars have pointed out 
the necessity to go beyond the debate and start talking about the importance of 
mainstreaming climate change in ODA (Gupta & Grijp, 2015). This is mainly because there are 
areas of development and climate change that are difficult to separate, particularly 
adaptation actions (Weiler, et al., 2018). According to Huq and Reid (2004), the concern about 
mainstreaming climate change in ODA, is that one thing is to connect actions such as 
institutional arrangements and polices, but another thing is to fulfil the commitments of the 
two agendas with the same limited amount of resources. 
 
Other scholars have focused attention on the real intentions of donors, such as Klöck et al., 
(2018), and Berthélemy (2006), who consider that the donors are not always motivated by 
the willingness to support, but rather for self-interest. This explains why not all the 
international cooperation goes to where is needed. Besides that there are different ways to 
cooperate, and some scholars have analysed the consequences of cooperation, because for 
developing countries “development finance has been mostly a matter of transferring 
resources to developing countries through the vehicle of investment projects” (Gupta & Grijp, 
2015, p. 329), which in many cases has increased public debt. 
 
The recent debate on the future of ODA in a world battling with climate change, where threats 
to humanity are increasing is complex. It may be necessary to think in terms of a “global 
insurance survival” (Hübler, 2016). This particular debate goes beyond the loss and damage 
debate and refers to the actual existence of sufficient capital to redesign the way that 
civilizations are living on earth.  
 
There is a clear understanding about the obligation of developed countries as major donors, 
or leaders of the mobilization of climate finance as the Paris Agreement pointed out. However, 
the discussion is starting to change from the traditional role of developed countries as 
providers, and developing countries as recipients, to see the developing countries as key 
drivers of financial transformation. This is because the traditional role of developing countries 
as recipients will not be enough to achieve Article 2 of the Paris Agreement. However, a key 
question that remains is under what conditions are developing countries willing to 
mainstream climate change in their own public finance system to deal with climate change 
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and comply with national and international climate goals (particularly if those countries rely 
economically on fossil fuels)? 
 
As Mickwitz et al. (2009) suggested in their analysis of climate policy integration, while 
analysis of the role of public expenditure of developed countries exists, further analysis 
related to the public expenditure of developing countries has yet to be conducted. Based on 
this gap, this research aims to contribute to the understanding of public climate finance from 
the developing country’s perspective.  
 
An important part of the analysis conducted in this research suggests that there are drivers 
and conditions that can explain or further support mainstreaming climate change in the public 
budget and expenditure of developing countries. Werksman (2009) suggests that one of the 
areas that will determine the success of a climate change deal “will depend upon closing the 
gap in expectations between developed and developing countries on climate finance” (p. 194). 
This is related not only to the amount of support provided, but also to the actual capacity 
building created in recipient countries.  
 
However, there is another caveat in the discussion. According to Werksman (2009), “financial 
transfer rarely comes without strings attached, i.e., conditionalities imposed by contributor or 
lending institutions on recipient countries” and “while the south can with some legitimacy 
demand financial support for reducing emissions, the north and the international community 
as a whole can legitimately demand a return on this investment” (pp. 190-191).  
 
Davis and Dadush (2009) questioned to what extent conditionality really enforces 
effectiveness and efficiency. Similarly, Woods (2009) agrees that other factors are needed to 
increase the effectiveness of financial support, such as the actual provision of financing from 
the recipient country to ensure ownership of the project. This approach is highly relevant for 
this research because it suggests that actual provision of public expenditure is a way to 
leverage international cooperation and might help recipient countries to better guide projects 
and programs.  
 
Furthermore, Ha et al., (2015) discussed whether climate finance between developing 
countries, called south-south cooperation, is an emerging opportunity to deal with climate 
change as well. In this sense the aim is to further discuss and contribute to the literature 
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regarding the role of developing countries not only as recipients but also as providers of 
climate finance, as possible donors, but mainly as implementers of national actions.  
 
Here, the opportunity is not necessarily to increase the amount of public resources, but rather 
to transform the use of their available public budget. Mainstreaming climate change in the 
allocation of resources would be a key tool to redefine priorities and therefore to re-think the 
use of their scarce resources in activities that can help to face the problem, instead of activities 
that will exacerbate it.  
 
For instance, scholars such as Fan and Rao (2003) studied the relationship between public 
expenditure and economic growth and poverty reduction, arriving at interesting conclusions 
related to the differential influence of types of government spending. They suggest that 
developing countries should stop spending in unproductive sectors such as defence, as well 
as cutting excessive subsidies in fertilizer, irrigation, power and pesticides, among others. 
They also mention the importance of having healthy public finance systems in developing 
countries. In this sense, scholars consider that the role of the state is still highly relevant to 
deal with environmental and other major problems such as climate change (Eckersley, 2004; 
Sachs, 2012). 
 
There are other initiatives such as the one developed by the United National Program for 
Development that created a methodology called Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional 
Review (UNDP, 2015). Other regional initiatives, such as the Climate Finance Group for Latin 
America and the Caribbean also developed an analysis about climate expenditure in LAC 
countries (GFLAC, 2014). As well as recent work of the Inter-American Development Work 
(IADB) related to climate budgets in the region. These analyses look for evidence on the 
allocation of public resources to deal with climate change in developing countries but are not 
questioning under what conditions such allocation happens. 
 
In this sense, this thesis aims to fill a gap in both theory and practice. There are no academic 
analyses about public climate finance from a developing country perspective, such as LAC 
countries, that investigate under what conditions they are willing to mainstream climate 




1.4. Theoretical approach  
 
I analyse the extent to which the mainstreaming approach has been used in developing 
countries to deal with the complexity of climate change, where there is a need to incorporate 
the problem in policies, institutions, and other processes, such as public budget, in order to 
deal with it in a more comprehensive manner (Hannan, 2000). Here, the main goal is to 
understand under what conditions developing countries are mainstreaming climate change in 
their own public budget, and what conditions promote and hinder such a process. 
 
 According to Piccioto (2002) “The term mainstreaming has become so fashionable in public 
policy circles that the notion, once rich in promise, has become trivialized through repeated 
use” (p. 322). Although the term has been attracting more attention, there are many 
interpretations of what it means. While “mainstream” as a noun, refers to the “principal 
course of activity”; mainstreaming as a verb, is more dynamic, and “suggests a deliberate 
perturbation in the nature order of things” (Piccioto, 2002, p. 323). The author emphasizes 
that “it subverts the status quo and yet it does not evoke chaotic change or painful disruption”, 
“in policy terms, it is typically achieved through incremental changes in programs goals, 
protocols of operation and organizational cultures” (Piccioto, 2002, p. 323). The last definition 
related to policies is the one that is used in this analysis. 
 
Piccioto (2002) points out “the mainstreaming process requires incremental resources, the 
exercise of compulsion and persuasion, changes in incentives, adoption of new procedures, 
adaptation of training protocols, etc.” and the author emphasizes that “mainstreaming is a 
key function of leadership” (p. 325). The gradual expansion of the development agenda is itself 
an example of mainstreaming (Piccioto, 2002). 
 
The reason why mainstreaming is examined in this thesis is because mainstreaming aims to 
bring key issues to the centre of the decision-making process. According to Hirschman (1970) 
a successful mainstreaming process implies a willingness to exit from past entanglements and 
to activate the voice of relevant stakeholders. This means that if past development and past 
investments are causing climate change, then, it is necessary to analyse the causes and be 
willing to exit such processes to start a new way of doing things, based on previous 
experiences.   
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Piccioto (2002) describes that there are different approaches to analyse mainstreaming that 
are connected to theories of behavioural change in society. The three main approaches are:  
a) Supported by sociologists, perceives human beings as highly responsive to 
authority and pliable to the opinion of others so that mainstreaming mostly 
requires decisions by leaders within the context of social customs, values and 
norms;  
b) Supported by economists, views social systems as atomized and made up of 
individuals motivated by self-interest; and  
c) Puts the focus on formal and informal relations, it views human actions as 
“embedded” in a web of information networks and social links (p. 326).   
The last approach emphasizes hybrid mixtures of cooperation and competition. A key aspect 
that Piccioto (2002) sees is that mainstreaming reaches a tipping point at a certain time, and 
this is when mainstream opinion shifts, and new ideas become the consensus. The author 
however recognizes that a “limitation” of the mainstream approach is that reaching this point 
of consensus is not a process written in stone, but rather something that must be constantly 
evaluated and adapted (Piccioto, 2002, p. 327). 
In this regard, Gupta and Grijp (2010), emphasize that mainstreaming is not only a goal, but it 
could be also a process. In this research it is analysed as a process. The mainstreaming 
approach has been applied in different fields such as gender and risk management, but its use 
in the climate change arena is relatively recent. However, I adopt the underpinnings of this 
approach to explain three central points of my research. 
Firstly, the complex nature of climate change necessitates the use of an approach that can 
analyse the role of different actors and sectors. In this sense, I maintain that the conduct of 
climate change action is a multilevel governance problem, where parties are simultaneously 
committed to and acting within international regimes, as well as national interests and 
priorities (Gupta & Grijp, 2010). International relations theory analyses the relevance of 
international regimes and their influence on the behaviour of states; however, these theories 
say little about national action for implementing international regimes (Harrison & McIntosh, 
2010). In this research, I refer to regimes as “set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actors´ expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations” (Krasner, 1982, p. 186). In this sense, the mainstreaming approach 
suggests the importance of incorporating climate change horizontally (in different sectors 
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beyond the environment) and vertically (across different levels of government) in order to 
tackle the problem in a structural way.  
 
Secondly, mainstreaming is a relatively new concept in the climate change field; however, this 
research argues that it is an approach that can be used to investigate state responses and 
responsibilities for climate change action in a more comprehensive way. This concept is similar 
to the policy integration concept. Some authors consider that climate policy integration aims 
to “integrate” climate elements into existing policies (Mickwitz, et al., 2009) while others 
consider that mainstreaming aims to re-define and re-think the way policies are designed 
under the lens of climate change that goes beyond the integration (Gupta & Gijp, 2010).  
 
Although in Chapter 2 there are further elements about the similarity and differences 
between climate policy integration and climate change mainstreaming, the research however, 
does not aim to go further into this debate, considering that there is insufficient empirical 
evidence about successful cases of climate change mainstreaming as a goal. For that reason, 
this research takes the vision of mainstreaming as a process, rather than ambitiously situating 
this approach as the final goal for parties’ response to climate change. Nevertheless, I 
acknowledge that mainstreaming climate change, as a goal is an ideal pathway for a more 
comprehensive approach to the problem. In that sense, this thesis takes climate 
mainstreaming and climate policy integration as similar in process, but different in outcome. 
 
Thirdly, a climate change mainstreaming approach enables an analysis of the role of the state 
at different levels, sectors and parts of the policy cycle, including public budget. The latter is 
a central element of this research. Even though climate change mainstreaming recognizes the 
role of non-governmental actors as well, the aim of this thesis is to examine the capacities of 
the state, especially as designers and key implementers of climate policies such as the NDCs. 
This technocratic approach has been criticized in the case of gender studies, because while 
there is recognition that achieving mainstreaming requires the participation of more 
stakeholders, it always starts by emphasising the role of the state in the mainstreaming 
approach (Lamprell, et al., 2014). 
 
For this research the role of the state is important because it represents the set of institutions 
that coordinates the public finance system and its public budget and expenditure (Besley & 
Persson, 2011). Moreover, as Eckersley (2004) recognizes in her work about the green state, 
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the role of the state remains key to achieve structural changes. Thus, the state remains 
important to enable the structural changes necessary to address the multiple issues arising 
from climate change, which requires systematic planning processes including the allocation 
of financial resources to be implemented. Nevertheless, the state alone cannot achieve 
everything; the participation of many other stakeholders is necessary to fully accomplish this 
mission.  
 
1.5. Research design 
 
To answer my research question, I used two distinct methods: 1) a Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (QCA); and 2) case studies based on interviews, as well as a literature review to set 
the framework of the research. 
1.5.1. Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) 
 
This research applies a Qualitative Comparative Analysis method, which in contrast to 
correlational techniques, such as traditional quantitative methods, “is grounded in set theory 
and thus is ideally suited for studying explicit connections” (Ragin, 2008, p.23). According to 
Ragin, the creator of the method, QCA is especially useful for analysing complex causation, 
defined as a situation in which an outcome may follow from several different combinations of 
causal conditions, instead of only one variable. 
 
The empirical comparative approach is divided into set-theoretic approaches and non-set 
theoretic approaches. QCA is seen as a third way to do research along qualitative and 
quantitative methods, as well as a way to connect both, since it combines “the best of two 
worlds” (Schenider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 10). Nevertheless, the set-theoretic method that 
QCA uses is close to case-oriented comparative approaches used in the qualitative method.  
 
QCA is not only a technique but also a research approach that refers to the process before 
and after the analysis of the data. Ragin refers to this process as “the back-and-forth between 
ideas and evidence” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 11).  
 
The goal of QCA is to find the conditions that are a subset or supersets of the outcome given, 
and thus to arrive at sufficient and necessary (or INUS or SUIN) conditions that explain that 
outcome. “INUS stands for a condition that is an insufficient but necessary part of a condition 
which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” and “SUIN stands for a sufficient, but 
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unnecessary part of a factor that is insufficient, but necessary for the result” (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2012, p. 79).  
 
The idea of QCA is to put those conditions in so-called “truth tables” to analyse such set 
relations. The truth table it is also an important tool in the QCA. In these tables the logically 
possible configurations of conditions are expressed. According to Schneider and Wagemann 
(2012) there are three steps to building a truth table: 1) the identification of all logically 
possible conditions; 2) the assignment of each case to one of these truth table rows; 3) the 
definition of the outcome values for each row (p. 179). Once these steps are done the table is 
subjected to analysis.   
 
According to Ragin (2008) an important aspect is that QCA is suitable to analyse a small and 
medium number of cases: between 10 and 50. “The motivation for using QCA should be the 
researcher´s interest in set relations rather than the number of cases under investigation” 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 13).  
 
My thesis seeks to understand under what conditions are developing countries willing to 
mainstream climate change in their public budget to comply with national and international 
climate commitments. The analysis is focused in the 21 major emitters of GHGs in LAC 
according to the World Resource Institute (WRI, 2016). Although the region contributes only 
8% of global emissions (Vergara, et al., 2013), this share is increasing because of the 
development model that countries are following.  
 
As is further explained in Chapter 3, this thesis uses the fsQCA to analyse the conditions or 
combination of conditions that better explain the presence or absence of public budget 
labelled as climate change in the environmental ministries, as well as the presence or absence 
of public budget labelled as renewable energy in the energy ministries for two years, 2010 
and 2016. This method provided a first analysis of the conditions that are further scrutinised 
in the case studies, which were selected based on the results of the fsQCA.  
 
It is important to acknowledge that there is an on-going debate around the use of the QCA 
method and its variants such as the fsQCA, since it uses elements of both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Scholars argue that it is important to differentiate QCA from the 
probability methods that according to Zadeh are complementary methods (Schneider & 
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Wagemann, 2012, p. 31). Furthermore, in order to compare the results of the fsQCA this 
research also applies a case study analysis, which is described next. 
1.5.2. Case studies  
 
According to Gerring (2004) a case study is “an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose 
of understanding a larger class or (similar) units” (p. 342). To select the case studies, this 
research applies a comparative method that, unlike the statistical method, allows for the 
selection of a small number of cases to do the analysis. This is based on the results of the 
fsQCA method.  
 
According to Lijphart (1971), the comparative method is defined as one of the basic methods 
of establishing general empirical propositions and recommends, “doing comparative analysis 
in comparative cases” (p. 687) meaning that they share similar characteristics.  
 
Latin America and the Caribbean is a highly complex region (Edwards & Roberts, 2015). Even 
though countries share cultural aspects, the size of the economies, societies and territories 
vary considerably. To do a comparative analysis requires taking into account these differences 
and similarities among countries to avoid generalizations. For instance, the fsQCA allowed for 
understanding that, even though most countries have developed several policies related to 
climate change, not all of them have allocated a budget to comply with them.  
 
In this sense and based on the fsQCA the selection of two case studies was conducted, which 
is further described in Chapter 3. Mexico and Colombia were selected because they have 
characteristics that could be comparable as Lijphart (1971) suggests. Mexico and Colombia 
receive different levels of international cooperation and have different allocations of climate 
budget, but are similar in other conditions, such as human development, governance, climate 
policies and international roles, among others.   
 
The goal of the comparative analysis with the two case studies is to obtain a deeper and richer 
understanding of what factors promote and hinder mainstreaming climate change in their 
public budget. Since the analysis of all public budgets in one country is highly complex and 
time consuming, two sectors that are highly related to climate change were chosen: the 
environmental and energy sectors. It is important to mention that for the case of Mexico and 
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Colombia it was possible to analyse current budget and also expenditure, and for the energy 
ministries it was also possible to analyse investment dedicated to renewable energy.  
 
The analysis of the public budget was not conducted in isolation, but alongside other parts of 
the planning process, such as institutional arrangements in place, development of climate 
policies and others. To do this the analyses builds on what Daly (2005) proposes as levels of 
mainstreaming: “it is helpful to register that there are at least five different levels of 
dimensions at which gender mainstreaming may take effect” (p. 442). This proposal came 
from a study where the author analysed the extent to which eight European countries have 
mainstreamed gender. The results provided elements for the theory and practice of the 
gender mainstreaming approach that shares important aspects with the climate change 
problem.  The five levels that will be further described in Chapter 2 are: 1) Level of discourse 
or rhetoric; 2) Levels of institutional or structural change; 3) Innovation in the tools used to 
make policy; 4) New data available and 5) Innovation in the way that policy is made. 
 
Although Daly suggests that public investments should be reflected in the fifth level of 
mainstreaming. I suggest that the allocation of public budget requires a deeper analysis, 
reason why I included it as a sixth level of analysis. It is important to mention that Daly (2005) 
does not present these levels as linear steps that go one after the other, but rather, they can 
happen in parallel.  The assessment of the six levels of mainstreaming is conducted based on 
a literature review and interviews. 
1.5.3. Interviews 
 
The interview method is widely used in qualitative research. According to George and Bennett 
(2005), interviews are one of the central tools of research that can be used to apply the 
process tracing method, which is a method where the researcher examines histories, archival 
documents, interview transcripts and other sources to identify the causal mechanisms. In this 
regard, this thesis applies interviews as another method to complete the case studies selected.  
 
Within the different types of interviews, this thesis uses elite interviews that, according to 
Hochschild (2009), are those conducted “with people who are chosen because of who they are 
or what position they occupy” (Online). George and Bennett (2005) point out that elite 
interviewing is useful in political science, where process tracing frequently involves the 
analysis of political developments at the highest level of government, and elite actors will 
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often be critical sources of information about the political processes of interest. An important 
element, noted by Tansey (2007), is that elite interviews are important sources of information 
that do not apply in isolation, but rather work to confirm information that has been already 
collected. 
 
In this case, the elite interviews help to verify information, but are also relevant “to gather 
new data about the beliefs or actions of specific individuals, but also to make inferences about 
the beliefs or actions of a wider group without interviewing everyone” (Tansey, 2007, p. 766).  
 
This thesis uses elite interviews because climate policy has been built by a growing number of 
stakeholders and to get everyone’s perspectives is highly complex. However, this thesis 
explores the perspectives of different representatives from sectors such as civil servants, civil 
society, private sector, academy and others.  
 
The interviews conducted were semi-structured interviews in order to allow the interviewees 
space to provide more information that they may consider relevant and to avoid rigid 
conversations. The number of interviews conducted for the analysis was 46: with 24 in Mexico, 
18 in Colombia and four from a regional perspective. The interviews were coded depending 
on the sector that they represented and the country that they are from: Federal 
Government=FM; Civil Society=CS; Private Sector=PS; Academia=A; Journalist=J; International 
Organization= IO, Mexico=M and Colombia=C. The interviews with regional perspective were 
coded as “R”. The list of the interviews can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
1.5.4. Originality and contributions of this thesis  
 
 
The present research makes at least five contributions that are important for the theory and 
practice of the public climate finance debate. The first contribution is related to the role of 
public budget in developing countries in the fight against climate change. In the literature 
more attention is now focused on developing countries tackling climate change but most of 
the analysis explores the role of policies and institutional arrangements (Nachmany, et al., 
2017; Burck et al., 2019). There is no academic work, however, that has studied the role of 
the public budget in developing countries as a key means of implementation to comply with 
national and international climate goals. Although there is a growing interest in the analysis 
of public budget in the climate change field, most of them analyse the status of public 
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allocation (UNDP, 2015; GFLAC, 2015). There is no work that explores under what conditions 
developing countries, and particularly Latin American countries, are willing to mainstream 
climate change in the public expenditure, which is an important element to mobilize climate 
finance to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. 
 
The second contribution is to the international cooperation field, including climate finance 
and development finance. This research analyses the role of developing countries not only as 
recipients of international cooperation but also as investors to tackle climate change and in 
the energy transition. One of the main findings is related to the mutual conditionality that 
exists between the reception of international cooperation and the allocation of public budget 
to deal with climate change. While international support in the form of ODA appeared 
necessary to explain the presence of a public budget, this national work is also important to 
further gain the trust of donors. This means that while international cooperation helps to build 
capacities at the national level, it also creates a pressure on countries to allocate public budget 
to deal with climate change as a way to comply with international commitments. It was 
observed that international cooperation has also certain limits, because is not always 
allocated where the money is needed but where donors have more interest; and seems to be 
insufficient to fulfil all the needs of developing countries. 
 
The third contribution is related to the public finance systems in LAC. The analysis showed 
that if countries remain reliant on fossil fuels to generate their revenues and keep using this 
money to fulfil their budgetary necessities, it would be hard to achieve an energy transition 
from fossil fuels to low carbon technologies. Fiscal reforms and measures to improve the 
health of the public finance systems are highly desirable to tackle climate change and other 
social and environmental issues. The analysis of public finance and climate change in LAC has 
been evolving but this research brings further inputs for the theory and practice on the field.   
 
The fourth contribution is to the Qualitative Comparative Analysis method. There have been 
studies that applied fsQCA to study climate policy in developed countries (Tobin, 2017), 
however, there was no identified academic work related to public budget and climate change 
in developing countries. This is the first work that uses fsQCA to analyse the presence or 
absence of public budget dedicated to climate change in the 21 major greenhouse gases 
emitters in LAC countries, to understand which conditions or combination of conditions better 
explain the outcome.  Although not all the results of the fsQCA model present relevant results, 
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the method obtained two important findings: the influence of ODA and the fossil fuel budget 
in the allocation of public budget dedicated to climate change. Furthermore, the method 
generated findings that contributed to the case study selection.  
 
The final contribution is related to the use of the mainstreaming approach in the climate 
change field. While there are many academic studies of mainstreaming in gender studies, 
there is still a void in the climate field. This research built upon the progress from gender 
studies and applied it in the climate field by looking at whether governments are starting to 
mainstream climate change into their broad approaches to government. Daly’s (2005) 
approach, identifying five levels of mainstreaming proved useful, but the addition of a sixth 
level - climate change mainstreaming in the public budget - significantly strengthened the 
analysis The approach allowed me to conclude that, while there may be progress in the 
discourse, design of policies, or institutional arrangements to deal with climate change, if 
climate change is not mainstreamed in the public budget, few changes will be implemented 
and success will be limited. 
  
1.6. Outline of this thesis  
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 analyses the relevance of the 
mainstreaming approach and its usefulness to study the complex nature of climate change, 
taking into account the work done in feminist studies regarding gender mainstreaming. At the 
same time, it aims to explain the multi-level nature of climate change and the role of 
developing countries in the international climate change regime. It also explains the important 
role of climate finance within the climate change debate, and the relevance of the public 
budget as a key means of implementation to act on and comply with national and 
international climate goals. Thus, this chapter explains the puzzle of the thesis as well as the 
research design, methods and its key contributions. 
 
Chapter 2 explains the importance of mainstreaming climate change in public finance, 
describing the nature of public finance and the relevance of its cycle where revenue, budget 
and expenditure play a major role in the decision-making process of a country. This chapter 
also explains the role of the state and presents the assessment of the levels of public budget 
dedicated to climate change in LAC countries. 
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Chapter 3 operationalizes the medium-N analysis applied to 21 countries in LAC to identify 
which conditions or combination of conditions better explain the outcomes identified.  The 
group of conditions selected and analysed are: 1) levels of climate risk; 2) official development 
assistance received; 3) levels of human development; 4) governance effectiveness, and 5) 
number of climate change policies. The chapter presents the results based on the fuzzy set 
software: among several interesting observations, crucially it shows that ODA and fossil fuel 
budget influence the presence and absence of climate budget in environmental ministries and 
renewable energy in energy ministries.  
 
The following four chapters examine the two case studies: Mexico and Colombia. Chapter 4 
assesses the levels of mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgetary process 
of Mexico, based on Daly´s (2005) methodology. Chapter 5 explores the levels of climate 
change mainstreaming in the planning and budgeting process of the energy sector of Mexico 
because the energy sector is a major emitter of GHGs. The argument in these chapters is that 
Mexico has been progressing towards the integration of climate change in the discourse, 
institutional arrangements and the way that policy is made, but the country has been unable 
to achieve the climate change-mainstreaming goal, not even in the environmental sector. 
Furthermore, other conditions such as the reliance of its revenue on fossil fuels, appear as 
major obstacles to mainstreaming climate change in budget and expenditure.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 explain the case of Colombia, where there is also an assessment of the levels 
of climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgeting process in Chapter 6, and the 
case of the energy sector in Chapter 7. In this case, my analysis shows that by adopting 
international commitments, Colombia has created national policy tools, which have in turn 
influenced the allocation of public investments related to climate change. The Colombian case 
shows active and clear efforts by the government to mainstream climate change at the 
institutional, policy and budgeting levels. According to civil servants, civil society, private 
sector and academic experts, these decisive actions are directly linked to the high levels of 
climate vulnerability that the country faces and that has generated financial loses.  
 
Chapter 8 discusses the results of the two methods (fsQCA and case studies) in order to 
identify the conditions that have promoted and hindered climate change mainstreaming in 
public expenditure. This Chapter shows that both methods share two conclusions, which are 
that international cooperation, such as ODA, is a major promoter of the mainstreaming of 
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climate change in the planning and budgetary processes in countries like Mexico and 
Colombia, but that their dependency on fossil fuel is a major hindrance for the success of such 
processes.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides the main conclusions of the research, as well as a short resume 
about the contributions achieved in the research as well as the research limitations and the 








CHAPTER 2. THEORISING CLIMATE CHANGE MAINSTREAMING IN THE 





Chapter 1 outlined the complexity of the climate regime and why the participation of both 
developed and developing countries is relevant to tackle climate change, including climate 
finance mobilization based on their respective capacities. This chapter further analyses 
theoretically mainstreaming climate change in the public budget of developing countries. In 
order to do so, the importance of the public finance cycle is analysed, as well as the evolution 
of this topic in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) countries.  
 
The chapter aims to highlight the important role that the public budget allocation has for the 
compliance of climate policies, and while is true that limited resources are available at the 
national level, there is a need to further diversify the sources of income to reduce the 
dependence of fossil fuel and to increase the possibility to transform the economies of 
countries in LAC, otherwise to achieve the national and international commitments on climate 
change will be highly difficult.  
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To discuss this, the chapter is broken into five sections. The first section provides further 
analyses about what mainstreaming climate change in the public budget means in theory and 
the advantages and disadvantages of the mainstreaming climate change approach. The 
second section analyses the elements that are part of public finance, such as revenue, budget 
and expenditure to contextualize the relevance of each of them in the planning process. The 
third section analyses the evolution of this topic in LAC, where the analysis of public climate 
finance is only in its initial stages. The fourth section presents the assessment of the public 
budget allocated to tackle climate change in the 21 major greenhouse gases emitters in the 
region, which is the base for the Qualitative Comparative Analysis described in Chapter 3.  
While the fifth and last section presents some conclusion about the chapter. 
 
2.1. What does mainstreaming climate change mean in theory? 
 
Mainstreaming is not a new concept. It has been popular since the 1990s as a means to 
efficiently tackle development issues such as gender inequality, environmental degradation, 
risk management and most recently, climate change (Oates, et al., 2011; UNDP, 2015a). Oates, 
et al., explain the concept as cross-cutting issues that should influence the ‘main-stream’ 
developmental activities, rather than being addressed as separate initiatives (Oates, et al., 
2011, p. 1). 
 
In the climate change field, the IPCC considers mainstreaming as a means to development 
policies, programmes and/or individual actions that otherwise would not have taken climate 
change mitigation into consideration explicitly, including decisions surrounding sustainable 
development (IPPC, 2015). 
An important debate in the context of the mainstreaming definition is that, according to Gupta 
and Grijp (2009), mainstreaming is different than policy integration. For the authors, 
integration is a checklist process while in the case of mainstreaming there is a process to re-
think policies based on climate change (in this case).  
2.1.1. Climate policy integration and climate change mainstreaming  
Underdal (1980) suggests that “to integrate means to unify, to put together into a whole” and 
that integrated policy, “means a policy where the constituent elements are brought together 
and made a subject to a single unifying conception” (p. 159). The author says that “to qualified 
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as integrated a policy must meet three basic requirements, viz comprehensiveness, 
aggregation and consistency” (p. 159). 
The integration of an environmental perspective in planning processes is something that has 
been evolving in theory and practice (Meijers, et al., 2004). The concept that was created to 
follow such processes is called the Environmental Policy Integration (EPI). According to Oosten 
et al., (2018) “the principle of EPI refers to the incorporation of environmental concerns into 
other policy areas to overcome policy conflicts” (p. 64).  
Persson (2014) describes the EPI analysis as a four-part process as follows: (1) a more 
integrated decision-making process; (2) improvement of underlying conditions such as 
effective implementation and enforcement; (3) specific environmentally integrated policy 
outputs such as policy instruments that improve both economic efficiency and environmental 
quality; (4) improvement of data and analytical input to the policy-making process such as 
integrated accounts (pp. 3-4). 
 
Since EPI aims to include only environmental aspects in the policy, it was not considered well-
equipped to tackle a complex subject such as climate change, which must incorporate social, 
cultural and economic aspects. For this reason, Mickwitz et al. (2009), proposed the creation 
of the Climate Policy Integration (CPI) approach, which is “the incorporation of the aims of 
climate change mitigation and adaptation into all stages of policy-making in other policy 
sectors (non-environmental as well as environmental)” (p. 19). 
 
In this same line of thought another concept was adopted in the climate change field, namely 
the mainstreaming approach. As was stated in Chapter 1, mainstreaming proposes to bring 
climate change (in this case) to the centre of the policy design, instead of “just” integrating it, 
with the aim of changing the way that policies are made (Gutpa & Grijp, 2010). While, Nkiaka 
and Lovett (2018) point out that “mainstreaming involves the articulation of information, 
policies and measures into on-going development planning and decision-making to address 
climate change; considering that it is easier to start with existing policies and practices, rather 
than creates new ones” (p. 50). 
 
There are important similarities regarding the aim of both CPI and climate change 
mainstreaming. For instance, CPI refers to the relevance of multi-level governance as a key 
element to ensure integration. Multi-level governance according to Bache and Flinders (2004) 
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“refers to the increasing interdependence of governments operating at different levels, while 
‘governance’ signalled the growing interdependence between governments and non-
governmental actors at various territorial levels” (Mickwitz et al, 2009, p. 25).  In the case of 
mainstreaming multi-level governance analysis is also key, since it occurs at various levels 
from local to regional to global and involves all actors (Gupta & Grijp, 2010; Wälti, 2010).  
 
CPI and climate change mainstreaming are similar, but Gupta and Grijp (2010) state that 
integration is not the same as mainstreaming, but that CPI seems to be the first step of the 
second. Achieve either or both is a complex task that brings challenges.  To analyse the 
difference between the two concepts is not the main goal of this research, but it is important 
to acknowledge the debate that exists between the two concepts, since some authors use 
them as synonyms.  
For instance, Ravindranth et al., (2010), point out that mainstreaming is the incorporation of 
climate change considerations into established or on-going policies, development 
programmes, policies or management strategies, rather than developing climate adaptation 
and mitigation initiatives separately. In the same line, Klein et al, (2007) mention that 
“mainstreaming involves the integration of policies and measures that address climate change 
into development planning and on-going sectorial decision-making, so as to ensure the long-
term sustainability of investments as well as to reduce the sensitivity of development activities 
to both today’s and tomorrow’s climate” (p. 9). 
This is a debate in progress, but there are few observations. The first is that climate change 
mainstreaming has been analysed mainly in the development agenda, and this one is mainly 
related to the adaptation side of the climate agenda (Nkiaka & Lovett, 2018), because it is 
considered highly difficult to separate climate adaptation from the development agenda. 
Furthermore, climate change mainstreaming and CPI are used interchangeably when they 
refer to a process, but not referring to a final goal (Gupta & Grijp, 2010). This means that in 
general, integration and mainstreaming involve different levels of action to be achieved. For 
that reason, in this thesis mainstreaming is considered equivalent to integration when I refer 
to a process but, but different when I refer to the goal, as suggested by Gupta and Grijp (2010). 
2.1.2. The process to achieve climate change mainstreaming  
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According to Gupta and Grijp (2010) the goal of climate change mainstreaming is not to 
include climate consideration into existing policies, but rather to create new policies under 
the climate change lens to deal with the problem in a structural way.   
 
In this sense, Gupta and Grijp (2014) propose five stages that have to be in place in order to 
achieve mainstreaming: 1) The search of ad-hoc pilot projects and approaches that aim to 
reduce emissions or enhance adaptation; 2) a more systematic search for win-win solutions 
that simultaneously deal with climate change and development goals; 3) all policies, 
programmes and projects are subjected to climate proofing to ensure they are resilient with 
respect to the impacts of climate change; 4) all policies, programs and projects are subjected 
to GHG-emission screening to ensure that these emissions are taken into account in project 
design (mitigation integration); and 5) a climate made upstream across the policy cycle (p. 77). 
 
Nkiaka and Lovette, (2018) suggest that in the case of mainstreaming climate adaptation, 
there are policies that can facilitate directly or indirectly the process, to understand, i) how 
the government organizational structure has been re-configured to accommodate climate 
change and environmental protection; ii) how information related to climate change is 
disseminated to the general public; iii) how new academic departments have been created to 
accommodate climate change, and iv) how climate change adaptation is funded and the 
various constrains involved (p. 51).  
 
The processes to assess climate change mainstreaming proposed by Gupta and Grijp (2010) 
seem rational but it assumes that countries have detailed information to do the assessment, 
which is not the case of Latin American countries. In the case of the approach taken by Nkiaka 
and Lovette (2018), was useful, but additional levels of analysis were needed. Consequently, 
the thesis seeks to adapt approaches that have been applied in other areas such as gender. 
 
Daly’s approach to gender mainstreaming provides a useful approach to understanding the 
climate change mainstreaming process to cover a broader spectrum of the planning cycle. 
Daly (2005) suggest that “the distinctiveness of the gender mainstreaming approach is that it 
seeks to institutionalize equality by embedding gender-sensitive practices and norms in the 
structures, processes and environment of public policy” (p. 438).  
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For this work, the proposal of Daly is relevant because it analyses the role of the state, 
although recognises that further non-governmental stakeholders also have to be part of the 
mainstreaming process. According to Daly (2005), “it is helpful to register that there are at 
least five different levels of dimensions at which gender mainstreaming may take effect” (pp. 
442-442). As described in Chapter 1, these steps were adapted to the context of climate 
change, proposing five levels of analysis to reach mainstreaming climate change, that are also 
alike to the EPI analysis proposed by Persson (2004). Although Daly does not provide a 
detailed description of the levels, I further described them in the context of climate change: 
1) At the level of discourse or rhetoric: this refers to the analysis of language data, 
including talk, documents and broadcast material (Taylor, 2012), and explains the 
extent to which climate change has been mainstreamed in the discourse of high-
level representatives in the government to show a change in the normal trend; 
2) At the level of institutional or structural change: this explains the extent to which 
there are institutions created to deal with the specific problem, creating structural 
changes to deal with the problem (for instance, the creation of dedicated “climate 
change” units); 
3) Innovation in the tools used to make policy: this explains the extent to which climate 
focused policy analysis, evaluation, and monitoring mechanisms to tackle more 
effectively the problem, are in place; 
4) New data available: as a result of the last two types of change, this explains the 
extent to which new data has been made available (sometimes this means old data 
with new disaggregation), and new research has been undertaken; 
5) Innovation in the way that policy is made: this explains the extent to which “the 
range of official actors in the policy process has broadened, especially through the 
inclusion of those in line ministries or departments or agencies heretofore not 
associated with [climate change]. Furthermore, there has been a visible increase in 
social dialogue through the institutionalization of consultation practices, and an 
increase in government investment with a view to equipping [climate change´s] 
representatives with the necessary skills to participate in policy-making” (Daly, 2005, 
p. 444). 
 
Once the analysis of the levels of mainstreaming is conducted, Daly (2005) suggests that there 
are three possible ways to classify the progress of the countries, which I adapted to climate 
change to assess the progress of Mexico and Colombia. These are: 
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1) Integrated approach is where responsibility for [climate change] is extended to 
most if not all, actors involve in public policy and is embedded across institutions in 
society; 2) mainstreaming in the form of limited transversality, or mainstreaming 
light, is where transversality indicates little more than the involvement of different 
government departments or ministries in the implementation of a plan or program 
around [climate change]. What [climate change] mainstreaming means in these 
contexts is a spreading out of responsibility for [climate change] objectives to more 
line ministries. However, mainstreaming is at an early stage of development and 
typically does not span the entire policy spectrum or hierarchy. 3) [Climate change] 
mainstreaming is a highly fragmented endeavour, confined either to a small 
number of policy domains or to a specific program within a domain and disconnected 
from general governmental policy on climate change (p. 439).  
 
Daly (2005) does not present these levels as linear steps, but rather as indicators that assess 
if mainstreaming is taking place to then assess if mainstreaming is actually as effective to 
achieve the transformational change. In this point, the author considers that the extent to 
which gender mainstreaming is transformative is a critical issue, which is still unsolved, which 
also applies to the climate change agenda. The author affirms that while gender 
mainstreaming has been better developed as policy approach than concept, there are still 
some critiques, such as the fact that mainstreamed is practiced within and across national 
settings, which makes the implementation excessively focus on policy makers, which could 
read as a tendency towards the technocratization of gender mainstreaming. 
 
It is important to note that Daly (2005) pointed out the necessity to conclude this process with 
the inclusion of climate change (in this case) in the public investments as an expression of 
commitment with the agenda. Although the author barely mentions this as part of the fifth 
level, she recognizes its importance, which is why I added it as a sixth level: “allocation of 
public budget and expenditure”. Public budgets cannot be seen as an isolated element of other 
public policy instruments but rather as the response to them. In this sense, public policy 
should then be translated into public budget and expenditure allocation (Gutierrez, 2013).  
 
Mainstreaming climate change in public budget and expenditure requires the allocation of 
financial resources to actions dedicated or related to climate change in a predominant way. 
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There are clear challenges to achieve that, such as the fact that there are limited public 
resources, and the unclear definition about what represents climate finance, among others. 
However, in the next section, I discuss why mainstreaming climate change in the public 
expenditure represents an important opportunity to tackle its effects. 
 
2.2. The importance of mainstreaming climate change in the public budgets  
 
The evolution of international agreements as well as national policies related to climate 
change have acknowledged that, in order to fulfil mitigation and adaptation goals, it is 
necessary to have means of implementation such as technology transfer, capacity building 
and, primarily, financial resources. The UNFCCC recognizes that developed countries have to 
provide financial support to developing countries in order to support mitigation and 
adaptation actions (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 4).  
 
However, the Paris Agreement also states the necessity “to make the financial flows 
compatible to the low greenhouse gases and resilient development” (UNFCCC, 2015). The goal 
does not specify the type of financial flow, who must do it or to what end, but rather leaves 
the goal open for interpretation, but although recognizes that developed countries must lead 
the mobilization of financial flows and invites “other parties” to contribute in the provision of 
information about the climate financial flows provided and mobilize (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 
9.5). Although not clear reference to who are “other parties” is included, is assumed that 
refers to developing countries in capacity to do so. 
 
In this sense, developing countries public investments are therefore also important 
instruments that are needed to deal with climate change. In the Index of Climate Policy 
Activity, Schaffrin et al (2015), point out that it is important to distinguish between the 
standard set of policy instruments most widely applied in climate policy research: regulatory 
measures (‘authority’, ‘stick’), soft instruments (‘nodality’, ‘sermon’), market-based 
approaches (‘treasure’, ‘carrot’), framework policies (’organization’, ‘adhesives’), and public 
investments (‘treasure’, ‘carrot’) (p. 4). According to Tanzi (2008) the use of public finance 
tools is important for the state to comply with its commitments. One of the key tools that the 
state has to deal with domestic matters is public finance, which is part of the public policy 
cycle, where the decision makers determine priorities. 
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 Before analysing in detail the importance of public finance and its cycle in the context of 
climate change, it is important to acknowledge that the mainstreaming approach applied in 
this research has some limitations.  
 
2.2.1. Discussing criticisms about the mainstreaming approach  
 
There are a number of limitations regarding the use of the mainstreaming approach. Some 
authors consider that mainstreaming tends to technocratize agendas, because it focuses on 
the action of the state in the first place. It is not that the concept does not recognize the role 
of non-governmental action, but it refers to the importance of the action of the state as a key 
step for operationalization of mainstreaming gender and climate change (Daly, 2005; Jordan 
& Lenschow, 2008; Adelle & Russel, 2013; Milward, et al., 2015). 
 
In this research I consider that is important to diversify stakeholders but I also highlight what 
Eckersley points out about the role of the state, which is fundamental because its institutions 
are the ones that are creating environmental problems (Eckersley, 2004, p. 258), therefore 
they are the first ones that need to adapt to rethink the way that they operate, as part of the 
solution of central problems. 
 
Another limitation refers to the diffuse attribution of responsibilities in the mainstreaming 
process. Since the idea is to include climate change in the planning process at different levels 
and within different actors, there is a concern regarding the lack of control over the action of 
each entity. Put in another way, if each entity must deal with the problem, who is in charge of 
tracking compliance? However there is also a concern about the centralization of the agendas, 
since under the mainstreaming approach specific areas have been created to deal with 
problems, but sometimes are “weak and underfunded” which is the case of gender, and also 
the case of climate change (Milward, et al., 2015). In this context, to what extent this 
centralization and further specialization create a barrier to other sectors to participate in the 
actions remains a problem. 
 
Another important critique in the context of gender mainstreaming that the agenda of climate 
change needs to consider, is that the approach became so institutionalized that in the aim to 
achieve the mainstreaming as a goal, it lost the real purpose, which was the reduction of 
inequalities between men and women (Milward, et al., 2015). Furthermore Milward et al. 
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(2015) point out that the problem has been also to be able to assess the effects that 
mainstreaming internally has at the external level, which is part of the critique of the 
technocratic dimension of the approach, that cannot be disconnected of the effects that the 
measures taken by the state have in the rest of the society.  
 
Referring to the CPI, Mickwitz et al., (2009) point out that it “is not a panacea” but an approach 
that could help analyse the problem in a cross-disciplinary and more integral way. In that 
sense, both integration and mainstreaming as processes require some effort to be achieved, 
however mainstreaming as a goal is difficult to assess since there is not enough empirical 
evidence that demonstrates that one state can put climate change at the centre of its planning 
process and therefore is not possible to assess its effectiveness. Furthermore, Daly (2005), 
also recognize that the extent to which mainstreaming is producing transformational changes 
is still unsolved.  
 
These limitations help to understand that there are still important areas to improve in order 
to make this approach as effective as possible to tackle climate change, which is the ultimate 
goal, although is still useful to study the progress of countries in regards of institutional, and 
policy changes related to climate change.  
 
2.3. Public finance cycle: revenue, budget and public expenditure. 
 
Public finance refers to “the income and expenditure of public authorities, and the adjustment 
of the one to the other” (Dalton, 2015, p. 3). Dalton (2015) points out that the public finance 
scheme aims to procure public goods, arrange and fund various transfers, and direct entities 
existing in the economy towards socially desirable behaviour, for instance, through taxes, 
penalties, subsidies and other stimulus and changes. This scheme can be understood as a cycle 
where the fiscal system is established to collect an amount of public revenue, which it then 
organizes as the public budget to fund public expenditures at different levels of the state. 
 
It is a complex system because its functioning depends on many internal and external factors.  
In the public sector, public funds will never be enough to fulfil all the needs of the population 
and thus it is necessary to prioritize the areas to be funded (Interviews 1FGM, 5FGM). This 
perception is particularly common in countries where revenue collection is not high enough 
or sufficiently allocated among all the relevant areas of development. To understand this 
 46 
complex interaction, I describe some of the key factors that are part of the public finance cycle 




Public revenue includes any revenue flowing to the public budget. The greatest revenue is 
generated through taxes. There is revenue that does not come from taxes, called non-tax 
public revenue (interest revenue, charges, and revenue from selling and renting out state or 
municipal property). According to Bandy (2015), “tax is a payment to public budgets that is 
obligatory, determined by law, non-refundable, non-equivalent and usually of no special 
purpose” (p. 41). Once the income from taxes comes to the general budget, it can be allocated 
in any area of interest of the state. 
 
In a healthy economy taxes should follow two main principles: a) the principle of justice and 
b) the principle of effectiveness. In general, “taxes are considered fair when they correspond 
with the populous’ idea of the division of the tax burden among individual tax subjects” (Bandy, 
2015, p. 42). However, the redistribution of taxes is a major challenge because most of the 
time there is a trade-off between fairness and efficiency or having “something for something 
else” (Bandy, 2015, p. 54). 
 
Taxes are politically complex issues in many countries, however, as Fuentes (2017) points out, 
it is possible that a country avoids increasing taxes as first step because is political unattractive, 
but that does not rule out rising taxes eventually or reduce expenses. Even though the state 
“is the largest player in modern societies, and often tries to control via regulation the economic 
resources that it does not take in taxes” (Smith, 2006, p. 12), in practice the revenue whether 
it comes from taxes or borrowing will determine the rest of the factors of the public finance: 




Once revenues are determined, budgets are then developed and set in motion. “The budget 
is an economic plan that focuses the entity´s financial and human resources on the 
accomplishments of specific goals and objectives established by the policy makers” (Bandy, 
2015, p. 42). Bandy (2015) points out that, there are three things to consider in the state 
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budget: the level of income and borrowing, which determines the capacity of the public 
manager´s organization, the planned expenditure and investment, which represent the 
resources converted into goods and services that are valued by the public, and the approval 
by the organization´s highest level of governance. 
 
Bandy (2015) also points out that in the context of the public sector, budget is inevitably 
political, and is a process that implies a certain level of competence among institutions and 
where issues such as fairness or social justice are prioritized. Although the budget is an 
important tool in state planning, “the outcome of the budget depends heavily on whether 
there are clear rules for formulating, executing, and reporting on the annual budget, as well 
as clear statements of medium-term fiscal policy objectives” (Lienert & Fainbom, 2007, p. 2).  
 
According to the Overseas Development Institute, an important factor related to the outcome 
of the budget is that it creates winners and losers (ODI, 2004). Winners are often those who 
have the capacity to advocate; those that do not have this capacity are likely to be losers in 
the budgeting process.  
 
Although this is not a subject of this thesis, it is important to know that not all budgets are 
developed in the same way or under the same premises. Most state budgets are developed 
with a political mid-term vision and indicators to track the levels of effectiveness in the 
allocation of public money. This is what Robinson and Last (2009) called performance-based 
budgeting.  
 
According to Bandy (2015), nearly all OECD countries have developed performance data and 
tools to improve accountability; while there is a growing number of tools to assess these 
processes such as the Public Finance Management Performance Measurement Framework of 
the World Bank (2016), created because according to the Bank, the budget is an indicator of 
the financial health of a state. 
 
A critical element of the budgeting process is that any budget decision will have long-term 
consequences. Of course, there is a level of uncertainty regarding what could happen in the 
future such as how much income will be raised, the cost of goods and services and price 
inflation, among other things.  However, the idea of future planning is precisely to re-think 
today’s decisions for future impact, which is more difficult for low-income countries that are 
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highly sensitive to swings in commodity prices, donor aid and others matters, making 
particularly difficult to implement medium term budgets (Bandy, 2015). Nevertheless, how 




Public expenditure is the flow of financial means within the public budget system. According 
to Guru (2016) “public expenditure can be used to improve income distribution, to direct the 
allocation of resources in the desired lines and to influence the composition of national 
product”. Bandy (2015) suggests there are two main types of public expenditure: government 
expenditure and transfer. Government expenditure is divided into government consumption 
and investment expenditure. Transfers on the other hand are flows of public funds from the 
state to various economic entities, which are also called “negative taxes”. 
 
As Dalton (1922) points out, government expenditure is not necessarily the same amount of 
the national income, because the income serves to do payments of interest on internal public 
debt and payment of pensions, and others. After all these payments, the government can say 
what is “available” to spend. Public expenditure that exceeds public income can give rise to 
public debt (Bandy, 2015). 
 
There are different perspectives related to the role of public expenditure in the economy of a 
country that are not the subject of analysis in this thesis. However, it is important to be aware 
of these debates. For instance, Wagner´s Law (Alfred Wagner 1835-1917) suggests that public 
expenditure has a direct impact on economic growth and that economic growth has an 
influence on the public expenditure (Akrani, 2011a). Meanwhile the Keynesian hypothesis 
implies that an exogenous factor is government spending, which can influence political factors 
to encourage economic growth, but does not necessarily have a direct impact (Chappelow, 
2019). In an empirical study, Pinilla et al, (2013) concluded that the increment of the public 
expenditure of the central government in a specific period had a positive although limited 
impact on the economic growth in Latin American countries. 
 
What is relevant in this discussion for this thesis is that there are several factors that influence 
public expenditure and therefore economic growth. These factors could be social and 
demographic factors, threshold events, and technological changes, to mention a few.  
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To sum up this section, I posit that public finance is a complex and imperfect system that 
nonetheless has an important role in the planning process of a country, where the state has a 
major role to play. The role of the state is not static, but rather it is changing to adapt to both 
local and global contexts, shifting away from an interventionist state, by limiting its 
participation to that of a regulator of activities (SHCP, 2015). 
 
Keynes proposed with the economic crisis of 1929 that the state should control the crisis with 
economic functions. In that sense, since the 1930s in western economies, the role of the state 
has broadened to include economic functions, known as the fiscal function or public finance 
function, that include the capacity of allocation, redistribution, and stabilization (SHCP, 2015).  
 
The intervention of the state is relevant because its actions are related to the provision of 
public goods, which includes social and environmental protection (Fuentes, 2014). According 
to Sachs, the market itself is not necessarily influenced by social or environmental conditions 
(Sachs, 2012); for instance, Stern (2006) pointed out that climate change is the major market 
failure.   
 
My argument is by strengthening the public finance cycle developing countries can redefine 
priorities to mainstream climate change, because this problem will produce economic and 
social costs that the public finance system will have to deal with, sooner or later.  The next 
section will discuss how public finance related to climate change is evolving in Latin America 
and the Caribbean countries.  
 
 2.4. Public finance in Latin America and the Caribbean countries 
 
The public finance system could operate differently in developing economies, particularly the 
public budget and expenditure, depending on governmental priorities. Fan and Rao (2003) 
found that over the past decades, government expenditure in developing countries shows 
erratic patterns.  Based on their study of 43 developing countries, they found that Latin 
American countries, for instance, had the slowest growth in spending between 1980 and 1998. 
There was virtually no growth in the 1980s, and rapid growth in the 1990s was primarily due 
to recovery from the decline in the 1980s (Fan & Rao, 2003).  
 
According to Tanzi (2008), the Latin American countries were not able to increase their public 
 50 
spending to the European level because of their inability to raise taxes. Due to this, and the 
additional pressure to play a larger role in the economy, the author notes that Latin American 
countries made growing use of tools other than public spending to achieve a similar goal, such 
as promoting the nationalization and privatization of enterprises, executing expropriations, 
and other regulatory measures.  
 
In recent years the economic growth in Latin America and the Caribbean varies among 
countries. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, 
Comisión Económica para Latinoamérica y el Caribe) in 2018 the economic growth in the 
region was estimated at 1.2%, which implies a slight deceleration compared to 1.3% growth 
reached in 2017. The growth was different per region; in South America there was a decrease 
from 0.8% in 2017 to 0.6% in 2018. In Central America, Cuba and Haiti, it decreased from 3.4% 
to 3.2%. In the case of Mexico, it grew at a slightly higher rate, from 2.1% in 2017 to 2.2% in 
2018. Finally, “in the Caribbean the recovery of the impact of the natural disasters of 2017 
contributed to an acceleration of growth” from 0.2% in 2017 to 1.9% in 2018 (CEPAL, 2018a, 
p. 11). 
 
On the other hand, CEPAL (2017) has pointed out that the levels of poverty are also increasing, 
in 2016, the number of people living in poverty in Latin America was 186 million, or 30.7% of 
the population, while extreme poverty affected 61 million people (10% of the population) (p. 
88). Situation that has also influenced the growth in the informal employments that do not 
pay taxes, and therefore less generation of revenues have been available to generate enough 
budgets to invest in social programs to reduce poverty. This is a complex vicious cycle that 
could explain the limited economic growth and the growing levels of poverty. 
 
Furthermore, the behaviour of the public finance cycle in Latin America is shaped by the 
existence of natural resources and the type of activities that contribute to their economies, 
as explained in the next section, specifically the role of fossil fuels in the economy of these 
countries.  
  
2.4.1. The influence of fossil fuels on the income of Latin-American countries.  
 
An important factor in the economy of the region is the changes in the prices of materials. For 
instance, in 2018 there was an increase in the price of oil (28%), as well as minerals and other 
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agricultural products that increased by 5% and 3% respectively (CEPAL, 2018a, p. 9), which 
positively impacted some economies. Latin America is highly dependent on fossil fuels. Hence, 
to understand the dynamics of public finance in Latin America and the Caribbean it is 
necessary to understand the role played by fossil fuels in these economies, which is a subject 
that is receiving growing attention (Fontaine, 2003; Monge, 2013; Fuentes, 2014). 
 
The country with the largest amount of oil reserves in the region is Venezuela with 80,000 
million barrels (MMB) followed by Mexico with 12,000 MMB, Brazil with 11,800 MMB, 
Ecuador with 4,600 MMB, and Argentina with 1,900 MMB, which have been declining for 
several years (Campodonico, 2008). According to CEPAL this can be translated into fiscal 
revenues. For instance, in 2006 the oil revenue in comparison with fiscal revenue was: USD 
4,166 million versus USD 51,160 million in Argentina; USD 13,627 million versus USD 280,800 
million in Brazil; USD 58,127 million versus USD 158,940 million in Mexico; USD 4,439 million 
versus USD 6,952 millions in Ecuador; USD 30,147 million versus USD 45,833 million in 
Venezuela, as shown in Figure 2.1, (Campodonico, 2008). 
 
Figure 2. 1 Oil and Fiscal Revenues in selected countries (in millions of USD) 
 
Source: Campodónico, 2008. 
 
The dependence on fossil fuel has been creating a vicious cycle, where countries tend to invest 
more in fossil fuel infrastructure to increase production. However, the historic trends show 
that production in many countries has been declining because their reserves are also 
decreasing. Nevertheless, Honty (2017) studied that, even though falls in oil reserves are clear 
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in Latin America, governments are investing more in fossil fuels than in renewable energy as 
shown in the Figure 2.2 produced with information from the World Energy Outlook (2014).  
 
Figure 2. 2 Energy consumption by source in Latin America (1990-2035) 
 
Source: World Energy Outlook 2014. 
 
According to Honty (2017), while conventional oil reserves are decreasing a new trend is on 
the rise: unconventional methods to extract fossil fuels such as fracking, a drilling technique 
used for extracting oil or natural gas from deep underground (EB, 2020; AMCF, n.d.). There 
are several criticisms against this method, including of the amount of water and chemical 
products that are used in the process that are harmful for health, and the potential risk of 
earthquakes associated with it (De la Fuente, & Olivera, 2017).  The environmental discussion 
about the effects of fracking is growing in Latin America, because even though there are a 
number of risks identified so far, countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, 
Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay are investing in or exploring the possibilities to extract 
further oil and gas with this technique (Bessi & Navarro, 2015). 
 
In further chapters I will explore the cases of Mexico and Colombia regarding their activities 
related to fracking and other practices that are increasing the production of oil and natural 
gas in the region.   
 
2.4.2. Public budget and climate change in Latin American countries  
 
 53 
Most Latin American countries have submitted their nationally determined contributions to 
deal with climate change, many of them pointing out that they will be fulfilling the goals with 
their own means of implementation or, what they call, unconditional measures.  This means 
that they will be able to fulfil commitments with their own financial resources. In this section 
I explore to what extent some countries have been integrating climate change in their public 
budget according to available literature.  
 
At the global level, there have been efforts to track the amount of money flowing from 
developed to developing countries, such as the work done by the Standing Committee on 
Finance (SCF) mentioned in Chapter 1. Although the analysis conducted by the SCF aims to 
incorporate information from public finance, it refers primarily to the developed countries 
public finance. In their biennial report of climate finance in 2016 and 2018 the SCF tried to 
incorporate information from public expenditure that came from developing countries, but a 
limited number of countries are reporting this information. What is not clear is to what extent 
the information is available, but probably not publicly available, or to what extent the 
information does not exist at all in developing countries.  
 
In Latin America there are two major efforts to analyse public budget related to climate 
change. On one hand, UNDP conducts analysis about public expenditure and climate change 
through their Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (CPEIR) methodology that 
has been mainly applied in Asia and Pacific countries but lately also in Latin American 
countries such as Colombia and Ecuador (UNDP, 2015).  
 
Another regional initiative is led by the Climate Finance Group for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (GFLAC, Grupo de Financiamiento Climático para Latinoamérica y el Caribe for its 
name in Spanish), that has been analysing climate finance with a hybrid focus, monitoring 
climate finance flows that arrived to Latin American and the Caribbean countries from 
international sources (top down approach), and also monitoring the allocation of public 
budget at the national level (bottom up approach) (GFLAC, 2015). Based on this, the 
organization analysed the cases of Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru in 2014, followed by 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala in 2015.  
 
The aim of this analysis was to understand to what extent climate change programs or projects 
were included in the federal public budget, in order to understand the relevance of the topic 
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in the context of the whole public budget (Guzman et al., 2017).  This analysis showed that 
the amount of public budget dedicated to climate change in relation to the total national 
budget is rather scarce, and some countries like Chile represented only the 0.04% in 2014, 
while in other represented higher amounts, such as 2.45% Guatemala in the same year, but 
never more than 2.5% of the total budget (Guzman et al., 2017). There are some challenges 
in the conduction of these analyses, such as transparency challenges, which is a major barrier. 
 
Mickwitz et al (2009), pointed out that the analysis of the evolution of public expenditure in 
developing countries is needed. Such exercises as shown above are examples of this in the 
context of Latin America, although more practical and theoretical work is still needed.  
2.5. Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Latin-American 
countries  
To build on the previous analysis, I studied to what extent the 21 major emitters of GHG in 
Latin America have mainstreamed climate change in their public budgets. This analysis sets 
the stage to conduct the Medium N analysis based on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
that is included in Chapter 3.  
Since there is not a universal definition of climate finance, I looked at the budget based on the 
“current expenses”23 of these Latin American and Caribbean countries to define two main 
outcomes: 1) the allocation of budget explicitly labelled as climate change within 
environmental ministries or within the environmental sector (depending on the information 
provided by countries), which includes climate policies or institutional arrangements such as 
climate offices, or any program labelled as climate change; and 2) the allocation of budget 
labelled as renewable energy in the energy sector, which includes policies, institutional 
arrangements or programs labelled as renewable energy. As I explained in Chapter 1, 
renewable energy is an alternative to fossil fuels for power generation and other activities in 
the energy sector. This analysis presents only current flows and refers to constant prices4. 
 
2  Type of expenses: Based on its economic classification, the programmable expense is divided into current 
expense and capital expense. The first one is dedicated to the operation of the public sector, without increasing 
the net worth; and the second refers to expenditures that increase the net worth of the public sector. 
3 The analysis is based on programmable budget. The numbers presented aim to show tendencies in the budget 
allocation, not round numbers. The conversion to USD was done in an online converser 
https://www.xe.com/es/currencyconverter/, which might change the real number of the local currency. 
4 It refers to those that serve as a reference at a certain time to establish a comparison with subsequent prices 
(Galan, nd). 
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The amount of resources labelled as climate change in the public budgets of Latin American 
and the Caribbean countries is limited. The analysis presented in Table 2.1., includes the 
results for the two main outcomes, presenting whether countries label activities in the public 
budget of their environmental ministries as climate change; and whether they label 
renewable energy activities in their energy ministries as renewable energy for both 2010 and 
2016.  
 
Since transparency of the public budget plays a major role in the analysis conducted, Table 
2.1 also indicates whether the budgetary information collected in the table was publicly 
available and the score that the countries obtained in the Open Public Budget Index5 in 2017. 
 
Table 2. 1 Presence of climate change and renewable energy budgets in LAC countries (in 
2010 and 2016) 




















































Argentina No No No No Yes  50 
Bolivia Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  10 
Brazil No Yes No No Yes  77 
Chile No No Yes Yes Yes  57 
Colombia Yes Yes No Yes Yes  50 
Costa Rica Yes Yes No No Yes  56 
Cuba NA NA NA  NA NA  NA 
Dominican 
Republic  
No No No No Yes  66 
Ecuador NA NA NA NA NA  49 
El Salvador No Yes Yes No Yes  45 
 
5  The Open Budget Survey assesses budget transparency based on the amount and timeliness of budget 




Guatemala Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  61 
Honduras  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  54 
Jamaica  No Yes No Yes Yes  NA 
México  Yes Yes No Yes Yes  79 
Nicaragua No Yes Yes Yes Yes  43 
Panama No No No No Yes  NA 
Paraguay No No No No Yes  43 
Peru No Yes Yes Yes Yes  73 
Trinidad y 
Tobago 
No No No No Yes  NA 
Uruguay No Yes No No Yes  NA 
Venezuela NA No NA No Yes  0 
No = Absence of explicit climate change budget/ or renewable energy budget 
Yes = Presence of explicit climate change budget/ or renewable energy budget 
NA = information on the public budget was not available 
Sources: Own elaboration with information from the public expenditure of the 21 
countries and the information of the Open Budget Index of the International Budget 
Partnership in 2017. 
               
 
This analysis provided three important observations that helped to introduce the next Chapter. 
The first observation is that the allocation of budget to deal with climate change and 
renewable energy in countries is growing in recent years. For example, in 2010, only 6 out of 
the 21 countries had allocated resources to tackle climate change but, in 2016, 12 countries 
did so. The country that allocated the most in relation to its environmental ministry budget 
was Bolivia in 2010 (2.99%), while Nicaragua was the highest in 2016 (26.4%). Meanwhile, the 
lowest in 2010 was Guatemala (0.0031%) and Uruguay (0.06%) in 2016. The information about 
public budgets for climate change can be found in Appendix 1 and information about 
renewable energy budget can be found in Appendix 26. 
 
In the case of renewable energy, 6 out of the 21 countries allocated resources for renewable 
energy in 2010, while in 2016, the number of countries increased to 9. In 2010, Nicaragua 
allocated the highest proportion of its budget for renewable energy with 85.6%, Bolivia was 
 
6 The sources where the budget information from the 21 countries was obtained are included in Appendix 3. 
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the second with 68.99%, and the lowest investor was El Salvador with a mere 0.1%. In 2016, 
the major investor was still Nicaragua with 83.92%, while the lowest was Colombia with 0.05%.  
 
Regarding the budget of the environmental ministries, in charge of climate policies in most 
countries, are limited. For instance, in Costa Rica the budget of the ministry represented 
around 5.7% of the total public budget of the central government in 2010. This amount is high 
in comparison with other countries and can be explained by the fact that the environmental 
ministry is the same as the energy ministry. However, this dropped to 0.70% in 2016. In the 
rest of the countries, the budget for environmental ministries does not represent more than 
2% of the total central government current budget in 2016. In 2016 the highest allocation for 
environmental ministries was Uruguay (1.9%) and the lowest was Colombia (0.03%).  
 
Although the number of countries allocating public resources to climate change in 2016 
compared to 2010 doubled, increasing the allocation of public budget from average of 0.89% 
(including only the countries that allocated resources) to 5.8% of the total of the 
environmental ministries’ budgets. This proportion is minor, when we realize that the budget 
of the environmental ministries went from average 1.0% of the total of the central 
government’s budget (including only the countries that allocated resources) in 2010, to 0.46% 
in 2016.  
 
This means that the environmental agenda and therefore the climate change one, are not yet 
relevant in public budgets in the country analysed. This is one of the key reasons why 
mainstreaming climate change should be an exercise that goes beyond the environmental 
sector. 
 
Another key analysis was to compare the amount of public budget dedicated to renewable 
energy versus that dedicated to fossil fuel. The analysis showed that in 2010, 11 of the 21 
countries invested in fossil fuels, but in 2016 increased to 13. In 2010, the highest proportion 
allocated to fossil fuels was found in Chile with 19.74%, with Argentina on the bottom with 
0.32%. In 2016, the highest investor was again Chile with 49.03%, and the lowest was Peru 
with 0.54%. Meanwhile some countries such as Jamaica, Honduras, Paraguay, Panama, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay do not have explicit investment for the extraction and 
production of fossil fuels.  
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This analysis does not include investment from the national oil companies, which could 
significantly change the results, but this analysis will be included for the case studies selected. 
As previously explained, the lack of labels related to climate change or renewable energy does 
not necessary means that countries are not doing anything in these areas, but explicit 
activities show a level of additionality to business-as-usual scenarios.  
 
The third observation is related to the difficulty to analyse the public budget in these countries. 
The aim of this research was to study the expenditure of the countries since it represents how 
much was actually spent in specific areas. However, because of the lack of information in all 
the countries, it was decided to analyse the budget allocation, which was easier to find 
publicly on the website of the finance ministries.  
 
The problem is that not all countries present the information in the same way, which can also 
influence de results of the analysis. Some countries have better, accessible systems to present 
the information of budget and expenditure, such as the case of Peru. Meanwhile, other 
countries present the information in a highly aggregated way, which makes it challenging to 
analyse. However, others don’t have information publicly available such as Ecuador, Cuba and 
Venezuela; in this last case there is information missing for some years. For instance, 
Venezuela, which has large oil reserves, do not have information publicly available to study 
their fossil fuel investment. The lack of transparency in the case of Venezuela is corroborated 
with the score given in the IBP index. 
 
Finally, regarding the levels of transparency, shows that based on the IBP index, the country 
with the highest score is Mexico (79) and the lowest score is for Venezuela (0). However, 
according to the Index, it was not possible to access information for Cuba and Ecuador, which 
was also a problem for the present research.  
 
Studying public finance cycles is highly complex but necessary to understand policy cycles as 
well. In this sense, it was necessary to analyse what conditions could explain why some 
countries are progressing in investing public money on climate change and renewable energy 
and others not. Therefore, I applied a Qualitative Comparative Analysis to analyse five 





The application of the mainstreaming approach to climate change is a recent endeavour. The 
aim is to be able to bring the problem to the centre of the planning process to tackle it in a 
more comprehensive way, since its causes and impacts are cross-cutting. In this research the 
mainstreaming approach is applied to study one important part of the planning process, which 
is the allocation of budget, which according to several authors in the public finance field, is 
the representation of priorities of the state.  
 
While the use of mainstreaming in the field of climate change is still a work in progress, it can 
make contributions such as the one mentioned above, but it also attracts criticism. Some 
authors suggest that mainstreaming tends to focus on the work of states, which lead to the 
technocratization of agendas, although in theory it recognizes the role of other stakeholders. 
In the same way, some critiques focus on the diffusion of allocation of responsibilities and the 
unknown capacity of producing transformational changes.   
 
In this context, the chapter further explores the importance of mainstreaming climate change 
in the public budget, acknowledging the importance of the whole public finance cycle, which 
is an important area of study to understand the behaviour of a state to respond to the 
priorities of the government to face social, economic and environmental needs.  
 
Although in climate finance, the discussion about public finance was primarily focused on the 
role of developed countries as providers of finance support, recently there has been attention 
to the role of public finance the developing countries, as well.  In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the public finance cycle faces different challenges such as the dependence on fossil 
fuels to generate income, the limited capacity of states to raise taxes, as well as the lack of 
balance allocation of sources in different agendas.  
 
In the region there is progress related to the allocation of public budget labelled as climate 
change in environmental ministries, as well as public investments related to renewable energy 
in energy ministries. However, this is still limited in most countries. Budget analysis is 
challenging because of the lack of transparency within Latin-American countries; however, 
the aim is to continue to push for improvement in the quality of available information and the 
decision-making processes.  The next chapter will build on the budget information collected 
for the 21 countries, to apply the QCA and analyse what conditions or sets of conditions can 
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explain the presence or absence of a climate change and renewable energy budget in these 
countries. 
CHAPTER 3. ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PUBLIC BUDGET IN LATIN-AMERICAN AND THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 





The analysis conducted in Chapter 2 introduced the relevance of applying the mainstreaming 
approach to climate change in the public policy cycle and particularly in the public budget 
allocation in developing countries, as this process reflects the priorities of the governments 
are reflected. It also assessed the extent to which Latin American and the Caribbean countries 
have been integrating climate change in their public budgets, where it was found that a limited 
number of countries have been clearly allocating public resources to face the problem. 
 
The allocation of budget in these countries is complex because of their particular political, 
economic and social conditions, and so there is a necessity to further understands, what 
conditions can explain some countries allocating budgets to tackle climate change and others 
do not. In this sense, this chapter introduces an analysis to explain what conditions or 
combination of conditions, explain the presence or absence of public budget to tackle climate 
change and to promote renewable energy, using a Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
method. 
 
The aim of the chapter is to understand under what conditions are countries willing to 
mainstream the problem in their public budget as an important planning tool, which is the 
core research question of this research. The selection of five conditions: 1) levels of climate 
risk; 2) official development assistance received; 3) levels of human development; 4) 
governance effectiveness; and 5) number of climate change policies, aim to identify certain 
patterns since the QCA, unlike other quantitative methods, does not look for generalizations. 
This analysis aims also to support the case study selection that will investigate these issues in 
greater depth.  
 
In order to present the analysis and the findings this chapter is broken down into five sections. 
The first section explains the QCA method, the definition of outcomes, timeframe and 
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conditions selected. The second section presents the steps taken to gather the information to 
operationalize the method, as well as the process to calibrate the information in crisp and 
fuzzy set language. The third section outlines the most relevant results of the method 
according to the fuzzy set software, and it discusses the key findings. Section four presents 
the selection of case studies that will be studied in further chapters and that were chosen 
based on the results of the fsQCA. In section five, I conclude by assessing the contribution and 
limitation of the results of the fsQCA to answering the research questions addressed in the 
thesis. 
 
3.1. Preparation of the QCA method   
 
As stated in Chapter 1, the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) method applied in this 
thesis, is according to Ragin (2008), critical in analysing complex causation where an outcome 
can have multiple variables arriving from several different combinations of causal conditions.  
 
Within QCA there are two ways to analyse the information, crisp sets or fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets 
have been used in disciplines such as mathematics, engineering, philosophy and more 
recently have been applied in social sciences. Schneider and Wagemann (2012) explain that 
fuzzy sets require set-membership to be based on three qualitative anchors: full set 
membership (1), full non-membership (0) and indifference (0.5); while crisp sets have only 
two qualitative anchors, 0 or 1.  This is because this method suggests that in the social sciences 
not everything can be explained as yes or no, and that sometimes there are degrees or levels 
in which an outcome can be explained. 
  
It is important to acknowledge that there is an on-going debate around the use of the QCA 
method and its variants such as fsQCA. As this methodology uses elements of both qualitative 
and quantitative applications, some scholars point out that is important to differentiate fuzzy 
sets of other methods, such as probability methods that, according to Zadeh, are 
complementary and not substitutes (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). 
 
This chapter applies a QCA method using both fuzzy sets and crisp sets to identify which 
conditions or combinations of conditions best explain the two main outcomes: 1) “the 
presence or absence of public budget labelled as climate change in the environmental 
ministries”, and 2) “the presence or absence of public budget label as renewable energy in the 
energy ministries”, in the 21 countries with major emissions in Latin America and the 
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Caribbean. It was demonstrated in Chapter 2 that resources are allocated to climate change 
and renewable energy in half of the countries studied, but the allocation is limited, so the first 
step here is to explain the presence or absence of a budget rather than the actual amount of 
that budget (which will be discussed in the case studies).  
 
The operationalization of the QCA was done in four stages: 1) defining the target, timeframe, 
outcome and conditions; 2) gathering raw data; 3) coding and calibrating data, and 4) 
operationalization with fuzzy set software.  
 




This thesis studies Latin American and the Caribbean countries that are major emitters of 
greenhouse gases in the region according to the CAIT Climate Data Explorer, of the World 
Resources Institute (WRI)7.  
 
This calculation does not include, short-cycle biomass burning (such as agricultural waste 
burning), large-scale biomass burning (such as forest fires) and carbon emissions/removals of 
land-use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) (WRI, 2016). The reason why the information 
related to LULUCF is not included is because this analysis aims to identify the major emitters 
in the energy sector, which at the global level contributes to 80% of the GHG emissions (IPCC, 




The goal was to compare two years of public budget in the selected countries in order to 
identify if there were significant changes from one year to the other. The first year chosen was 
2010 as this followed the 15a Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC that took place 
in Copenhagen, Denmark. Here, a major agreement on climate change was expected but it 
concluded with a “non-inclusive agreement” (UNFCCC, 2009) between a small group of 
countries that had negative impacts on the UNFCCC negotiation process (Dimitrov, 2010; Ash, 
 
7 The emissions estimated are total CO2 emission of fossil fuel use and industrial processes (cement 
production, carbonate use of limestone and dolomite, non-energy use of fuels and other combustion, 
chemical and metal processes, solvents, agricultural liming and urea, waste and fossil fuel fires). 
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2010). Not everything was a failure, because major economies such as China and the USA 
were in the same agreement (Jacobs, 2010). At the same time, 2010 was the year when the 
participation of developing countries in climate action was highlighted in the context of the 
Cancun Agreement (UNFCCC, 2010).   
 
The second year examined is 2016, the year after the COP21 that took place in Paris, France, 
which concluded with the creation of the Paris Agreement, a series of actions to be followed 
to stabilize emissions, including developing countries. This year was also relevant because in 
2013 the Warsaw COP agreed on the submission of intended national determined 
contributions (INDCs), domestic commitments that indicate the willingness of countries to 
collaborate in the achievement of the Convention goals (UNFCCC, 2013). Most INDCs were 
submitted in 2015 and some countries included unconditional goals, meaning they are not 
subjected to international support but to national means of implementation.  In this way, the 
aim is to understand if the submission of NDCs in 2015 had any effect in the public budget in 
2016.  
 
The gap of five years is also important because the stocktake included in the Paris Agreement 
points out that the revision of commitments should take place every five years, which could 
reflect significant changes at the national level. The outcomes are therefore analysed for 2010 
and 2016, but the conditions that are explored relate to the years 2009 and 2015.   
Outcomes 
 
The analysis of governmental public budget to determine the extent to which climate change 
has been mainstreamed across whole sectors is a time consuming and challenging process. 
Therefore, I decided to conduct the analysis on two specific sectors: the environmental and 
the energy sectors. While this may limit the extent to which I can make a full assessment of 
the mainstreaming approach - which is to analyse the inclusion of climate change across 
several sectors – it was practical to focus on these two sectors due to time constraints, and 
the availability of high quality data. The environmental sector was chosen because in most 
countries this sector leads climate policies while the energy sector is the major source of GHGs 
at the global and regional level.  
 
Since there is no universal definition of what climate finance means, I looked at the resources 
allocated through the public budget of the 21 countries to identify: 1) allocation of budget 
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explicitly labelled as climate change within environmental ministries or within the 
environmental sector (depending on the information provided by countries), which includes 
climate policies or institutional arrangements such as climate offices, or any program labelled 
as climate change; and 2) allocation of budget labelled as renewable energy actions in the 
energy sector, which includes policies, institutional arrangements or programs labelled as 
renewable energy8.  
 
With the aim to do a comparative analysis, two complementary outcomes were also included: 
3) the percentage that the environmental ministry represents out of the total public budget of 
the central government (EBT); and 4) the percentage that the public budget allocated to fossil 




The conditions named independent variables in traditional quantitative methods are the 
variables that explain the outcome. According to Ragin (2008), in social science it is difficult to 
find only one condition that can explain one specific result because there could be a number 
of influential factors surrounding such a condition. However, the author suggests that the 
number of conditions to be analysed in a QCA should be limited (ideally no more than four), 
to avoid too many observations. Ragin (2008) points out that it is important to consider 
conditions that are related to the topic but that are not too obvious, to avoid clouding the 
ability to understand further aspects that may be influencing the outcome.  
 
An extensive review of literature related to climate change and climate policy was conducted 
to identify economic, political, social, public policy and geographic conditions that could 
influence the allocation of budget related to climate change. Based on this review five 
conditions were chosen: 1) levels of climate risk; 2) official development assistance received; 
3) levels of human development; 4) governance effectiveness; and 5) number of climate 
change policies. The rationale behind the selection of these conditions is explained in Table 
3.1.  
 
8 For the purpose of this research, the definition of renewable energy included projects related to solar, wind and 
geothermal energy policies. There were no projects included related to hydropower energy because as will be 
analysed in further chapters, it has several methane emissions, and produces other type of social and 
environmental externalities (Ortuzar & Aguirre, 2018). However, there is a possibility that countries include 
hydroelectric projects within their definition of clean or renewable energy, without being explicit about it.  
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Table 3. 1 Conditions selected 
Condition  Rationale  
Levels of 
climate risk 
To analyse if climatic conditions that place countries at a greater risk 
for human and monetary loss, influence the allocation of public 






To analyse if the provision of ODA from developed countries 





To analyse if the levels of human development condition or influence 
the allocation of public budget related to climate change.  
Governance 
effectiveness 
To analyse whether voice and accountability, political stability and 
absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption contribute to the strengthening 
of governments and if that is related to the interest of governments 




To analyse if the existence of public policies related to climate 
change has an influence on the allocation of public budget related to 
climate change.  
Source: Own elaboration  
I also selected these conditions based on the availability of public information for all relevant 
countries in this research. For instance, one condition considered to be studied was climate 
performance based on Germanwatch reports9, however, the data was only available for few 
of the countries studied, reason why it was excluded. Another condition, levels of greenhouse 
gases, was also considered, but since the selection of the 21 countries was based on them 
being major emitters in the region, this information was redundant.  In the next section each 
of the conditions is explained. 
1) Levels of Climate risk 
 
 
9 Germanwatch, Climate Policy Index available from https://www.climate-change-performance-index.org/ 
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The IPCC points out that the “vulnerability to climate change is the degree to which 
geophysical, biological and socio-economic systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope 
with, adverse impacts of climate change” (Füssel & Klein, 2006). Some examples that the IPCC 
provide about vulnerable zones are: low-lying islands or coastal cities, flooding of coastal cities 
and agricultural lands or forced migration, disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet, 
among others (IPCC, 2014).  
 
According to the ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), Latin 
America and the Caribbean countries are highly vulnerable to climate change impacts, 
because of the low capacity to adapt to the changes in temperature and its consequences 
(CEPAL, 2012).  
 
To measure the vulnerability, however, is highly complex because of the existence of several 
factors that can contribute to it. As part of this debate, Germanwatch created the Global 
Climate Risk Index (GCRI), which provide information related to weather events such as storms 
and floods, as well as temperature extremes and mass movements (heat and cold waves, etc.), 
thereby including climate change related events (Kreft, et al., 2016).  The indicators that the 
GCRI measure are: number of deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, sum of losses in USD, 
purchasing power parity, as well as losses per unit of Gross Domestic Product (Kreft, et al., 
2016). According to this Index, the LAC region includes some of the most vulnerable countries 
in the world, such as Honduras.  
 
This index is not only about climate change but in general about climate risk. As the 
Germanwatch (2016) report points out, even though “there are certain weather events which 
relationship with climate change is still a frontier in science”, there are studies such as the 
IPCC reports, “which show that anthropogenic climate change increased the likelihood of 
extreme weather events” (p. 9), meaning that even if they are not produced by climate change, 
its occurrence might increase because of it. 
 
I took the results of the Climate Risk Index (called “CRI” for the purpose of this research) for 
two years (2009 and 2015) to analyse to what extent the extreme events that happened in 
2009 and 2015 influenced the allocation of public expenditure labelled as climate change in 
2010 and 2016 in the 21 countries selected. Countries with higher score means they were less 
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affected by climate events and lower score means countries were more affected. The scores 
can be found in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3. 2 CRI scores for LAC countries (in 2009 and 2015) 
Countries  CRI2009 CRI2015 
Argentina  49.83 63.67 
Bolivia  56.67 47.0 
Brazil 36.83 76.17 
Chile  90.50 25.17 
Colombia 78.83 45.67 
Costa Rica  87.50 77.5 
Cuba NA NA 
Dominican Republic  69.17 74.83 
Ecuador 41.67 69.17 
El Salvador  4.33 53.0 
Guatemala 55.17 45.0 
Honduras 58.67 52.17 
Jamaica 62.67 124.5 
 Mexico  56.67 56.33 
Nicaragua 56.50 40.83 
Panama  87.50 104.83 
Paraguay 51.33 47.5 
Peru 55.00 45.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 71.33 124.50 
Uruguay 31.33 97.5 
Venezuela  70.00 124.50 
NA: Not Available 
Sources: Own elaboration based on information of the GCRI 
provided to the years 2009 (Harmeling, 2010) and 2015 (Kreft, et 
al., 2016).   
 
The scores show that the level of climate risk in the countries changed from 2009 to 2015. 
While in ten countries the climate risk score increased, meaning that these countries were 
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less affected by climate events in 2015 than 2010 (including: Argentina, Brazil, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and 
Venezuela); in the other nine countries the score decreased, meaning they were more 
affected by climate events (including: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru).  
 
The results also show that some countries remained stable, while others saw significant 
changes such as Chile, its score falling from 90 in 2009 to 25 in 2015, meaning that in 2015 it 
faced severe impacts related to climate events. According to the GCRI (2016), this was 
because “Exceptional rainfalls occurred in the northern part of the Atacama Region in Chile at 
the end of March 2015… At least 31 people died” (p. 8). 
 
2) Official development assistance received 
The UNFCCC has established in its Article 4 that "the developed country Parties and other 
developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to 
meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country” (UNFCCC, 1992). It has been 
assumed that the inclusion of the word “additional” referred to the provision of financial 
resources beyond the Official Development Aid agreed by developed countries.  
Back in 1972, the ODA target aimed to transfer 0.7% of the GDP of developed countries to 
developing countries to help them in key areas of their development. This target was based 
on the work of the Nobel Prize winning economist in 2018, Jan Tinbergen, who estimated the 
inflows required for developing economies to achieve desirable growth rates (Tinbergen, 
1996). The OECD points out that Development Assistance Committee members generally 
accepted the 0.7% target, with some exceptions, such as Switzerland, who did not adopt the 
target, and the USA who did not adopt the timetable. Nevertheless, 15 European countries 
have re-endorsed this goal in the Conference of Sustainable Development Goals celebrated in 
2015 (OECD, n.d.1). 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the use of climate finance as ODA is a contentious topic in the 
climate negotiations, because negotiation groups such as the G7 + China have replied that this 
is not “new and additional” as the UNFCCC asked (Roberts & Weikmans, 2015). Since there is 
a lack of clarity about how many OECD countries include climate finance as part of their ODA, 
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this condition was chosen to analyse if general aid (including or not climate finance) has an 
influence in the allocation of domestic resources in recipient countries.  
 
I used the data provided by the annual report of OECD called “Geographical Distribution of 
Financial Flows to Developing Countries” (OECD, 2017b), using the Total ODA Net in 2009 and 
2015 for the 21 countries selected. The results are shown in Table 3.3. The highest numbers 
mean that countries receive more ODA, while lower numbers indicate the opposite.  
 
Table 3. 3 ODA received in LAC countries in millions of USD (in 2009 and 2015) 
Countries  ODA2009 ODA2015 
Argentina  127.7 -23.3 
Bolivia  725.8 786.7 
Brazil 338.5 998.7 
Chile  79.7 50.2 
Colombia 1060.2 1347.5 
Costa Rica  109.3 108.7 




Ecuador 208.6 311.1 
El Salvador  276.7 88.2 
Guatemala 376.2 408.5 
Honduras 457.1 537.0 
Jamaica 149.6 56.8 
 Mexico  185.5 308.9 
Nicaragua 774.0 454.1 
Panama  65.5 8.8 
Paraguay 148.3 56.2 
Peru 441.9 331.8 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
6.9 0  
Uruguay 50.6 19.2 
Venezuela  66.8 37.1 
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Sources: Own elaboration using data from the OECD-DAC 
reports for 2011 and 2017, extracting information for 
2009 and 2015 respectively (OECD, 2011, 2017b). 
  
The analysis of the data shows that the levels of ODA vary significantly among countries. In 
nine countries the ODA allocation increased from 2010 to 2015 (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico). Meanwhile in 12 countries 
the support was reduced (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela).   
 
The country that received the most ODA support in 2010 and 2015 was Colombia, while the 
countries that received the least were Trinidad and Tobago in 2010 and Argentina in 2015. 
 
3) Levels of Human Development  
 
Measuring the progress of countries is complex due to the inability to define what constitutes 
progress. In order to measure the level of healthy economies, countries use the gross 
domestic product (GDP), which measures the monetary value of final goods and services 
produced in a country in a given period; that can also include some nonmarket production, 
such as defence or education services provided by the government, although does not include, 
activities such as unpaid work and activities in the informal sector (Callen, 2018).  
 
Callen (2010) points out that GDP is important because it gives information about the size of 
the economy and how an economy is performing. Nevertheless, GDP has been criticized 
because it does not measure the overall standard of living or well-being of a country. For 
instance, it does not measure the environmental damage or other externalities produced by 
economic activity and it does not count the depletion of non-renewable natural resources 
(Neumayer, 2013).  
 
For that reason, another global measurement was created, the Human Development Index 
(HDI) (UNDP, 2019b). This measurement analyses long and healthy life (Life expectancy index), 
knowledge (Education Index) and decent standard of living (GNI Index) in 169 countries and 
establishes a score that ranges from 1.000 as the highest and 0.000 as the lowest.  
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Although not an official measure, the ranking created by the UNDP was chosen as the 
condition to analyse to what extent human development influences the allocation of public 
budget on climate change, as this is a problem that threatens such development. The 
information used for the analysis was the score for 2009 and 2015 given to the 21 countries 
selected, which results are in Table 3.4. As close to the 1.000 they are, means that they have 
high levels of human development, and the opposite if they go close to 0.000. 
 
Table 3. 4 HDI scores for LAC countries (in 2009 and 2015) 
Countries  HDI2009 HDI2015  
Argentina  0.772 0.827 
Bolivia  0.637 0.674 
Brazil 0.693 0.754 
Chile  0.779 0.847 
Colombia 0.685 0.727 
Costa Rica  0.723 0.776 




Ecuador 0.692 0.740 
El Salvador  0.655 0.680 
Guatemala 0.556 0.640 
Honduras 0.601 0.625 
Jamaica 0.686 0.730 
 Mexico  0.745 0.762 
Nicaragua 0.562 0.645 
Panama  0.751 0.788 
Paraguay 0.634 0.693 




Uruguay 0.760 0.795 
Venezuela  0.696 0.767 
NA: Not available 
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Sources: Own elaboration based on data from the HDI 
(UNDP, 2010, 2016) with information for 2009 and 2015. 
 
The analysis of the HDI scores shows that most Latin American and Caribbean countries are in 
the mid-high and mid-low levels of human development. The scores in all countries improved 
in 2015 compared to 2010, which suggests some progress in this regard.  In 2010 and 2015 
the country with highest HDI was Chile. In 2010 the country with the lowest level was 
Guatemala and in 2015 it was Honduras.  
 
4) Governance effectiveness 
 
According to Lemos and Agrawal (2006), governance is not the same as government but “it 
includes the actions of the state, in addition, encompasses actors such as communities, 
business, and NGOs” (p. 298). The authors mention that international accords, national 
policies, local decision-making structure, and environmental NGOs are examples of 
environmental governance (Lemos & Agrawal 2006, p. 299; Börzel & Risse, 2010). 
 
However, the case of climate governance has strongly focused on the role of the state as being 
responsible for the economic activity that produces GHG emissions. Although there is a 
debate about this state-centric vision, scholars point out that the role of the state remains 
important in confronting global problems such as climate change (Eckersley, 2004; Lemos & 
Agrawal, 2006), but that it is necessary to build multilevel governance to deal with the 
problem effectively (Rabe, 2007).  
 
For the World Governance Indicators (WGI, n.d.) project, governance “consists of the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” (Online). This includes, 
among other things, the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, 
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement policies, and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social 
interactions. 
 
To measure governance is no easy task, however, the WB created an index that measures the 
level of governance in 200 countries. The six indicators that this Index measures are: voice 
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and accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; 
regulatory quality; rule of law; and control of corruption (Kaufmann, et al., 2010).  
 
This Index was chosen because it presents a comprehensive database with information for all 
the selected countries from 1996 until 2015. This research uses the scores given in 2009 and 
2015 to the 21 selected countries in each of the indicators to calculate a general governance 
score (averaging the six indicators) to measure the effectiveness of the governance. The aim 
was to analyse to what extent the effectiveness of governance influences the allocation of 
public budget on climate change in the 21 countries - the scores are shown in Table 3.5. The 
closer the number to 100 the better the qualification of the indicators and the higher the 
effectiveness, while lower scores close to 0 mean the opposite.  
 
Table 3. 5 Governance scores for LAC countries (average) (in 2009 and 2015). 
Countries  GOV2009 GOV2015 
Argentina  38.2 37.51 
Bolivia  29.0 28.09 
Brazil 53.8 46.66 
Chile  83.4 80.34 
Colombia 47.1 40.78 
Costa Rica  68.3 71.39 




Ecuador 20.1 29.01 
El Salvador  47.8 45.64 
Guatemala 31.7 28.62 
Honduras 29.8 28.37 
Jamaica 49.2 55.55 
 Mexico  46.2 41.89 
Nicaragua 28.6 30.92 
Panama  55.8 59.22 
Paraguay 26.4 32.87 





Uruguay 74.3 78.33 
Venezuela  11.3 8.46 
Sources: Own elaboration with information from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators project for 2009 
and 2015. 
 
In general, the region has low governance effectiveness. There are 10 countries whose 
effectiveness increased in 2015 over 2010: Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Meanwhile, 11 countries did not 
improve over this period: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. In 2010 and 2015 the country with 
the lowest levels of governance effectiveness was Venezuela, while the country with the best 
scores in both years was Chile. 
 
5) Number of Climate Change Policies 
 
The fifth condition is the number of climate change policies and legal instruments in these 
countries. Currently, there is no ranking or index that analyses the climate policy performance 
in all selected countries. For that reason, a new condition was built that measures the number 
of climate instruments in these countries to analyse the extent to which the number of policies 
dedicated to tackle climate change influence the allocation of public budget on this matter.  
 
In order to measure this condition, the climate legislation study by Globe International and 
the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) was used (Nachmany, et al., 2017). It assesses 
the existence of laws, policies and institutional arrangements in countries. I used the results 
of the study published in 2017 aggregating all the policies. However, since this study does not 
have information for Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay, I added other 
information by including the number of national communications submitted by the countries 
to the UNFCCC in 2009 and in 2015 10 (UNFCCC, n.d.3). National communications are the 
 
10 UNFCCC (nd3), National Communications and Biennial Reports portal, Available from: 
https://unfccc.int/national-communications-and-biennial-reports 
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reports that include all the activities that countries do related to climate change as a way to 
be held accountable for their actions. The calculations for the 21 countries selected are 
included in Table 3.6. The higher the score, the higher the number of climate policies in place 
in the country, the lower is it, represents the opposite. 
 
Table 3. 6 Number of climate instruments in LAC countries (in 2009 and 2015) 
Countries  CCPI2010 CCPI2015 
Argentina  4.0 3.0 
Bolivia  2.0 2.3 
Brazil 5.0 4.3 
Chile  3.7 4.3 
Colombia 4.3 3.7 
Costa Rica  2.7 3.7 




Ecuador 1.7 3.0 
El Salvador  0.3 2.7 
Guatemala 2.7 3.0 
Honduras 0.3 0.3 
Jamaica 3.0 1.7 
 Mexico  6.3 3.7 
Nicaragua 0.3 0.3 
Panama  0.3 0.3 
Paraguay 0.3 0.3 




Uruguay 1.0 0.0 




Sources: Own elaboration with information from the 
UNFCCC (ndc) and the Grantham Institute of LSE 
(Nachmany, et al., 2017) data for 2010 and 2015. 
 
The Table 3.6 shows that there are changes in the number of policies in place in the countries. 
While eleven countries had more policies in 2015 than in 2010 including: Bolivia, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago; 
others had fewer policies in 2015 than 2010, including: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela. However, some countries had the same number of policies 
including: Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Paraguay.  
 
In the case of national communications, it is important to point out that the goal is to submit 
at least one every five years. The capacity of countries to do so, however, varies. When this 
dissertation was written, each of the countries analysed had submitted their first 
communication, 20 countries had submitted their second, 7 countries had submitted their 
third, 2 countries had submitted four, and only 1 had submitted six communications, when 
Mexico submitted the sixth in 2018  (UNFCCC, n.d.3).  
 
The number of policies could reflect the level of interest in the topic, the aim is to understand 
if that is related to the allocation of public budget to deal with the problem.  
 
3.2. Operationalization of the QCA method   
 
3.2.1. Gathering of raw data 
 
The aim of the research was to analyse public expenditure, which reflects the final use of the 
resources, but because of the lack of information in all countries, it was decided to use budget 
data that is more readily available. Therefore, this analysis was conducted reviewing public 
budget allocation data sets in the 21 countries for 2010 and 2016. The information collected 
was publicly available on websites of the finance ministries. However, the information varies 
in format and level of desegregation. Some countries have developed accessible online 
platforms to clearly present the information, such as Peru and Brazil. Others do not have up-
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to-date information or have missing data for the years under analysis or no data at all, 
including Cuba and Ecuador11.  
 
Because of the differences in the presentation of the data, budget data was used from those 
documents or formats that present information by function, institution or program, and 
included in an excel sheet for analysis. In order to have a comprehensive set of information to 
compare, five elements of the public expenditure were analysed: 
1. Total public budget labelled as climate change within the environmental sector or 
environmental function, when it was not possible to identify the budget of the 
ministry (converted: percentage of climate change budget out of the total budget of 
environmental ministries). 
2. Total budget of the environmental ministry or environmental function, when it was 
not possible to identify the budget of the ministry (converted: percentage of the 
environmental ministry’s budget out of the total budget of the central government). 
3. Total public budget of the central government or the national government 
(converted: percentage of the environmental ministry’s budget out of the total 
budget of the central government. 
4. Total budget labelled as renewable energy within the energy ministry or the energy 
function, when it was not possible to identify the budget of the ministry (converted: 
percentage of the renewable energy budget out of the total budget of the energy 
ministry). 
5. Total budget on fossil fuels within the energy ministry (related to exploration and 
production of oil, gas and coal) (converted: percentage of the fossil fuel’s budget out 
of the total budget of the energy ministry) 
3.2.2. Coding and calibration of data 
 
In order to classify the information, all the data was included in an excel spread-sheet and was 





11 Even though public expenditure information in these two countries was not available, they were included in the 
analysis since they are major emitters of GHGs and the goal is to analyse conditions that might be relevant to 
explain the absence of information in this case.   
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Table 3. 7 Codes allocated to the outcomes and conditions 
Outcome  Codes 
The presence of public budget labelled as climate change in the 
environmental ministries. 
CCEM 
Total public budget of the environmental ministries in relation to 
the total budget of the central government. 
EBT 
The presence of public budget labelled as renewable energy in the 
energy ministries.  
REB 
Public budget labelled as fossil fuel in the energy ministries (fossil 
fuel exploitation and production mainly) 
FFEM 
Conditions  
Climate risk  CRI 
Overseas development assistance  ODA 
Human development  HDI 
Governance  GOV 
Climate policies  CCPI 
The letter c after the denominations means calibrated c 
The letter cs after the denomination means crisp set cs 
The number 09, 10, 15, 16 after the denomination means the year 
of analysis.  
09, 10, 15, 16 
Absence  ~ 
Source: Own analysis 
 
Once the data was collected, I proceeded to calibrate it. Calibration is the process that 
translates the data gathered into the language of the QCA in order to conduct the analysis. 
According to Ragin, in QCA the calibration of data is “especially important in situations where 
one condition sets or shapes the context for other conditions” (2008, p. 72).  
 
For the purpose of this research, I applied a calibration for both outcomes and conditions. The 
outcomes were calibrated in crisp sets while the conditions were calibrated in fuzzy sets. The 
operationalization of the calibration was done both directly in the fsQCA software as well as 
manually in order to avoid errors; the differences in the result between these methods were 
minimal. Based on the calibration of the information, the outcomes and conditions were 
denominated as follows: 
 
Outcomes. Since the levels of public budget labelled as climate change are very low in many 
of the countries, the information was organized in a crisp set language, distinguishing the 
presence or absence of a public budget labelled as climate change in the environmental 
ministries (yes is 1 and no is 0), and the presence or absence of a renewable energy budget in 
the energy ministries.  
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Climate risk. To calibrate the condition, the lowest score was denoted as 1, indicating a 
country with highest climate risk, and 0 for countries with lowest climate risk. The sum of the 
lowest and the highest score was then divided to get the mid-point, which is 0.5 for the fuzzy 
set analysis. 
 
ODA.   1 was denoted as the highest number, indicating a major recipient of ODA, and 0 as the 
lowest, indicating a minor recipient. Both numbers were added together then divided to get 
0.5 for the fuzzy set analysis.  
 
Human development. 1 was denoted as the highest number that represents a country with 
the highest level of human development, and 0 representing the lowest score, indicating a 
country with poor human development. Both were then summed and divided to get 0.5 for 
the fuzzy set analysis.  
 
Governance. 1 was denoted as the highest score, indicating a country with a effective 
governance, and 0 as the lowest score, indicating a country with poor effectiveness of 
governance. Both were then summed and divided to get 0.5 for the fuzzy set analysis. 
 
Climate policies. 1 was denoted as the highest score, indicating a country with the highest 
number of climate policies, and 0 represented the lowest score, indicating a country with a 
low number of climate policies. Both were then summed and divided to get the 0.5 for the 
fuzzy set analysis. 
 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show the calibrated data for 2010 and 2016 respectively - the information 
was also coded by colour in order to better track each of the conditions, as shown in Table 3.8 















EBT10c REB10cs FFEM10c ODA09c HDI09c GOV09c CRI09c CCPI10c 
Argentina 0 0.4 0 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Bolivia 1 0.0 1 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 
Brazil 0 0.0 0 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 
Chile 0 0.0 1 1.0 0.1 1.0 1 0.0 0.6 
Colombia 1 0.2 1 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.7 
Costa Rica 1 1.0 0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.4 
Cuba     0.1  0.3  0.3 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0.2 0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.2 
Ecuador     0.2 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.3 
El Salvador 0 0.1 1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 1.0 0.1 
Guatemala 1 0.0 1 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Honduras 1 0.1 0 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1 
Jamaica 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 
Mexico 1 0.1 0 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.5 0.4 1 
Nicaragua 0 0.1 1 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.1 
Panamá 0 0.1 0 0.0 0.1 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.1 
Paraguay 0 0.1 0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.1 
Peru 0 0.0 1 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.1 
Uruguay 0 0.4 0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.2 
Venezuela     0.1 0.6 0 0.2 0.3 













EBT16c REB16cs FFEM16c ODA15c HDI15c GOV15c CRI15c CCPI15c 
Argentina 0 0.1 0 1.0 0.0 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.7 
Bolivia 1 0.2 1 0 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.5 
Brazil 1 0.1 0 0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 1.0 
Chile 0 0.0 1 1 0.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Colombia 0 0.0 1 0.1 1.0 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 
Costa Rica 1 0.4 0 0 0.1 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.9 
Cuba     0.4 0.7 0.4  0.7 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0.6 0 0.5 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.7 
Ecuador     0.2 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.7 
El Salvador 1 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 
Guatemala 1 0.1 1 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.7 
Honduras 1 0.1 0 0 0.4 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.1 
Jamaica 1 0.4  0 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.0 0.4 
Mexico 1 0.2 1 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Nicaragua 1 0.2 1 0 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.1 
Panama 0 0.3 0 0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 
Paraguay 0 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.1 
Peru 1 0.1 1 0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 
0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.0 0.5 
Uruguay 1 1.0 0 0 0.0 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.0 
Venezuela 0 0.4 0 0.5 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3 









3.2.3. Use of the fuzzy set software 
 
To conduct the analysis, I used the fuzzy set software12 (fsQCA, n.d.). This is a tool that was 
created to assess conditions and combinations of conditions to identify necessity and 
sufficiency (Ragin, 2006). It allows the analysis of different possible configurations of 
conditions to explain the outcome. It is expressed as 2k, where k denotes the number of sets 
in the study. For instance, two causal conditions result in four possible configurations, three 
could lead to eight possible configurations and so on. This is due to the inclusion of negative 
configurations in the analyses.  
 
The software also analyses the consistency and the coverage of each configuration. The 
necessity values conditions, examining the one(s) necessary to explain the outcome according 
to the levels of consistency and the levels of coverage. The truth table is the tool that analyses 
all possible combination of conditions, including the analysis of the presence and absence of 
the conditions (Ragin, 2008, p. 125). This allows for a better understanding of the extent to 
which a certain combination of conditions is sufficient to explain the outcome according to 
the levels of consistency and coverage. 
 
According to Ragin (2008) “consistency gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given 
combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question”, while coverage 
“assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination accounts for instances of an 
outcome” (p. 44). Ragin (2008) explains that consistency, like significance in traditional 
quantitative methods, signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of 
the investigator, while coverage, like strength, “indicates the empirical relevance or 
importance of a set-theoretic connection” (p. 45).  
 
According to Thomson cited in Schneider and Wagemann (2012), a sufficient condition will 
have a higher consistency score the more necessary it is for the outcome. Similarly, a 
necessary condition will have a higher coverage score the more sufficient it is for the outcome. 
On the other hand, necessary and sufficient conditions that have high consistency, but low 
coverage scores demonstrate that, while important, these explanations are either rare or too 
broad to be helpful. However, calculations of coverage usually only make sense in the event 
 
12 fsQCA sofware available from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsQCA/software.shtml 
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of a subset relationship being found. So, checks on consistency usually precede checks on 
coverage. 
 
Ragin (2008) suggests that perfectly consistent set relations are relatively rare in social 
research because of the number of potential conditions that can influence the outcome. In 
this sense, it is recommended that the consistency threshold should be set to 0.75. A 
consistency level below this mark suggests a weak relationship between the configurations 
and the outcome. As Ragin (2008) points out, a configuration with a high level of consistency 
(above 0.75) may have a low coverage value, because significant configurations may only be 
found in a small number of cases. In other words, in set-theoretic analysis it is possible to have 
a set relation that is highly consistent while low in coverage.  
 
According to Schneider and Wagemann (2012) there are two different coverage measures. 
The first is “raw coverage,” which shows the percentage of all the cases in the outcome 
covered by a single sufficient path of an equifinal solution term. The second is “unique 
coverage,” which shows the percentage of cases that are uniquely explained by that solution 
(2012, pp. 332-334). In the analysis I use the raw coverage.  
 
3.3. Results based on the fsQCA software  
 
The fsQCA software was used to identify which conditions or combinations of conditions are 
necessary or sufficient to explain the presence and absence of the final outcomes: CCEM, EBT, 
REB, FFEM and ~CCEM, ~EBT, ~REB and ~FFEM. 
 
Many observations were obtained through the fuzzy set software; however, in the next 
section I report in tables the results that have high consistency, which mean that are more 
meaningful to explain the outcome. The tables present the results by condition, which 
analyses which condition (presence or absence) is necessary to explain the outcome, as well 
as by combination of conditions based on the true table analysis.  
 
In the column of results, I only include those conditions (or combination of conditions) that 
are high in consistency (more than 0.75). In the column of observations, I included the 
narrative description of the results.  It is important to say that when the words presence or 
absence are use, they can also mean “low” and “high” levels of. This is mainly for the case of 
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the conditions, which are expressed in fussy set terms. For instance, ~ODA means absence or 
low levels of ODA. 
 
1) Conditions that explain the presence of public budget labelled as climate change in the 
environmental ministries (CCEM).   
 
Table 3.10 resumes the results of the analysis of necessity and sufficiency to explore what 
condition or combination of conditions explains better the presence of public budget labelled 
as climate change in the environmental ministries of the 21 countries.  
 
Table 3. 10 Conditions to explain the presence and absence of public budget labelled as 
climate change in environmental ministries (CCEM) in 2010 and 2016 
Outcome: What conditions explain the presence or absence of budget labelled as climate change within 
environmental ministries (CCEM) in 2010 and 2016? 














No positive or negative 
condition higher than 0.75 
 
None of the conditions are 
necessary to explain the presence of 
the outcome (presence of climate 
change budget within 





the absence of 
the outcome 
One negative condition appears 
high in consistency:   
~ODA 
 Consistency (0.82)13 
 Coverage (0.74) 
The absence of ODA is a necessary 
condition and almost sufficient to 
explain the absence of the outcome 
(absence of climate change budget 













No combination of conditions is 
higher than 0.75 
 
No combination of conditions is 
necessary or sufficient to explain the 




the absence of 
the outcome 
One combination of conditions 
appears high in consistency in 
the intermediate solution: 
 
~CCEM =  
~ODA09c*HDI09c*GOV09c*CR
I09c*~CCPI10c  
Consistency (0.86)  
Coverage  (0.25) 
Parsimonious solution: 
The absence of ODA in conjunction 
with the presence of human 
development, governance 
effectiveness, and climate risk, and 
in absence of climate policies is 
sufficient to explain the absence of 
the outcome. However, the 
coverage is low, which only explains 
the case of Uruguay. 
 
13 The results present round numbers, 0.81666= 0.82. 
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Climate risk in conjunction with the 
absence of climate policies is 
sufficient to explain the absence of 















No positive condition higher 
than 0.75 
 
None of the conditions are 






the absence of 
the outcome 
One negative condition appears 
high in consistency:  
 ~ODA 
Consistency (0.82)  
Coverage  (0.45) 
The absence of ODA is necessary to 
explain the absence of the outcome. 












No combination of conditions is 
higher than 0.75 in the 
intermediate solution. 
 
One positive condition appears 
high in consistency in the 
parsimonious solution: 
ODA  
Consistency (0.90)  





The existence of ODA is sufficient to 
explain the existence of the 
outcome. However the coverage is 
low, and only explains the cases of: 




the absence of 
the outcome 
No combination of conditions is 
higher than 0.75  
No combination of conditions is 
necessary or sufficient to explain the 
absence of the outcome  
 
 
In the analysis of conditions, it is relevant that none of the conditions appears higher than 
0.75 to explain the presence of the outcome, but the absence of ODA appears high in 
consistency to explain the absence of climate budget in 2010 (0.82) and in 2016 (0.86). The 
most relevant observation is that in 2010, the coverage of that condition was 0.74 – very close 
to the 0.75.  This means that in 2010 the absence of ODA was necessary and almost sufficient 
to explain the absence of climate budget, while in 2016 the coverage went to 0.45, which 
means that in 2016 the absence of ODA was necessary but not sufficient to explain the 
absence of climate budget. 
 
The analysis of the truth table in 2010 and 2016 revealed that there is no combination of 
conditions sufficient to explain the presence of the outcome. However, in 2010 there is a 
combination of conditions that explains the absence of the outcome that is high in consistency 
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(0.86) in the intermediate solution (which, according to Ragin is preferred because they are 




The absence of ODA in conjunction with the presence of human development, effective 
governance, climate risk and the absence of climate policy explain the absence of climate 
budget in 2010. However, the coverage of this combination is low and only explains the case 
of Uruguay.  
 
A relevant observation in that solution is that the absence or low number of climate policies 
results in the absence of climate budget, because it shows that policies are important to 
allocate budget, although the presence of policies is not a guaranty of budget allocation.  In 
2016, ODA is the condition that appears highly consistent (0.91) in the parsimonious solution, 
although the coverage is low and only explains the cases of Colombia, Brazil and Bolivia. This 
suggests that the presence of ODA is sufficient to explain the presence of public budget for 
climate change in the environmental ministries of these three countries. 
 
In both years the most relevant condition is ODA, which shows that there is a correlation 
between this condition and the outcome. However, although the model shows that ODA is 
necessary to explain the outcome, in 2016 was not sufficient enough, which means that other 
factors also played a role to explain the absence of the outcome.  
 
2) Conditions that explain the levels of environmental budget in relation to budget of central 
governments (EBT). 
 
Table 3.11 resumes the results of the analysis of necessity and sufficiency to explore what 
condition or combination of conditions explains better the levels of environmental budget in 
relation to the total budget of central governments (EBT) in the 21 countries.  
 
 
Table 3. 11 Conditions to explain presence and absence of environmental budget in the 
central governments (EBT) in 2010 and 2016 
Outcome: What conditions explain the levels of environmental expenditure in central governments 
(EBT) in 2010 and 2016? 














Two conditions are high in 
consistency: 
GOV  
Consistency (0.92)  
Coverage (0.50) 
HDI  
Consistency (0.84)  
Coverage (0.45) 
The presence of effective governance 
is necessary to explain presence of the 
outcome. 
Presence of human development is 









One condition appears high in 
consistency 
~ODA  
Consistency (0.76)  
Coverage (0.87) 
The absence of ODA is necessary and 
sufficient condition to explain the 













No combination of conditions 
appears higher than 0.75 
None of the combination of conditions 
appears as necessary or sufficient to 







One combinations appears 
high in consistency after 
reducing paradoxical 
conditions (when one 
condition appears negative 





~ODA09c *~CRI09c= ~EBT 
Consistency (0.75) 
Coverage (0.60) 
The absence of ODA and absence of 
climate risk are sufficient conditions 
to explain the absence of the 
outcome. However the coverage of 
this combination is not higher than 
0.75. 
The cases that are part of the solution 
are: Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Brazil, 
Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Colombia and Peru.  
 
  *The combinations were: 
1.  ~ODA09c*HDI09c*GOV09c 















Two conditions appear high in 
consistency: 








The presence of human development 
is necessary to explain the presence of 
the outcome. 
 The presence of governance is 







One negative condition 
appears high in consistency: 
~ODA  
Consistency (0.80)  
The absence of ODA is necessary and 


















One combination of 




Consistency (0.79)  
Coverage (0.41) 
The presence of human development 
in conjunction with climate risk and 
absence of climate policies are 
sufficient to explain the presence of 
the outcome.  








One combination appears 
high in consistency (after 
reducing the paradoxical 
conditions) in the 
intermediate solutions: 
~EBT= 
~ODA15c *~GOV15c  
Consistency (0.76) 
Coverage (0.52) 
The absence of ODA and absence of 
governance effectiveness is sufficient 
to explain the absence of the 
outcome. 
Countries that explain this are: 
Panamá, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Chile, Argentina and Mexico. 
 
Table 3.11 shows that in 2010 and 2016 two conditions were necessary to explain the 
outcome: governance effectiveness (0.92, 0.90) and human development (0.84, 0.85), 
although the coverage was less than 0.75, which means that those conditions were necessary 
but not sufficient to explain the outcome.  
  
On the other hand, the most relevant finding to explain the absence of the outcome was the 
absence of ODA, in 2010 and in 2016; this condition (~ODA) appeared high in consistency 
(0.76, 0.80), and also high in coverage (0.87, 0.79). This means that the absence of ODA is a 
necessary and sufficient condition to explain the absence or low levels of environmental 
budget in central governments.  
 
Regarding the results of the truth table, it shows that in 2010 and 2016 there are two 
combinations that are high in consistency but low in coverage. In 2010 is:  
 
~EBT= ~ODA09c *~CRI09c 
 
The absence of ODA and absence of climate risk are sufficient to explain the absence of 





The absence of ODA and the absence of governance effectiveness are sufficient to explain the 
absence of the outcome. Both shared the absence of ODA as an important condition. 
 
3) Conditions that explain the presence of public budget labelled as renewable energy in the 
energy ministries (REB).   
 
Table 3.12 resumes the results of the analysis of necessary and sufficiency to explore what 
condition or combination of conditions explains better the presence of public budget labelled 
as renewable energy in the energy ministries (REB). 
 
Table 3. 12 Conditions to explain presence and absence of renewable energy budget in 
energy ministries (REB) in 2010 and 2016 
Outcome: What conditions explain the presence or absence of renewable energy expenditure in the 
energy ministry (REB) in 2010 and 2016? 










presence of the 
outcome  
No positive or negative 
conditions higher than 
0.75 
 
There are not conditions that are 
necessary to explain the presence of 





absence of the 
outcome 
One negative condition 
appears high in 
consistency: 
~ODA  
Consistent (0.86)  
Coverage (0.71) 
The absence of ODA is a necessary 










presence of the 
outcome 
No combination of 
conditions is higher than 
0.75 
 
None of the combination of conditions 





absence of the 
outcome 
No combination of 
conditions is higher than 
0.75 
 
None of the combination of conditions 
appears as sufficient to explain the 



















The presence of climate risk is 














The absence of ODA is necessary to 













No combination of conditions 
is higher than 0.75 
 
None of the combination of conditions 








Two combinations of the 
parsimonious solution appear 
















One combination appear 











The absence of climate risk is 
sufficient to explain the absence of 
the outcome. 
Cases that explain this: Panama, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
 
The presence of human development 
in conjunction with the absence of 
climate policies is sufficient to explain 
the absence of the outcome. Cases 
that explain this: Trinidad and Tobago, 





The absence of ODA in conjunction 
with human development, absence of 
climate risk and absence of climate 
policy is sufficient to explain the 
absence of the outcome. 
 
 
Table 3.12 shows that in 2010 no condition is high in consistency to explain the outcome, but 
in 2016 the condition that appears highly consistent is the presence of climate risk (0.80), 
however, the coverage is below 0.75. In order to explain the absence of the outcome, the 
condition that is high in consistency for 2010 and 2016 is the absence of ODA (0.86, 0.85), 
both with coverage below 0.75, although in 2010, the coverage was 0.71.  
This means that the absence of ODA is necessary but not sufficient to explain the absence of 
public budget labelled as renewable energy in the energy ministries.    
 
The analysis of the truth table shows that in 2010 there is no combination of conditions that 
is sufficient to explain the outcome; however, in 2016 there are three combinations of 
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conditions, two in the parsimonious solution and one in the intermediate solution, this last 




It suggests that the absence of ODA in conjunction with human development, absence of 
climate risk and absence of climate policy is necessary to explain the absence of the outcome, 
although the coverage is below 0.75. This analysis also suggests that ODA, climate risk and 
human development are important to explain the absence of renewable energy budget. 
 
4) Conditions to explain fossil fuels budget in energy ministries (FFEM) 
 
Table 3.13 shows the results of the analysis of necessity and sufficiency to explore what 
condition or combination of conditions explains better the levels of public budget allocation 
on fossil fuel in relation to the budget of energy ministries (FFEM). 
   
Table 3. 13 Conditions to explain the presence and absence of fossil fuels in energy 
ministries (FFEM) in 2010 and 2016 
Outcome: What conditions explain fossil fuels expenditure in the energy ministry (FFEM)? 













One condition appears high in 
consistency: 
GOV  
Consistency (0.87)  
Coverage (0.23) 
The presence of governance 
effectiveness is necessary to explain 








Two conditions appear high in 
consistency: 
 ~ODA  






The absence of ODA is necessary and 
sufficient to explain the absence of 




The presence of climate policies is 
necessary to explain the absence of 












No combination of conditions 
is higher than 0.75 
 
None of the combination of conditions 









One combination appears 
high in consistency (after 
reducing the paradoxical 
conditions) in the 
intermediate solution: 
~FFEM= ~ODA09c*~CRI09c 






The absence of ODA in conjunction 
with the absence of climate risk is 
necessary to explain the absence of 
the outcome. Coverage lower than 
0.75. Cases that explain this solution:  
Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Brazil, 
Panama and Trinidad and Tobago, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, 















Four conditions appear high 
in consistency: 
 
 HDI  












Consistent (0.95)  




The presence of human development 




The presence of climate policies is 




The presence of climate risk is 




The absence of ODA is necessary to 









One condition appears high in 
consistency: 






The absence of ODA is necessary and 
















No combination of conditions 
is higher than 0.75 
 
None of the combination of conditions 








One combination of 
conditions appears high in 
consistency in the 
intermediate solution: 
 
The absence of ODA in conjunction of 
absence of governance effectiveness 
is sufficient to explain the absence of 
the outcome. Coverage lower than 







Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Honduras, and Argentina. 
  Parsimonious solution:  












The absence of governance 
effectiveness is necessary but not 
sufficient to explain the absence of 
the outcome.  
 
The absence of climate risk is 
necessary but not sufficient to explain 
the absence of the outcome. 
 
The absence of climate policies is 
necessary but not sufficient to explain 
the absence of the outcome. 
 
Table 3.13 shows that in 2010 the condition that appears highest in consistency to explain the 
outcome was the presence of governance effectiveness (0.87), which explains some countries 
but might not describe the case of one of the major producers of fossil fuels in the region, 
Venezuela, which invests in fossil fuels but has low levels of governance effectiveness.  
 
In 2016, four conditions appear consistent: human development (0.85), climate policies (0.87), 
climate risk (0.77) and the absence of ODA (0.95), all of them with coverage below 0.75. Of 
these it is relevant to highlight that while in 2010 governance effectiveness was necessary 
(although not sufficient) to explain the outcome, in 2016 other conditions intervene. As it was 
explained in chapter 2, many countries in the region rely on fossil fuels to increase income, 
which could explain that in the absence of ODA they are more susceptible to invest in fossil 
fuel.  
 
However, to analyze the absence of the outcome in 2010, two conditions appear high in 
consistency, the absence of ODA (0.77), and the presence of climate policies (0.75). It could 
be said that the absence of ODA and the presence of climate policies is a necessary condition 
to explain the absence of fossil fuel investments, although the coverage is low, at 0.26. In 
2016 the condition that appears high in consistency to explain the absence of the outcome is 
the absence of ODA, which is also high in coverage (0.79), which means that in this year the 
absence of ODA was necessary and sufficient to explain the absence of the outcome.  
 
This might be a contradiction considering that the same condition appears in the presence of 
the outcome, however, it can be also read as in some cases the presence of ODA is also a 
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promoter of fossil fuel investments, since ODA includes all sorts of cooperation, not only on 
environmental matters; while in other countries the existence of ODA disincentives fossil fuel 
investments, which will be further discussed.  
 
In the analysis of the truth table, there is one combination that is high in consistency in 2010 




This means that the absence of ODA, in conjunction with the absence of climate risk, is 
necessary to explain the absence of the outcome.  While in 2016, the combination that is high 
in consistency (0.90) but low in coverage is:  
 
~FFEM16c = ~ODA15c*~GOV15c 
 
This means that the absence of ODA in conjunction with the absence of governance 
effectiveness is necessary to explain the outcome. The most relevant finding is that in both 
combinations ODA appears as necessary, which confirms that the absence of ODA is 
necessary and sufficient to explain the absence of public budget on fossil fuels production, 
which was observed in 2010 and in 2016.   
 
5) CCEM and other budgetary conditions 
 
A final exercise in the truth table was conducted, to analyze the relationship between the four 
outcomes, with the aim to analyze which outcome influences more the allocation of climate 
change budget in the environmental ministries (CCEM). In 2010 and 2016 no positive 
condition explains the presence of the outcome, but in 2010 the absence of environmental 
budget (~EBT) appears highly consistent (0.88) and therefore necessary to explain the absence 
of CCEM, although the coverage is below 0.75 (0.69), this means that the absence or low 
levels of environmental budget is necessary to explain the absence of climate change 
budget. 
 
However, the absence of a fossil fuel budget appears also high in consistency in 2010 (0.89), 
although not higher than 0.75 (0.68) in coverage, but this could be read as: the absence or 
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low levels of fossil fuels budget is necessary but not sufficient to explain the absence of the 
outcome.  
 
While in 2016, the conditions that have high consistency are the absence of environment 
budget (~EBT16c, 0.81) and the absence renewable energy budget (~REB, 0.75) although no 
higher than 0.75 (0.47, y 0.54 respectively). This can read as the absence or low levels of 
environmental expenditure and the absence of renewable expenditure budget are necessary 
but not sufficient to explain the absence of the outcome.  
 
In the truth table analysis, there is no combination of conditions high in consistency in 2010, 
but in 2016 the combination high in consistency (0.80), although low coverage, in the 




The absence or low levels of environmental expenditure in conjunction with the presence of 
renewable energy budget and the absence or low levels of fossil fuel budget are necessary 
but not sufficient to explain the presence of the outcome. 
 
The analysis to explain the absence of the outcome shows that the combination with higher 




The absence of a renewable energy budget and the presence of a fossil fuel budget are 
necessary but not sufficient to explain the absence of the outcome.  
 
This last analysis shows that the presence of environmental budget is important for the 
presence of a climate change budget. Another observation is that there is a correlation 
between the presence of climate budget and renewable energy budget, it seems that where 




Finally, the role of the fossil fuel budget is also important since it appears independently and 
in combination with other conditions highly consistent to explain the presence or absence of 
climate budget. There are three observations: 1) there are countries were the absence of fossil 
fuel budget explains the absence of climate budget; 2) there are countries where the presence 
of fossil fuel explains the absence of climate change budget; 3) there are countries where the 
absence of fossil fuel budget explains the presence of climate budget. In all cases this appears 
as necessary but not sufficient to explain the outcome. 
 
3.3.1. Key conclusions about the necessity and sufficiency of conditions  
  
The analysis of conditions and combinations of conditions provided four relevant conclusions. 
First, it is important to point out that no positive combination appeared as necessary and 
sufficient to explain the presence of the main outcomes; similarly, there was no combination 
of conditions necessary and sufficient to explain the presence. But there are five observations 
that deserve closer attention and that are of most relevance. 
1. In 2010 the absence of ODA is a necessary condition and almost sufficient to explain 
the absence of a climate change budget in environmental ministries: this means that 
the absence of ODA was a critical condition, but not quite sufficient to explain the 
absence of climate budget.     
2. In 2010 and 2016 the absence of ODA is a necessary and sufficient condition to explain 
the absence of environmental budget in relation to the central government’s budget: 
this is a critical finding since it reflects that the absence of low levels of ODA impact 
the attention that countries provide to environmental issues as part of the central 
priorities. It suggests that countries tend to invest in the environmental agenda if they 
receive ODA in exchange, therefore the absence of it implies the absence of interest 
or even the absence of capacity to deal with such issues, a tendency that persists over 
time. This interaction suggests a level of conditionality that will be further explored in 
the case studies. 
3. In 2010 the absence of ODA is necessary and almost sufficient to explain the absence 
of a renewable energy budget in the energy ministry: similarly, in 2010, the absence 
of ODA explained the absence of a renewable energy budget, but this tendency 
changed in 2016 when ODA became less relevant, which could be explained by the 
fact that in recent years is the private sector the one investing in the production and 
amplification of renewable energy around the world (IRENA, 2016).  
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4. In 2010 and 2016 the absence of ODA is necessary and sufficient to explain the absence 
of a fossil fuel budget in the energy ministries: absence of ODA is a critical condition 
to explain the absence of fossil fuel budget. This can be considered a paradoxical 
result, because ODA was created to deal with development problems, after related to 
the Development Millennium Goals, and recently with the Agenda 2030, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (UN, n.d.), where the production of fossil fuels is not 
desirable. However, ODA also reflects bilateral cooperation where the development 
of energy and mining activities could be included.  
5. In 2010 and 2016 fossil fuel budget plays an important role, since it appears 
independently and in combination with other conditions highly consistent to explain 
the presence or absence of climate budget. 
 
The key finding from the fuzzy sets method is that the existence or absence of ODA seems to 
condition the actual existence of budget in the environmental, climate change and renewable 
energy sectors, but also seems to be a condition to determine the levels of public investments 
on fossil fuels. In order to further analyse these results two case studies are chosen based on 
the fsQCA results.  
 
3.4. Case study selection based on fsQCA method  
 
The fsQCA studied the performance of the 21 major GHG emitters in Latin America and the 
Caribbean under the same conditions. However, in order analyse in more detail what factors 
promote or hinder mainstreaming climate change in the public budget, a small number of 
cases comparative analysis was applied. Lijphart recommends doing comparative analysis in 
comparative cases, meaning that they share similar characteristics (1971, p. 687).  
 
In Latin America and the Caribbean countries share many cultural aspects, but the size of the 
economies, societies and territories varies considerably. To do a comparative analysis requires 
considering these differences and similarities among countries to avoid generalizations. For 
instance, the fsQCA showed that, even though most of the countries have developed several 
policies related to climate change, not all of them have integrated climate change as an 
explicit feature of the public budget.  
 
Out of the 21 countries, twelve countries included specific resources in their public budget 
labelled as climate change in 2016, while six of them did so in 2010: Guatemala, Costa Rica, 
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Bolivia, Colombia, Honduras and Mexico. Therefore, based on the difference and agreement 
method of J.S. Mill, the cases were evaluated to identify any that are similar in profile, with 
different outcomes but characteristics that could be comparable.  
 
As shown in the QCA analysis, one condition that was an important influence in the allocation 
of public budget labelled as climate change was the presence or absence of ODA. The major 
recipient of ODA out of the six countries is Colombia; while in the parsimonious solution the 
absence of ODA explains the absence of climate budget in Colombia, Brazil and Bolivia. Reason 
why, Colombia was chosen. Mexico was also selected because it is also one of the major 
recipients of ODA and climate finance, but in different scale than Colombia.  
 
The comparison will analyse the degree of mainstreaming climate change in two key sectors, 
the environment and the energy sector in these countries, based on Daly´s levels of 
mainstreaming proposal (2005), explained in Chapter 1. The analysis will be presented in 




The Qualitative Comparative Analysis in its fuzzy set format enabled the identification of two 
conditions that are relevant to explain the absence of climate and renewable energy budget, 
namely, the role of ODA and the influence of the fossil fuel budget. Although the method does 
not aim to create generalizations, the role of ODA as independent condition and in 
combination to others was relevant to explain the different outcomes analysed. In general, it 
can be said that countries that do not receive ODA do not tend to invest their national 
resources on climate change, although this condition is necessary is not sufficient, which 
means that other conditions play a role as well. The absence of ODA also explains the absence 
renewable energy budget in the energy ministries where it is also necessary but not sufficient. 
However, the absence of ODA is both necessary and sufficient to explain the absence of 
environmental budget in relation to central governments budgets, as well as is necessary and 
sufficient to explain the absence of fossil fuels.  The last element, regarding the presence of 
fossil fuels, also influences the allocation of climate budget in different ways. These results 
will be further analysed in two case studies: Mexico and Colombia, that was possible to choose 
based on the findings of the fsQCA. 
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The Qualitative Comparative Analysis as a method aims to combine elements of qualitative 
and quantitative methods. It was used in this research is because the aim was to study a 
medium number of countries and to analyse different conditions rather than a single one, 
which is possible with the fuzzy set software. 
 
This thesis is pioneering in the use of this method to explain the conditions or combination of 
conditions that are necessary or sufficient to explain the presence and absence of public 
budget dedicated to climate change in Latin American countries. However, the application of 
this method was challenging for various reasons, notably the difficulty in securing access to 
raw and disaggregated data for all countries, and in establishing the definition of outcomes 
and conditions.  
 
Regarding the implementation of the method using the fsQCA software, which has been 
evolving, but it could further improve to facilitate the interpretation of the data, because it 
provides several observations, including positive and negative observations, which could be 
difficult to analyse. However, the rules proposed by Ragin, help to identify those that are more 
consistent and therefore more meaningful to answer the research question. 
 
Ragin and supporters of the QCA method suggest, that this method is not only valuable for 
the results it can obtain, but also as a process, because it requires several steps to get a result, 
which makes is more robust than other methods. The next four chapters will further analyse 











Mexico was identified as one of the twelve major GHG emitters in Latin American and the 
Caribbean that explicitly allocate public budget on activities to tackle climate change, in 
 100 
Chapter 3. Out of the twelve, Mexico is one of the lowest investors of public budget to tackle 
climate change in relation to the total environmental ministry budget. Due to its position as 
one of the major emitters of greenhouse gases in the region, as well as its vulnerability to the 
impacts of climate change, Mexico was chosen as a case study.  
 
This chapter investigates under what conditions Mexico is willing to mainstream climate 
change in the public budget and expenditure to comply with national and international 
climate goals and what factors promote or hinders such efforts. It takes into consideration the 
progress that the country is making towards mainstreaming climate change in the planning 
process and analyses the challenges that Mexico is facing in successfully transitioning towards 
a low carbon future and climate resilience. 
 
To do that, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section assesses the climate 
change mainstreaming efforts of Mexico based on the methodology proposed by Daly (2005), 
which looks at the levels of climate change mainstreaming through discourse, at the 
institutional level, in tools used to make policy, the generation and use of new data, and the 
level of innovation to make policies. Based on this evaluation, Mexico’s mainstreaming efforts 
can be placed into one of the following categories: 1) integrated approach, 2) mainstreaming 
in the form of limited transversality (mainstreaming light) or 3) highly fragmented climate 
mainstreaming. 
 
Since the core of the analysis is the public budget, the second section analyses the nature of 
public finance in Mexico and the levels of climate change mainstreaming in the public budget 
of the country. The third section examines the conditions that were identified as promoting 
or deterring climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Mexico, while the fourth 
and final section provides conclusions about the case study.  
 
 
4.1. Mexico in context  
 
Mexico has around 120 million inhabitants (INEGI, 2015) with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
of around 18,583 USD per capita (OECD, 2017). Is the eleventh largest economy 14 , and 
according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in 2015, 
 
14 In terms of GDP measured according to the parity of purchasing power (OECD, 2017).  
 101 
the national debt represented 53.3% of GDP. In the last three decades the country has 
experienced structural changes, going from an oil-dependent economy in the early 1990s, to 
a manufacturing-based economy in the same decade (1990´s). Mexico has increased its 
international trade capacity having signed twelve agreements. Although the economy has 
been improving in the last decade, Mexico has many social and environmental problems that 
impact the economy and the public finance system (CEFP, 2014). 
 
The UNFCCC regards Mexico as a developing country, however, it is also member of the OECD, 
thus sharing an international space with the wealthiest economies in the world. Mexico is also 
a major GHG emitter. In 2015 the country emitted 446.3 MtCO2, which represented 1.38% of 
global emissions (SEMARNAT, INECC, 2018), occupying the 13th position at the global level, 
which main source of GHG is the use and burning of fossil fuels (Mexican Government, 2015). 
 
At the same time, Mexico is considered highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
experiencing a growing number of events such as cyclones category 3 or higher on the Saffir-
Simpson scale “10 of which happened in the last 12 years” (Mexican Government, 2015). 
Furthermore, there have been five significant droughts during the 21st century and substantial 
portions of the country have been affected. In 2011 the drought affected 90% of the territory 
(Mexican Government, 2015). 
 
In this context, this chapter analyse the extent to which the country has been mainstreaming 
climate change in the planning and budgetary framework to respond to such events, based 
on the levels of mainstreaming proposed by Daly (2005) in her work on gender mainstreaming 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, such as: 1) Level of discourse or rhetoric analysis; 2) Level of 
institutional or structural change; 3) Innovation in the way that policy is made; 4) New data 
available and 5) Innovation in the tools used to make policy. However, as stated in Chapter 1, 
I also include a sixth level: levels of public budget allocated to tackle climate change.  
4.1.1. Level of discourse or rhetoric  
 
Mexico signed the UNFCCC on the 13th of June in 1992; approved by Congress in December of 
the same year, and ratified to the Convention in March 1993 (SEMARNAT, 2017). However, 
the development of the architecture to tackle the problem began in 2005. President Vicente 
Fox from the National Action Party (PAN, Partido Acción Nacional) initiated the changes in 
climate policy and introduced the preparation of the National Strategy on Climate Change 
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(ENCC, Estrategia Nacional de Cambio Climático) (CICC, 2006) and its Special Program on 
Climate Change (PECC, Programa Especial de Cambio Climático) (CICC, 2009).  
 
These initial actions started to frame the discourse on climate change in Mexico. By 2010 the 
country hosted the 16th Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, when climate change 
assumed unprecedented importance in the public discourse, including within the rhetoric of 
the government at international conferences (Interviews 9CSM, 1FGM, 11CSM).  
 
As part of the growing interest in climate change, Senator Alberto Cardenas of PAN, proposed 
the creation of a climate change law in 2010. However, the debates among political parties 
and the opposition from entities in the private sector resulted in a delay in approval. 
Nevertheless, the Climate Change Law (LGCC: Ley General de Cambio Climático) was approved 
in “record time” (Interview 4LPM) in June 2012 (DOF, 2012), at the end of Calderon´s 
presidency cycle.  
 
Although the approval of the LGCC is considered an achievement of the “Calderonismo” 
(Interview 4LPM), representatives from both governmental and non-governmental 
institutions, consider that the successful passage of this law resulted from the engagement of 
several stakeholders in its revision, discussion and finally its approval. It was not solely 
because of the leadership of the president, although it obviously helped (Interviews 9CSM, 
1FGM, 11CSM).   
 
In 2012, the PAN lost the elections and the previous governing party, Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institutional), took the presidency under the 
mandate of Enrique Peña. According to different experts, this political change also altered the 
rhetoric related to climate change (Interviews 10CSM, 11SCM).  
 
A representative from the federal congress mentioned that Calderon was personally 
interested in climate change and, as President, he included the topic in his discourses at 
national and international conferences. This included high-level discussions such as the G20 
in 2012 (Interview 4LPM). This is also the perception of non-governmental stakeholders 
(Interviews 15OIM, 9SCM). In fact, Patricia Espinosa, former Foreign Affairs Minister during 
Calderon´s administration was chosen as the Secretary of the UNFCCC for her role in the 
COP16, hosted to show the leadership of Mexico (Flores, 2012). In contrast, President Peña 
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did not display the same interest in the topic, reflected in the lack of “significant progress in 
climate policy” during his mandate (Interview 4LPM), which was confirmed later with the 
evaluation of the climate policy conducted by the INECC that will be mentioned later in this 
chapter.  
 
Based on the discourse, the priorities of Peña were oriented towards economic growth 
(Interview 17CSM). Nevertheless, representatives of governmental and non-governmental 
entities recognized that the government of Peña could not deny the climate commitments 
because of the LGCC that established specific targets.  In that sense, although the topic was 
not central in his rhetoric, actions did take place (Interviews 14IOM, 16FGM).  
 
Another way to analyse the progress of the climate change agenda is by studying the National 
Development Plan (PND, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo), the most important policy instrument 
in Mexico according to the Political Constitution of Mexico (CPEUM, 1917). The PND dictates 
the actions of the state and its sectors during that governmental period, which in the case of 
Mexico are 6 years (CPEUM, 1917, Article 26).  
 
For instance, the first explicit mention about climate change in the PND was in the period 
2001-2006, which acknowledged that “the expansion of industries that generate carbon 
emissions and other pollutants have a direct or indirect impact on climate change” (Mexican 
Government, 2001, p.13). Although this was a small reference, it prompted future references 
on the topic, as the previous PND in 1996-2000 included some reference about the 
environment but nothing explicitly about climate change (Mexican Government, 1996, 
p.133).  
 
Later, and for the first time, in the PND of 2007-2012 (during Calderon´s mandate), there was 
a specific chapter about climate change under the umbrella of the environmental 
sustainability goal (Mexican Government, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, in the version of PND in 2013-2018 (during Peña´s period) there was, once again, 
no mention of climate change, although the program talks about sustainable development 
(Mexican Government, 2013). According to civil society representatives this reflected the lack 
of interest by Peña on the issue (Interview 9CSM). Along the same lines, in the PND 2019-
2024 designed under the mandate of Andrés López, from MORENA (Movimiento de 
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Regeneración Nacional), elected in 2018, no reference about climate change was included. 
There was only one paragraph about sustainable development, but with more focus on social 
matters rather than environmental issues (Mexican Government, 2019). After years of 
progress, the latest PND version could be consider the weakest related to environmental 
issues in the last twenty years.  
4.1.2. Level of institutional or structural change 
 
The first institutional effort to deal with climate change in a structural and integral way was 
the creation of the Inter-Ministerial Commission of Climate Change (CICC, Comisión 
Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático) in 2005. This commission had the aim of mainstreaming 
climate change across different ministries beyond the environmental ministry.15  
 
The main responsibilities of the CICC are to create and implement national policies related to 
the mitigation and adaptation to climate change and its incorporation in programs and 
sectorial actions, to promote compliance with the UNFCCC and to participate in the design 
and implementation of the PECC, among others (LGCC, 2012). Within the CICC, seven working 
groups were established16 and in 2018, a new group was created for climate finance matters 
(GT-FIN), however at the time of writing this thesis it is not in operation (GFLAC, 2018).  
 
Although the CICC was created in 2005, it was not until 2012 that the Commission was legally 
mandated to operate with the approval of the LGCC. With the recognition and establishment 
of the CICC, the LGCC mandated the creation of the National System on Climate Change 
(SINACC, Sistema Nacional de Cambio Climático), which “aims to promote a cross cutting 
application of the national policy of climate change in the short, medium and long term 
between the authorities of the three orders of government (federal, sub national and the 
municipalities), as well as with other entities such as the Mexican Congress (Deputies and 
Senates)” (SEMARNAT, 2015a).  
 
 
15 There are now 14 ministries that are members of the CICC: Energy, Governance, Foreign Affairs, Marine, Finance, 
Social Development, Economy, Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development, Communications and Transport, 
Public Education, Health, Tourism, Rural and Urban Territorial Development, and Environment and Natural 
Resources (CICC, 2015). 
 
16 The group for the elaboration of the Special Programme on Climate Change (GF-PECC); the adaptation group 
(GF-ADAPT); the reduction of emission for deforestation and degradation group (GT-REDD); the mitigation group 
(GT-MITIG); the group related to the international negotiations on climate change (GF-INT); the Mexican 
Committee for the reduction of emissions and GHG Capture group (COMEGEI) and the group for the link with Civil 
Society (GT-VINC) (SEMARNAT, 2015). 
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The CICC participates within the SINACC, which was established for the first time in 2014, as 
well as the National Institute of Ecology, which changed its mandate and name to the National 
Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC, Instituto Nacional de Ecología y Cambio 
Climático) to act as the technical arm of the federal government on climate change matters 
(Mexican Government, 2015). 
 
To date, SINACC has been operating for five years. In an analysis that assesses the 
implementation of the law during this period, Averchenkova and Guzman (2018) found that 
one of the most difficult tasks that the country has faced is the coordination of SINACC 
because of the high number of entities involved. Former civil servants, who are now 
representatives of civil society, commented that SINACC´s operation is highly complex and 
that achieving full collaboration among all the entities is difficult (Interview 24CSM).  
 
Regarding the CICC, neither an internal nor external assessment has been conducted on its 
operation.  Based on interviews, there are at least three general perceptions about its work: 
1) the mandate is not strong enough to ensure the compliance of all the ministries involved 
(Interviews 9CSM, 17CSM, 11CSM); 2) there are no periodic activities through which all the 
ministries can interact and work together, because legally they have to have only two 
meetings per year, which are protocol meetings, instead of technical ones (Interview 5FGM). 
In the few meetings held, “only lower directors that do not have the capacity to take decisions 
attend” (Interview 1FGM); and 3) besides the limited capacities bestowed on the 
environmental ministry with the creation of the Direction for Climate Change Policies in 2012, 
and recently in the Climate Change General Direction created by the agriculture ministry, 
there is a lack of capacity in other ministries regarding climate change (Interviews 1FGM, 
18AM). There is thus a concern that there is a lack of strong leadership from SEMARNAT to 
guarantee the mainstreaming process in the rest of the CICC (Interview 2LPM). The ideal 
scenario, according to a high-level representative of the energy ministry is to delegate the 
coordination of the CICC to the Ministry of Government, who according to the LGCC could be 
also president (Interview 5FGM). 
 
The INECC is an entity that, thanks to the approval of the LGCC, became more independent of 
SEMARNAT to provide technical support for the rest of the federal government and to the 
SINACC. However, according to civil society and a consultant, instead of developing an integral 
strategy to strengthen capacities of other ministries, INECC operates in isolation with a strong 
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dependency on SEMARNAT (Interviews 9CSM, 25CEM), which is hindering the mainstreaming 
process. An important fact is that INECC is now the one in charge of doing the assessment of 
the climate policy, which according to certain stakeholders that is a conflict of interest 
because the assessments need to be independent (Interview 17CSM).  
4.1.3. Innovation in the tools used to make policy 
 
The document called “Towards a National Strategy on Climate Change” was the first attempt 
to include multi-sectorial actions in 2005 (CICC, 2006). This was later published as the ENCC 
in 2007 (CICC, 2007), and renewed later in 2013 during the government of Peña (Mexican 
Government, 2013). The PECC was proposed to implement this strategy, defining specific 
targets and entities responsible to achieve such targets. The first Program was published in 
2009 (CICC, 2009). 
 
However, it is considered that the approval of the LGCC that was the most innovative tool to 
make climate change policies because it strengthened the existing institutional arrangements 
and policies such as the CICC, the ENCC and the PECC (Interviews 19LPM, 20SGM).   
 
The LGCC established that the ENCC must have a vision for every 10, 20 and 40 years, which 
must be revised every 10 years, while the PECC must be elaborated every six years (LGCC, 
2012).  However, the PECC published for 2014-2018 was criticized for being a ‘business as 
usual’ program and not innovative, as most actions are part of existing sectorial programs that 
were not designed to take into consideration a climate change perspective. For this reason, 
the measures included are rather forcedly ad hoc (Interview 9SCM). Governmental 
representatives consider the PECC a good driver for climate change mainstreaming in terms 
of policy development (Interview 1FGM), but former government, civil society and academic 
representatives believe that it is not effective due to the lack of technical engagement from 
other ministries and lack of additionality (Interviews 4LPM, 9CSM, 18AM); “If the policies of 
the PECC are not included in the sectorial programs of other ministries is never going to be 
effective” (Interview 15OIM). 
 
Furthermore, the study conducted by INECC found that only 43% of the actions included in 
the PECC (2014-2018) were accomplished, even though the Programme was created based 
on existing sectorial measures with budget allocation (INECC, 2018). In this sense, “even 
though there were no additional measures, PECC still failed on compliance” (Interview 9CSM).  
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The other concern is that the PECC was the basis for the creation of the National Determined 
Contributions (NDCs) that Mexico submitted to the UNFCCC within the context of the Paris 
Agreement, which affects the ambition of the goals (Interview 18AM). 
 
Another key criticism for both the PECC and the NDCs is the lack of an implementation route 
map, which clearly establishes how these measures will be implemented and financed. The 
LGCC includes a Climate Change Fund and other financial mechanisms, such as a carbon tax; 
however, there is no strategy to connect these to the actual implementation of these policies 
(Interviews 2LPM, 1FGM, 4LPM, 10CSM, 11CSM; GFLAC, 2018; Averchenkova & Guzman, 
2018). In 2018 the LGCC was amended and harmonized with the Paris Agreement and the 
NDCs, however, the NDCs submitted by Mexico are not aligned to the goals of the Paris 
Agreement, creating a contradiction (Averchenkova & Guzman, 2018). 
 
The long-term vision that the LGCC provides is considered an important tool for the future of 
climate policy in the country, because according to a congress representative, the law 
provides a level of certainty for the future, “regardless which political party is in power, the 
law must be obeyed” (Interview 4LPM). However, the major problem recognized is that the 
LGCC does not include sanctions, in which case “the lack of compliance could mean anything 
for the entities” (Interviews 2LPM). In this sense, although innovative, the law needs to be 
strengthened for full compliance and allow for punitive measures.  
4.1.4. New data available  
 
Mexico is the only country in Latin America that has submitted six national communications 
to the UNFCCC.  These are documents that were requested from the Convention to inform 
about the progress of policies and actions completed at the national level to deal with climate 
change, as well as the challenges faced to do so (UNFCCC, n.d.3). The first one was submitted 
in 1997 and the last was submitted in 2018 (INECC, 2018). 
 
The LGCC has also mandated the creation of the Information System on Climate Change, led 
by the National Institute of Geography and Statistic (INEGI, Instituto Nacional de Geografía y 
Estadística) (LGCC, 2012).  INEGI has collected and compiled information on emissions and the 
impact on climate change but has yet to include data on the costs or other financial 
considerations for climate change.  
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In the case of financial data, there is no clarity on how much money is received to deal with 
climate change and how much money is allocated through public expenditure. This lack of 
transparency was identified as one of the conditions that is hindering the mainstreaming 
process in both planning and budgeting, since the responsible entities do not have enough 
information to decide how to deal with climate change (Interviews 1FGM, 10CSM, 9CSM).  
Although there is progress in the latter, there are challenges that will be further discussed. 
4.1.5. Innovation in policy creation  
 
The LGCC is considered an innovative tool to facilitate policy formulation. With it, Mexico is 
viewed in the international community as a country that is proactive and a leader for 
promoting policy innovation for climate change (Interviews 4LPM, 9CSM). Mexico has 
complied with the demands that come from the UNFCCC and has received credit at the 
international level. It was the first developing country to submit its NDCs in 2015 (Interview 
1FGM).  
 
Within the NDCs, an important step taken by the Mexican Government was the creation of an 
unconditional set of measures, which are those “that Mexico will implement with its own 
resources”, and conditional actions that are “those that could be implemented if a new 
multilateral climate regime was established from which Mexico would obtain additional 
resources” (Mexican Government, 2015). This is relevant because Mexico has indicated its 
willingness, by 2030, to improve on its GHGs from 22% to 36% and black carbon reductions 
from 51% to 70%; this is even more ambitious than the goals established in the law of 2012.  
 
As Daly (2005) proposed, to be truly innovative, besides the progress on policy and 
institutional arrangements, there should be public investments. In the next section I conduct 
an analysis that shows the extent to which climate change has been mainstreamed in the 
public budget in Mexico. 
 
4.2. Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the public budget  
 
The allocation of public budget is an important source of resources to invest on climate change 
matters, and it is a mandate that comes from the LGCC. In this way, the aim is to understand 
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to what extent climate change has been included and mainstreamed in the public budget and 
under what conditions that allocation has been taking place.  
 
The cost of climate change and sources of climate finance  
 
In 2009, SEMARNAT and the finance ministry (SHCP, Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público) 
demanded an analysis of the costs of climate change in Mexico. Some of the main conclusions 
of the analysis stated that, by 2100, the cost of climate change in Mexico could be “at least 
three times more than the cost of mitigating 50% of the emissions” (Galindo, 2009, p. 6).  
 
Although this analysis has not been updated since its publication, the debate about the 
economic and financial means to deal with climate change in Mexico has grown considerably. 
In 2018, the INECC made an estimation of the cost of 30 mitigation measures included n the 
NDCs in Mexico, pointing out that the cost would be about USD 126 billion during the period 
of 2015-2030, but that the cost of inaction could be USD 146 billion (INECC, 2018). This study 
suggests that Mexico could be investing public resources to cover part of the measures, but 
that the mobilization of further resources is important.  
 
Mexico has been the beneficiary of international cooperation from the Official Development 
Assistant (ODA). Between 2011 and 2015, however, the amount of support received varied 
significantly, as shown in Table 4.1.  
 
Table 4. 1 Evolution of ODA in Mexico in millions of USD (2011-2015) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Amount 973.2 407.9 562.4 814.9 308.9 
Source: Own elaboration with OECD data for the period 2011-2015 (OECD, 2017b) 
 
The ODA support is dedicated to different areas and based on the information provided by 
the OECD in the ODA report, it is difficult to know how much of that cooperation is related or 
dedicated to climate change. However, there are other studies that have estimated the 
amount of climate finance received in Mexico.  
 
According to GFLAC, in the period 2014-2018, Mexico received around USD 3,232 million from 
international mechanisms, including cooperation in the form of grants and finance in the form 
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of loans, to finance 75 projects (GFLAC, 2018). Meanwhile the Climate Funds Update, points 
out that Mexico and Brazil are the major recipients of climate funds, receiving close to half of 
the support. According to the 2018 update, Mexico received USD 705 million (Watson & 
Schalatek, 2019).  
 
From the point of view of former and current representatives of government, the evolution 
of climate policies in Mexico has been possible with the interest and support of international 
cooperation and that many projects have been dependent on such contributions, including 
the design of national policies (Interviews 15OI, 14OIM, 1FGM, 16FGM). 
 
In order to diversify these financial resources, and based on the LGCC, other fiscal, market, 
financial and economic mechanisms were proposed to invest in climate change activities. The 
most relevant are the climate change fund, the carbon tax and the carbon market.  
 
The Climate Change Fund (FCC, Fondo de Cambio Climático), created by the LGCC, aims to 
collect and channel financial resources to support the implementation of climate change 
activities, with adaptation actions being the priority (LGCC, 2012, Article 80). The law says that 
the Fund could have several sources of income, including budget allocation every year and 
other public funds, as well as international grants, the resources that come from carbon bonds 
and certificates, among others (LGCC, 2012, Article 80). This Fund operates through a national 
development bank, which serves as a trustee: Nacional Financiera (NAFIN). A technical 
committee was established by SHCP and is presided by SEMARNAT (LGCC, 2012, Chapter VII).  
 
Although the Fund is considered an innovation in the country, civil society, legislative and 
international organization representatives consider the operation of the Fund unsuccessful 
because of the lack of actual financial resources at its disposal (Interviews 11CSM, 14IOM, 
4LPM). Since one source of income is a public expenditure, the allocation of funds has been 
done mainly through the budget that SEMARNAT has (including money that the ministry did 
not use), but not from additional sources (Interviews 17CSM, 2LPM).  
 
Moreover, this Fund is not considered transparent because of the lack of information to assess 
its effectiveness (Interview 4LPM); and because the Committee, which includes members of 
civil society, does not operate as planned (Interview 11CSM).   
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In addition, a carbon tax was created in the fiscal reform in 2013. According to President Peña 
(2017), the amount of money raised from the carbon tax by 2017 was USD 1.3 billion. Although 
there was support for the creation of this instrument, the main concern from civil society 
representatives is that it has served only as a revenue collection instrument, because the 
revenues goes to the general budget and has not been allocated to environmental projects 
(Interview 9CSM); because according to a finance ministry representative, is not possible to 
make direct allocations (Interview 12FGM).  
 
At the same time, the LGCC established that the federal government must create, authorize, 
and regulate emission trading (LGCC, 2012: Article 94). The first exercise to have a voluntary 
emissions’ trade was proposed in 2017 and, during 2018, there were piloting models to 
prepare the market in Mexico (Alarcón, 2018), the base of which was finally published in 
November 2019 (DOF, 2019). 
 
The LGCC highlights the need to promote mechanisms to raise and re-allocate funds for these 
actions (LGCC, 2012) and, in Article 34, emphasizes the necessity to have a public budget to 
implement climate policies.  
4.2.1. Public finance in Mexico: General context  
 
It is important to analyse the public finance system in general, to understand the function of 
the public budget. As it was stated in Chapter 2, the balance in the public finance cycle is a 
relevant aspect that determines the economy of a country.  
4.2.2. Revenues  
 
Mexico’s public finance system has not been able to fulfil the needs of its population. A study 
conducted in 2003 showed that one of the elements that makes Mexico’s public finance 
system vulnerable is its high reliance on revenue from goods whose value is volatile such as 
fossil fuels (CIDE, ITAM, 2003). The study explained that the price of these goods used to be 
reliable, but with the reduction of reserves in the country, such as oil, and fluctuating 
international pricing, the scenario has changed in recent years and that the country needs to 
create structural reforms to increase income and create better redistributive policies. Ten 
years after this study was completed, the country approved structural reforms aiming to 
redefine the revenue policies in the country through the fiscal reform in 2013 (SHCP, 2013).     
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This reform aimed to tackle the changes in the pricing of goods, but also other problems such 
as the low level of tax collection as the country only collects around 10% of taxes in relation 
to its GDP. Comparatively, this is more than countries such as Haiti and Guatemala, but less 
than countries like Chile with 19%, Brazil with 35%, Argentina with 30% (CEFP, 2014) and far 
below other advanced economies and members of the OECD which collect, on average, 40% 
taxes on GDP (CIDE & ITAM, 2003, p. 40). The two principal reasons why Mexico’s tax 
collection is the low rate of contributions from the population and the wide scale of its 
informal market.  
 
According to the Centre for Public Finance Studies (2014) (CEFP, Centro de Estudios de las 
Finanzas Públicas), except for the state of Chihuahua in the north of Mexico, all federal states 
have 50% of their population working in the informal economy (p. 33). Cumulatively, this 
represents 35% of the GDP of the country (CEFP, 2014). There is also a problem with 
regulation coupled with a complex administrative process.  Of note, only 32.87% of the 
population is registered in the fiscal system and even less (20%) pay taxes (CEFP, 2014).  
 
On the other hand, the fiscal reform also strengthened the national oil company, Mexican 
Petroleum (PEMEX, Petróleos Mexicanos), and enabled a modern and efficient fiscal regime 
(SHCP, 2013).  
 
The revenue in Mexico by 2015 was 23.7% of GDP (USD 146,387.97) having increased 
constantly during the most recent years (OECD, 2017).  The main two sources of revenue in 
Mexico are oil revenue17 and non-oil revenue18, and Table 4.2 provides shows the proportion 
of these revenues in relation to the GDP. 
 
Table 4. 2 Revenues perspective as percentage of GDP (2015-2019) 
Concept 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Total 21.77 22.59 23.32 24.04 24.60 
Oil revenue 
(Federal 
6.88 7.58 8.20 8.81 9.22 
 
17 The two main sources in the category of oil revenue since the reform are: 1) Special tax on production and 
services (IEPS) to gasoline and diesel, and 2) PEMEX’s own revenues and oil rights (SCHP, 2014). 
18 This category includes: 1) Tax revenue, which is the contributions of companies and citizens; and 2) Non-tax 
revenue, which is the payment of rights and concessions for the use of goods and services. The third source of 
revenue comes from the income of entities that contribute to the revenue and control the budget directly, such as 








14.89 15.01 15.12 15.23 15.38 
Entities 
revenue  
3.58 3.57 3.56 3.54 3.53 
Source: SHCP, 2013, p. XIX 
 
Although there was a reduction in the state dependence on oil revenue, Mexico’s exploitation, 
production, and exportation of oil is still important. The projections for such contributions 
show an increase to more than 9% by 2019, according to SHCP (SHCP, 2013). 
 
An interesting element of the reform in 2013, is that it created a fiscal space for ecological and 
consumption taxes that could improve revenue collection and the quality of life of the 
population (SHCP, 2013). As was noted, a carbon tax was created which costs 43.77 Mexican 
pesos per ton of CO2.  Other taxes imposed on higher-pollutant fuels were gasoline (10.38 
cents of MXP/liter), diesel (12.59 cents of MXP/liter) and others, but not to natural gas, which 
according to experts, it could be the biggest source of income because of the growing 
exploitation of this resource (MexiCO2, n.d.).  
 
Beyond revenue collection, this reform promoted positive incentives such as the removal of 
tax on machinery and all equipment for the generation of renewable energy; the exemption 
of taxes on the acquisition of hybrid and electric cars continued; and the exemption of 
payment for the import of natural gas - which was highly criticised because it incentivises the 
use of this fossil fuel (Interview 9CSM). The reform also produced a reduction in the fiscal 
charges to PEMEX.  
 
According to the former Minister of Finance, the fiscal reforms were having positive impacts 
because they helped raise funds. The carbon tax and taxes on sugary beverages generated 
income of USD 1.7 million by 2014. Meanwhile the reduction of subsidies in gasoline and 
diesel raised an additional USD 3 million in 2014 (SHCP, 2013: III). Although the fiscal reform 
 114 
was successful in collecting more tax revenue, “is impossible to know the destination of the 
money” (Interview 1FGM). 
 
In addition, another element that reduces the capacity to raise taxes and is creating further 
pressure to the government is the external credits, which also creates external debts, a topic 
that will not be further analysed in this research but which creates additional pressure on the 
finance system (Tello & Hernández, 2010, p. 41).  
 
4.2.3 Public budget and expenditure  
 
Article 31 of the Constitution of Mexico articulates that, “all Mexicans have to contribute to 
the public expenditure, of the Federation, the Federal District, or the State where they are 
residents, in a proportional and equitable way according to the specific laws in place” (CPEUM, 
1917, Article 31st).  
 
As noted earlier, public budget and expenditure are linked to revenue generation. In Mexico, 
from 2013 to 2017, the difference between revenue and public expenditure is negligible as 
shown in Table 4.3. The table presents information from the Budgetary Transparency 
Platform19 created by the Finance Ministry. 
 
Table 4. 3 Comparison between revenue and public expenditure in millions of USD (period 
2014-2018) 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Revenue 224,552 235,986 243,568 245,748 264,842 
Public 
expenditure 
224,552 235,986 270,326 245,748 264,842 
 Source: Own elaboration based on the Budgetary Transparency Platform version for 2013, 
2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 
* Budget approved for 2017. 
 
One of the major debates regarding public expenditure is the limitation of the resources that 
will be allocated and the destination of such resources. Chapter 2 depicted this as a highly 
politicised debate, particularly when the resources are limited. Table 4.4 provides a brief 
 
19 The Budgetary Transparency Platform is available from https://www.transparenciapresupuestaria.gob.mx/ 
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comparative analysis on the allocation of public budget in key sectors such as energy and the 
environment in the period of 2014-2018.  
 























162.747 154.942 138.399 118.464 120.907* 
Direct control 
entities (PEMEX) 
26,168.61 27,116.93 23,991.94 19,661.01 19,661.02* 
Direct control 
entities (CFE) 
15,353.03 15,774.02 15,021.41 16,676.74 19,442.51* 
Source: Own elaboration with information from the Budgetary Transparency Platform 2014, 
2015, 2016, 2017 and budget projection for 2018. 
 
Notably, the allocation of money for the environmental protection sector is considerably 
lower when compared to the allocation for the fuel and energy sector. In the project of the 
federal budget for 2018 the relationship was USD 1,134.67 million for the environmental 
protection sector versus USD 47,458.32 million for the fuel and energy sector. Therefore, the 
fuel and energy sector have a budget that is 41 times greater that the environmental 
protection sector.  
 
Paradoxically, when the allocation of the budget is analysed through the institutional 
component, the findings indicate that the budget for the environmental ministry (SEMARNAT, 
Secretaría de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales) was USD 1,858.30 million versus USD 
120.907 million allocated to the Energy Ministry (SENER, Secretaria de Energía) in 2018, which 
is considerably less. While SENER has a lower budget than SEMARNAT, my analysis of the 
budget shows that the main recipients in the energy sector are the major state-owned 
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companies, PEMEX and the Federal Commission of Electricity (CFE, Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad), with USD 19,661.02 million provided to PEMEX and USD 19,442.51 million for 
CFE in 2018. This relationship will be further analysed in the next section and in Chapter 5 
where the energy sector is discussed in detail, but in the next section I explain what this means 
for the attention on climate change.  
4.2.4. Public budget for climate change   
 
In Mexico, and according to the LGCC, the federal government as well as local governments 
and municipalities are responsible for elaborating and proposing the budgetary provisions for 
adaptation and mitigation actions (LGCC, 2012, Articles 7 and 8). At the same time, in order 
to finance the main instruments of climate policy, such as the PECC, the law states that the 
program must include a budgetary estimation to implement the proposed goals and targets. 
Specifically, Article 70 says that: 
 …the projects and other actions contemplated in the Program... shall be 
executed according to the resources approved in the Federal Income Law. 
Additionally, they will depend on the budgetary availability that is approved 
for these purposes in the Budget of Expenditures of the Federation… (LGCC, 
2012, Article 70). 
 
As a way to know the budgetary provisions related to climate change, a tool was created called 
the Transversal Annex on Mitigation and Adaptation of Climate Change of the Federal Public 
Expenditure, call it AT-CC. It was created due to pressure from civil society that demanded 
more transparency on climate budget allocation (Interview 10CSM, 11CSM).  
 
The Transversal Annex on Mitigation and Adaptation of Climate Change, AT-CC  
 
In 2009, a labelled budgetary classification about climate change was included in the public 
budget for the first time (in the programmatic classification of the environmental sector)20.  
This category corresponded to the PECC operated by SEMARNAT. In 2010 the amount of 
money received in this category was USD 4,799,570, more than triple the sum when compared 
to 2009 (see Table 4.5). Representatives from civil society and Congress believed this was 
 





because COP16 took place in Mexico in 2010, and the Congress wanted to show a compromise 
to the international community, approving extra resources for the program during that year 
(Interviews 9CSM, 4LPM).  
 
However, in 2011 after COP16, the budget allocated for the PECC dropped 8-fold, indicating a 
possible loss in financial support. Nevertheless, in the same year, a new entity called Program 
for Mitigation and Adaptation of Climate Change (PMACC, Programa de Mitigación y 
Adaptación al Cambio Climático) was created, which is a program implemented by INECC. 
 
The PMACC received USD 27,197,100 in 2011, including an extra allocation of USD 14,749,500 
approved by the Congress as part of “the spirit of COP16” (Interview 11CSM), and as part of 
the debate that was taking place previous to the approval of the LGCC (Interview 10CSM). 
However, in 2012, the budget dropped to less than half of the amount received in 2011.  
 
There is no clarity on the amount allocated in 2013 because the information does not appear 
in the Federal Budget. But, in 2014, the PECC and the PMACC were replaced by two new 
categories, “Research on climate change, environmental sustainability and green growth” 
(ICCSACV, Investigación en Cambio Climático, sustentabilidad ambiental y crecimiento verde, 
ICCSACV) and the category “Research Policies on Climate Change” (PICC, Políticas de 
Investigación de Cambio Climático). While the ICCSACV received more resources in 2014 than 
2015 (USD 11,996,900 and USD 11,918,500 respectively), PICC received less over the same 
period (USD 254,940 and USD 256,966 respectively). In 2016 and 2017, these categories 
disappeared, as the Table 4.5 shows.  
 
Table 4. 5 Evolution of the public labelled as climate change 
Year Program Amount in 
USD 
2009 PECC 1,021,160 
2010 PECC 4,907,120 
2011 PECC 568,365 
PMACC 27,806,500 
2012 PECC 484,182 
PMACC 10,629,800 
2013 - - 
2014 ICCSACV 12,265,700 
PICC 260,653 
2015 ICCSACV 12,185,500 
PICC 262,724 
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2016 - - 
2017 - - 
Source: Own elaboration with information of the Federal 
Public Expenditure for the period 2009-2017. 
 
In order to track these movements and after the approval of the LGCC in 2013, it was created 
the AT-CC. The creation of cross-sectorial annexes included in the PEF was established in 2008. 
According to the Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law (LFPRH, Ley de Presupuesto 
Federal y Responsabilidad Hacendaria) published in 2012, the annexes were created to 
provide information about programs that include the participation of different ministries 
(INECC, 2017a, p. 19).  
 
In this case, the informative annex about climate change, was labelled as the Annex 16 in 
2015, with the goal to identify the amount of public expenditure allocated to deal with climate 
change in the responsible entities (the members of the CICC) (Interviews 4LPM). The amount 
of money reported from 2013 until 2017 has been between USD 1,696,880 and USD 
1,813,100, with the lowest amount identified in 2017 as can be seen in Figure 4.1. Although 
in 2018 the amount increased to USD 3,234,622 million, in 2019 a significant reduction is seen 
to USD 1,847,622 million (GFLAC, 2018). 
 
Figure 4. 1 Allocation of public expenditure in the AT-CC in USD (period 2013-2018) 
 
Source: GFLAC, 2018. 
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The amount of money reported in the Annex 16 is limited; in relation to the Total Public 
Federal Expenditure it has gone from 0.84% in 2014 to 1.16% in 2018, as shown in Figure 4.2, 
which means that explicit climate change programs play a limited role in the whole budget 
(GFLAC, 2018).  
 
Figure 4. 2 Representation of the AT-CC resources in regards to the total public 
expenditure, in percentage (period 2013-2018) 
 
Source: GFLAC, 2018. 
 
In 2017, the INECC conducted an assessment about the function of the AT-CC. Based on this 
assessment, three key aspects, amongst others, were identified. First, there is no 
methodology to clearly define what constitutes climate change activities, a reason why the 
implementation of the AT-CC raises high levels of uncertainty regarding the information 
provided.    
 
Secondly, there is no correlation between what was included in the AT-CC, and the measures 
included in the PECC. This means that not all the programs included in the AT-CC are part of 
the PECC, and other programs included in the PECC are not part of the AT-CC (INECC, 2017a, 
p. 27). 
 
Thirdly, the SINACC and the CICC - the two bodies with mandates to define the guidance for 
the mainstreaming of climate change within the national planning processes - have not 
provided guidance to mainstream climate change within the public expenditure, and 
therefore such an exercise has not been integrated in the At-CC. Similarly, the Congress as the 
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entity with oversight responsibilities to approve the budget has not executed its mandate in 
this regard.   
 
The assessment of the INECC emphasized that, in order to comply with the climate policy 
goals, it is necessary to allocate public expenditure according to national priorities established 
in the LGCC. According to INECC, public expenditure “is the most important financing 
instrument for the fulfilment of the PECC” (INECC, 2017a, p. 11).   
 
The Former President of the Climate Change Commission within the Deputies Chamber 
conducted another study to identify the methodology that the entities used to provide 
information to the AT-CC.21 The Commission analysed 66 measures that were included in the 
Annex in 2016.  Out of the 66 measures or programs, only one was labelled as climate change 
and corresponded to the programme “Research on climate change, sustainability and green 
growth”.   
 
An important element that this study highlighted was that, while many of the activities 
included in the AT-CC were not related to climate change, the main concern is that activities 
that can exacerbate the problem were included, such as measures related to PEMEX, namely 
“infrastructure maintenance”, and “economic infrastructure of hydrocarbons projects”. The 
first does not mention what type of infrastructure it refers to, and the second clearly refers to 
infrastructure of hydrocarbons. The possible explanation of this is that the Annex has to be 
incremental, this means that the resources included there cannot be less than the previous 
years, which can explain why ministries are included any activity to comply with that rule 
(Interview 17CSM). 
 
The analysis of the public expenditure shows that the topic of climate change is still in its very 
early stages of integration in the public finance system in Mexico (Interviews 3LPM). 
According to non-governmental representatives, the creation of the Annex is an important 
transparency tool for revealing the amount of money that the different entities have allocated 
in the public expenditure related to climate change (Interviews 10CSM, 11CSM). Yet, the 
evidence shows that the Annex is not a tool that aims to redistribute expenditure or redefine 
the planning processes to mainstream climate change (Interviews 9CSM); although it could 
be if better methodologies are created (16FGM). 
 
21 In this exercise, 16 entities were identified that provided information to the Annex 16 in 2016 and 2017. 
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4.3. Discussion about levels of climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgetary 
process in Mexico  
 
Mexico has progressing mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgetary process. 
However, the levels of mainstreaming vary depending on the political momentum that a 
country is experiencing.  
 
For instance, when analysing the mainstreaming climate change in the rhetoric or discourse – 
it was observed that the discourse changes along the time, depending on the interest of the 
person in power, which is not necessarily associated to the political party, although 
conservative parties appear to be more progressive in the climate agenda. The concern here 
is that political changes such as the arrival of Lopez in 2019 presented a dramatic change, 
bringing policies that go in the opposite direction. Dr Gay points out that for instance, “the 
energy strategies are not coherent with the climate policy” (Dominguez, 2019), although 
during Lopez´s campaign there was presented a plan for environmental policy that included 
climate change actions (NaturAMLO, 2019).    
 
For the second level of analysis regarding institutional arrangements and systemic change, the 
creation of the CICC and SINACC are the most relevant attempts to mainstream climate 
change in different ministries of the federal government. However, the concrete 
mainstreaming activities within institutions is very limited. Only two out of the fourteen 
ministry members of the CICC (the environmental and the agricultural ministries) have areas 
dedicated to climate change. Although there was a consolidation of entities, such as the 
National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) dedicated to the topic, this has not 
resulted in engagement with the rest of the sectors. 
 
Regarding the third level of mainstreaming related to innovative tools to make policies, it was 
observed that, according to most of the interviews, the publication of the LGCC created a new 
stage for climate policy in Mexico. The Law is considered an innovative tool to make policy, 
among other things, because it established goals. However, the policies included in the Law, 
such as the ENCC and the PECC, are not progressive and innovative enough, but rather are 
seen as ‘business as usual’ instruments. Besides that, the Law does not include a strategy to 




In the fourth level regarding new data, Mexico has produced some information to improve its 
international reports to the UNFCCC. Missing information is related to the cost of all measures 
(mitigation and adaptation), as well as information on the amount of money available and 
needed, to comply with these measures. In the absence of this information, climate planning 
is difficult.  
 
The final level looks at innovation in the way that policy is made which, according to Daly, 
should have a broader range of official actors involved in the policy process, shows that 
recently under the mandate of Lopez, limited mention of climate change and a growing 
interest in fossil fuel is observed, nevertheless at the non-governmental level further efforts 
to tackle climate change is observed. 
 
Regarding the sixth level, related to public budget to tackle climate change, it was observed 
that there are public resources used to deal with the problem, the creation of the annex in 
the public expenditure was an important progress in terms to transparent these resources. 
However, the amount is still limited, and the annex is guiding entities to a better decision-
making process.  
 
This analysis of the levels of mainstreaming allows us to understand that Mexico´s efforts to 
mainstream climate change in the planning and budgetary processes are in a form of “limited 
transversality” in terms of Daly´s (2005) descriptions, which means that the progress is not 
ideal to achieve the commitments that the country has. The analysis also allowed identifying 
key conditions that according to interviews and literature review are major promoters and 
hinders of the mainstreaming climate change in planning and budgeting processes.  
 
4.4. Conditions that promote or hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget 
of Mexico. 
 
Public budget is seen as an important vehicle to drive the development of climate actions. 
Most of the stakeholders interviewed agreed that there is limited public money to achieve all 
the necessary changes. Nonetheless, the allocation of money rather than the amount of 
money is what matters most. Scarce resources must be used strategically and investing in 
actions that will exacerbate the problem must be avoided. It is also recognized that the 
allocation of public money can send a signal to private and international financial mechanisms 
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to show the interest that exists in the climate field. Therefore, exogenous and endogenous 
factors were identified that promote or hinder mainstreaming climate change in the budget 
of the country. In this section, I highlight the most relevant conditions found in the analysis. 
 
Conditions that promote climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Mexico 
 
My analysis has shown that there are several conditions that promoted the incorporation of 
climate change in the policy and budgetary process in Mexico.  The main condition that 
promotes climate action in Mexico is the creation of the General Climate Change Law, which, 
according to all interviewees, is the instrument that has served to strengthen institutional 
arrangements, policy instruments, such as the ENCC and the PECC, and to design tools such 
as the Climate Change Fund and the Carbon Market. Nevertheless, there is still a perception 
that further inclusion of sanctions for incompliance is needed to ensure effectiveness 
(Interview 14OIM).  
 
Many stakeholders believe that the law, and other instruments, were created in response to 
international pressure from the UNFCCC that has pushed for the adoption of international 
commitments, which is another important condition that promotes the action (Interview 
16FGM). The proposal to reduce 30% of GHGs by 2020 and 50% by 2050 is included in the 
Law, and the reduction of 22% of GHGs by 2030 is included in the NDCs. This guides the action 
of the government, however, according to stakeholders, the incompliance of such goals must 
be punishable (Interview 9CSM).  
 
In the same way, governmental representatives consider that climate action has been possible 
thanks to international cooperation and support, which has come in form of ODA and climate 
finance (Interview 8FGM). The active participation of the country at the international level 
has sent an important signal to donors, regarding the willingness of the country to act 
(Interview 15OIM).  
 
This has allowed Mexico to become one of the major recipients of climate finance in the 
region, thanks to which many actions have been implemented, which would not have been 
possible with the budgetary restrictions that exist nationally. Regarding budget allocation, the 
creation of the Transversal Annex on climate change in the federal public expenditure has 
also been useful to identify where these limited resources are allocated. In this sense, this 
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transparency has served to better identify gaps, although not all actors use it as a decision-
making tool, since it does not have a methodology for operation (Interviews 10CSM, 11CSM).  
 
Conditions that hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Mexico 
 
The major condition that constrains the country in general is the limited budget with which 
it must operate, including negative adjustments due to the limited resources that the country 
has raised (Interview 8FGM). The reduction of budget is even more prominent in the 
environmental sector (Interview 16FGM, 4LPM), particularly with the arrival to power of 
Lopez in 2019 (Milenio Digital, 2019).  
 
A key concern is that the budget reduction from the Lopez administration not only affected 
the environmental sector, but the money collected from the reduction was used to invest in 
the operation of the fossil fuel industry (García, 2018; Fariza, 2019). The tendency to increase 
the budget in this industry is due to their reliance in fossil fuels to raise revenue, a major 
source of income.  
 
The last point is important due to the limited capacity of the country to raise taxes, which is 
another major condition that hinders progress. This is due in part to the growth of informal 
jobs where taxes are not paid and, indeed, Mexico is one of the lowest collectors of taxes in 
the OECD countries. In addition, illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, are growing and 
there are changes in remittances, another important source of income. For instance, in 2006, 
remittances were the third source of income, reaching USD 23,000 million (OCDE, 2009, p.44). 
Ten years later, in 2016, the amount was almost USD 26,970 million (González, 2016). A 
representative of the Mexican government pointed out that the border policies of Trump in 
USA could affect remittances (Interview 13FGM). However, in 2019, USD 36,048 million were 
transferred to Mexico (Saldívar, 2020). The uncertainty and fluctuation of these sources 
demand a new and more comprehensive fiscal reform in the country (Maldonado, 2020).   
 
Another condition that hinders the allocation of public budget in climate change activities is 
the distribution of limited resources, where the central government must provide resources 
to local governments, which also reduces its capacity to operate. By 2009, the federal 
government was the main source (90%) of finance of the sub-national states (OECD, 2009: 
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29), a tendency that is changing with the state potentially able to increase their resources, but 
this must be better implemented (Interview 6FGM).  
 
All of this is faced with one additional, negative condition, which is the level of corruption. 
Mexico has major problems with this and, although Mexico is part of agreements such as the 
Open Government Partnership, institutions are still behind with their compliance (Interview 
10CSM). 
 
Another condition that directly impacts climate action is the reduction of budget in the 
environmental sector because the environment agenda, as well as the climate change 
agenda, is always on the bottom of the list of priorities (Interviews 2LPM, 4LPM). This lack 
of interest is reflected by the limited institutional capacity that exists to deal with the problem 
within the ministers that are part of the CICC, even within the environmental sector.  
 
Out of the 24 interviewees, only 3 considered climate change a priority in Mexico. While it 
received attention during the mandate of Calderon, this pattern did not continue with other 
governments. Moreover, even during the Calderon government, interest in fossil fuels 
remained strong (Interviews 2LPM, 14IOM. Therefore, the lack of political will to tackle 
climate change is another major constraint. “If the head of the state is not convinced, then 
there won’t be effective actions” (Interview 4LPM).  
 
Furthermore, there is a lack of articulation at the institutional level, which is also reflected in 
the creation of policy instruments, such as the PECC, which is a business-as-usual document 
that is not built under the lens of climate change. This is reflected in the lack of correlation 
between policy and the allocation of public budget.  
 
Along the same lines, a major constraint is the limited engagement of the finance ministry in 
climate change and the lack of willingness to conduct fiscal reforms to reduce dependency on 
fossil fuels. Other ministries believe that the finance ministry must lead (Interview 5FGM, 
2LPM) while the finance ministry thinks that allocation and cuts in the budget is the 
responsibility of the thematic ministries (Interview 6FGM, 12FGM). This is because the 
finance ministry sets the cap but does not decide which funding areas need to be reduced or 
increased amongst the ministries (Interview 3LPM). In this context, engagement of the 
legislative power is desirable because they play a major role in budget approval, although 
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some legislators consider that what they can do to change the budget once is approved by the 
main ministries, is limited (Interview 2LPM).  
 
Another major problem is that, in Mexico, there is limited understanding about the 
consequences of climate change in terms of costs and needs, particularly at the local level 
(Interview 2SGM). There is limited knowledge about the economic and social losses that will 
occur as well as the costs to implement actions (mitigation and adaptation) that will lead the 
country to the trajectory of 1.5o C warming as today’s scenarios are insufficient to tackle 





The analysis of the levels of mainstreaming using Daly’s methodology shows that Mexico has 
neither fully mainstreamed climate change into its planning processes, nor in its public 
budget.  Rather, Mexico is still in its early stage of integrating climate change in some sectorial 
policies, or what Daly (2005) calls “a limited transversality”.  
 
Based on the literature review and interviews, it can be concluded that mainstreaming climate 
change at the discourse and rhetoric level has been progressing, but it depends heavily on the 
government in place, which means that progress has been inconsistent. Regarding the levels 
of institutional or structural changes, Mexico has progressed significantly towards the creation 
of a national architecture to deal with climate change, with the creation of the SINACC and 
the CICC, but still with few active members.  
 
Although the LGCC is considered an innovative tool for climate policy formulation, the lack of 
sanctions for incompliance puts into question the effectiveness of the instrument. 
Furthermore, the instruments, such as the ENCC and PECC, are not innovative enough to 
produce structural changes, and that explains the limited allocation of public budget to tackle 
climate change.  
 
Finally, while a growing flow of international cooperation is arriving in Mexico, promoting 
climate action and supporting the creation of policies and instruments, such as the climate 
change law, the concern is that Mexico is still highly dependent on revenue from fossil fuels. 
These energy sector policies are therefore contradictory and dissociated to the climate change 
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goals. This dependency is a major hindrance and, in addition to the high level of corruption 
and lack of institutional articulation, is dragging Mexico to the carbon lock-in scenario.  
 
To further analyse the dynamics of the energy sector, the next chapter presents an analysis 





CHAPTER 5. ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE MAINSTREAMING IN 




In Chapter 4 the levels of mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgetary 
process of Mexico were introduced, leading to the observation that limited federal 
government actions are happening in the context of the Environmental Ministry, however in 
order to assess if these efforts are being extended to other sectors to achieve the 
mainstreaming process in an integral way, this chapter introduces the analysis of climate 
change mainstreaming in the energy sector, because it is the major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions in Mexico. 
 
Although the synergies between the energy and the climate agendas are huge, there are 
major challenges in harmonizing both sectors, through the climate change mainstreaming 
process because Mexico is a country highly dependent of fossil fuels in its public finance 
system, however as a vulnerable country to the impacts of climate change, is urgent 
accelerate the energy transition. This chapter analyses what factors promotes and hinders 
such climate mainstreaming process that is relevant to achieve climate national and 
international commitments. 
 
To do so, this chapter is broken in sections. The first section assesses the levels of climate 
change mainstreaming in the energy sector following Daly´s (2005) methodology; the second 
section assesses the levels of climate change mainstreaming in the public expenditure of the 
energy sector by performing a comparative analysis between investments on renewable 
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energy and fossil fuels. The third section analyses key conditions that promote and hinder 
mainstreaming climate change in the public expenditure of the energy sector, building on the 
conditions found in Chapter 4. Finally, the fourth section provides further conclusions about 
the levels of mainstreaming climate change in the energy sector. 
 
5.1. Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the energy sector of Mexico 
 
The role of the energy sector in the GHG emissions is highly relevant because, according to 
the Mid Term Strategy that Mexico submitted to the UNFCCC, the emissions from the sector 
(transport and power generation) have experienced the largest growth of any other sector 
between 1990 and 2010, with an annual growth rate of 2.3%, growing 63% in that period, as 
shown in Table 5.1. (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 59).  
 
Between 2002 and 2012 GHG emission growth was 2.5%, while Mexico’s GDP grew by 2.4% 
in the same period, which, according to the strategy, is an example of the correlation between 
emissions and economic growth (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 60). The energy sector is 
therefore a strategic sector for economic growth. 
 
Table 5. 1 GHG emissions by economic sector (in Gg CO2eq) 
 
Source: Mexican Government, ENCC, 2013: 59 
 
In Mexico there is a strong interest in understanding the relationship between climate policy 
and the energy sector to better align these policies (Villarreal & Tornel, 2017). In the following 
sections, I will analyse the extent to which there is a climate change mainstreaming process 
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in the planning and budgeting process of energy sector based on Daly´s methodology 
described in Chapters 1 and 2.  
 
5.1.1. Level of discourse or rhetoric 
 
The discussions related to the innovation of the energy sector in the context of climate change 
started in 2007 when an important energy reform took place. During this period, a National 
Strategy on Energy was published for the first time that included an environmental 
consideration as part of its goals: “to plan the provision of energy resources to improve the 
quality of the population in a responsible way and in harmony with the environment and 
sustainable development” (SENER, 2011).  
 
This Strategy included both the impacts of climate change, as well as the important role of the 
energy sector in reducing GHG emissions, providing the Energy Ministry (SENER, Secretaría de 
Energía) with a mandate to protect the environment and to reduce emissions (SENER, 2011). 
This happened during the mandate of Felipe Calderon, who, as previously explained in 
Chapter 4, had a particular interest in including climate change in its agenda. 
 
As part of this debate, another important legal framework was approved, the Law to Use 
Renewable Energy and Financing the Energy Transition (LAERFTE, Ley para el 
Aprovechamiento de Energía Renovable y el Financiamiento de la Transición Energética). The 
aim of this Law was to regulate the use of renewable energy and clean technologies, with the 
goal to cut the use of fossil fuels in electricity generation by 65% in 2024, 60% in 2035 and 
50% in 2050 (LAERFTE, 2012). The LAERFTE was also created to regulate the participation of 
private entities in the production of electricity and they created the Fund for the Energy 
Transition (FTE, Fondo para la Transición Energética). 
 
In general terms, the 2007 reform established the explicit relationship between the energy 
sector and climate change, which was part of Jordy Herrera’s discourse, the Minister for 
Energy in Calderon’s administration. During various events, including the World Economic 
Forum for Latin-American (WEF in 2012) and the COP16 in 2010, the Minister pointed to 
Mexico as a positive example for sustainability, citing the importance of tackling climate 
change and mitigating GHG emissions in the sector (ExpokNews, 2012; Interview 9CSM).   
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Years later, the energy reform that was approved in 2013 during the administration of Enrique 
Peña produced an important change in the sector that also impacted the progress related to 
climate change. Ever since the oil expropriation executed by President Lazaro Cardenas in 
193822, the oil industry was managed by the State. However, the 2013 reform opened up the 
energy sector, allowing oil production to be undertaken through private, national and 
international companies and investments.  
 
According to the language of the reform, two arguments that drove energy reform were, 1) 
the modernization of the energy sector, and 2) the need to attract more investment (SENER, 
2014). Another argument put forward was the need to heal the public finance sector in 
Mexico, reducing its dependence on income from the production and export of oil, as was 
explained in Chapter 4 (Mexican Government, 2013a).  
 
De la Fuente and Olivera (2017), however, state that the real explanation behind the reforms 
can be attributed to the decline in production from Cantarell, Mexico’s main oil reserve. With 
the decline of Cantarell, “the era of cheap and accessible oil in Mexico ended” (Interview 
5FGM). Although the country still produces and exploits oil and gas, the production went from 
3.4 million barrels per day in 2004 to 2.5 million in 2013 (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 4).   
 
Here a new debate and a new discourse started to appear in the political arena, the inclusion 
of the “cheap and clean energy” concept, referring to the necessity to transit towards 
renewable energy but also related to the use of less carbon intense resources such as nuclear 
energy and gas. According to the Federal Government “natural gas is four times cheaper and 
emits 68% less carbon dioxide than fuel oil, one of the main fuels with which we currently 
generate electricity” (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 20).  
 
Ever since the 2013 reform, this definition of “clean energy” has been an important and 
contentious debate, because it introduced a new topic on non-conventional resources. SENER 
pointed out “the future of the oil will come from the non-conventional resources that are in 
shale basins and deep water” (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 4). 
 
 
22 The oil expropriation was a decision that the President Lázaro Cardenas made because private companies were 
not providing good salaries and employment conditions to the people that created unions to demand this. After 
manifestations and the cessation of activities, which had economic impacts, the President decided to expropriate 
in order to fix the debate between the union and the companies. For more information 
http://www.industriapetroleramexicana.com/2011/03/expropiacion-petrolera/ 
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In this sense, with the reform in 2013, the LAERFTE was cancelled. But in order to promote 
the energy transition, a group of actors within congress, with the assistance of civil society, 
promoted and achieved the creation of the Energy Transition Law (LTE, Ley de Transición 
Energética). It was the last law approved as part of the energy reform package of 2013 
(Interviews 9CSM, 4LPM).  
 
The LTE achieved an important step, building an explicit connection between the energy and 
climate change agendas. This Law established the goal: “to provide support to the goals of the 
LGCC, related to the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions and components, and the 
generation of electricity that comes from clean energy” (LTE, 2015, Article 2). This is the only 
explicit mention of climate change among all the laws created in the reform. According to a 
high-level representative of the energy sector, the LTE was the contribution of the energy 
sector to the fight against climate change, although is not the direct mandate of the sector 
(Interview 5FGM).  
 
The LTE includes the same definition of renewable energy as the LAERFTE, however, it also 
includes a definition of “clean energy,” based on the Electricity Industry Law (LTE, 2015, 
Article 3), that defines it as: “the source of energy and electricity generation processes 
whereby emissions or residues, when they are produced, do not exceed the thresholds 
established in regulatory provisions that are issued for that purpose” (LTE, 2015, Article 3). 
The LTE says that “in order to be considered clean, the source has to produce less than 100kg 
of CO2 per MW/h”, which is not accomplished by the gas for instance (LTE, 2015; Interview 
9CSM), but the government still promoted gas as a clean source  (Interview 10CSM). 
 
Although the 2013 energy reform was criticized for opening the door to investors in the fossil 
fuel industry, it was crucial in including an explicit mention of the necessity to transit towards 
low carbon technologies such as renewable energy in order to tackle climate change 
(Interview 4LPM). 
 
This debate continues with the government of Lopez, the president who arrived in 2018 who, 
in his first discourse as a president, pointed out: “We will allocate more public investment to 
urgently produce oil, gas and electricity ... we will modernize six refineries and build a new one 
... we will promote the development of renewable alternative energy sources such as wind, 
solar, geothermal and the tidal wave …” (Lopez, 2018, Online).  
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However, in the next section I will analyse the transition towards low carbon energy 
technologies that appears to be going down an alternative path.   
 
5.1.2. Level of institutional or structural change 
 
In the energy sector, the problem of climate change has been included in its discourse in 
recent years, although at times not explicitly. However, at the institutional level, this process 
has had its fair share of complications, as I will explain in this section.  
 
The reform approved in 2013 changed Articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Constitution of Mexico. 
These articles referred to ownership of the State over its lands and waters within the limits of 
Mexico’s national territory, where the State used to have complete control. Although the 
reform maintains the government right to grant or veto concessions for the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons, it allows for the establishment of private contracts to companies (Mexican 
Government, 2013).  With the Reform of 2013, PEMEX (Mexican Petroleum) and CFE (Federal 
Commission of Electricity) received autonomy and a new character of productive entities, 
although, according to the Federal Government, they remain 100% Mexican public entities 
(Mexican Government, 2013). 
 
In this reform (2013), many institutions in the oil sector were strengthening, not only creating 
more private competition to expand the sector, but also giving more independence to PEMEX 
to improve its operation (Interviews 9CSM, 22JM), having partnerships where the entity does 
not have the capacity to operate alone (Interview 5FGM), “making the state company more 
competitive and cost-effective” (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 6). 
 
Along the same lines, other entities were created or strengthened to improve the sector such 
as the National Centre for Control of Natural Gas (CENAGAS, Centro Nacional de Control de 
Gas Natural), the National Commission for Hydrocarbons (CNH, Comisión Nacional de 
Hidrocarburos), and the National Agency for Industrial Security and Environmental Protection 
of the Hydrocarbons Sector (ASEA, Agencia Nacional Industrial y de Protección al Medio 
Ambiente del Sector Hidrocarburos), all of them with the aim to promote the extraction of 
hydrocarbons (Interview 22JM) but taking care of the “externalities” (Interview 10CSM). 
According to civil society representatives, ASEA for instance, has been a validator of the fossil 
fuel industry instead of a regulator (Interview 10CSM, 9CSM). 
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Similar changes took place in the power generation sector but some of them related to the 
climate agenda. During the 2007 energy reform, the Organic Law of Public Administration 
(LAPF, Ley de la Administración Pública Federal) gave a mandate to the Energy Ministry to 
conduct the energy policy based on “the energy security, energy diversification, energy saving, 
and the protection of the environment” (2011, p. 5); in the reform of 2013, SENER remained 
the general coordinator of the public policy in the energy sector, but the CFE was put in charge 
of the supervision of power generation, who was now also obliged to generate clean energy 
certificates as part of the mandate of the LTE. 
 
Other institutions were strengthened such as the National Centre for Energy Control (CENACE, 
Centro Nacional de Control de Energía) in charge of the operational control of the national 
electricity system (SEN, Sistema Energético Nacional). Among the goals of the Strategic Plan 
of CENACE (2017-2021), are to promote the efficient use of energy, and to promote the 
development of renewable energy (CENACE, 2017, p. 14). 
 
The most relevant institution created in this regard was the National Institute for Electricity 
and Clean Energies (INEEL, Instituto Nacional de Electricidad y Energías Limpias), which 
oversees research, technological development and human resource creation to support the 
energy transition (Interview 21FGM).  
 
Another body that was created was the Consultative Council for the Energy Transition 
(Consejo por la Transición Energética) (SENER, 2016). This council includes almost the same 
ministries as the CICC analysed in Chapter 4 but also includes all the relevant institutions of 
the energy sector and aims to evaluate key policy instruments of the sector (SENER, 2015).  
 
The creation of these institutions in the context of the reform has been important in 
promoting renewable energy development in the country. Although the main mandate of the 
new entities does not mention climate change explicitly as part of their goals, their work has 
been highly relevant for energy transition towards low carbon technologies (Interview 
21FGM). 
 
According to civil society, academia and experts in this area there is a contradictory message 
within this debate. On the one hand, there is a clear signal regarding the interest of increasing 
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the use of clean energy in the energy matrix. On the other hand, the inclusion of sources such 
as gas in the definition of “clean energy” will increase and not decrease GHG emissions. This 
creates uncertainty in the future of the energy sector in the context of climate change 
(Interviews 18AM, 22PSM). Furthermore, certain representatives of the energy sector 
consider that “the obligation to lead the climate policy is not the role of SENER, but an 
obligation of SEMARNAT (the environmental ministry)” (Interview 5FGM, 7FGM).  This 
discussion remains as a problem in the government of Lopez, as will be further discussed.    
 
5.1.3. Innovation in the tools used to make policy  
 
According to civil society representatives (Interviews 9CSM, 11CSM), the energy sector has 
been adapting its policies based on specific national and international circumstances. The 
energy reforms have been a way to redefine priorities within the sector, considering 
international oil prices and international discussions such as the UNFCCC climate change 
negotiations. Although both energy reforms (2007 and 2013) have emphasized the interest 
that the government has in fossil fuels, they have not been consistent in the way they promote 
renewable energy, energy efficiency, and the attention given to climate change. 
 
In the case of the 2007 reform, the inclusion of specific tools, such as the LAERFTE and the 
Energy Transition Fund, to promote the transition towards renewable energy, was recognized. 
Meanwhile the 2013 reform introduced the LTE, but also brought a debate about the necessity 
to have clean and cheap energy, arguing that gas (fossil fuel) was both clean and cheap. The 
Federal Government said that Mexico has multiple deposits of natural gas, although, 
according to De la Fuente and Olivera (2017), the production of this has declined, and today 
30% is imported for consumption.  
 
Nevertheless, former governmental representatives and civil society experts consider the LTE, 
is an innovative tool to develop and promote climate policy because it aims to support the 
compliance of the LGCC and its goals such as the generation of 35% clean energy by 2024, and 
43% by 2030 (LGCC, 2012, Article 35) 23 . In this context, the National Program for the 
Development of the Electric System (PRODESEN) is considered an important tool, because it 
provides a prospective for the participation of renewable energy (Interview 9CSM). 
 
 
23 The Geothermal Energy Law was also created to promote this type of energy (2014). 
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Another important tool that, according to private sector and civil society representatives 
(Interviews 23 PSM, 9CSM), has played a major role in the promotion of renewable energy is 
the emission of Clean Energy Certificates (CEL, Certificados de Energía Limpia), which are 
vouchers issued by the government to verify that companies and CFE do what they have to 
do to reduce GHG emissions, and were included in the LTE and the Electricity Industry Law 
(reformed in 2013). This tool allows SENER to determine the percentage of energy that must 
be generated each year from clean and renewable sources.  
 
CENACE promoted auctions to define the sources of energy that will participate in power 
generation in the medium term (15 years) and long term (20 years) (CENACE, 2018). In the 
first auction, for instance, there were offers for 6.36 TWh of clean energy, 6.36 million in CELs, 
and 500 MW of power annually (PWC, 2016, p. 3). In this auction 17 projects were selected, 
12 of them for solar photovoltaic energy (2,180 MW of capacity). In 2018 the installation of 
this capacity had received an investment of 2,600 million USD (PWC, 2016, p. 7). The auction 
covered 84% of the CERs mandated by the CFE.  
 
In the third auction, 100% of the projects approved were renewable energy projects. 
According to a civil society representative, “generating electricity with renewable energy was 
50% cheaper for CFE than using gas in the last auction” (Interview 9CSM). “These mechanisms 
have been the most effective way to allow the participation of renewable energy in the 
matrix”, including the participation of CFE, pointed out a private sector representative 
(Interview 23PSM). However, under the mandate of Lopez, there was an attempt to modify 
the regulation, to allow the participation of old technologies as CELs to allow CFE to comply 
with it, which has been disputed by NGO´s and private sector (ICM, 2019).  
 
Although there are tools to help include climate change considerations in energy policies, 
changes in the application of these instruments impact its effectiveness and are creating an 
uncertainty about the future of the low carbon development. Besides that, it is recognized 
that climate change is not the main driver of such actions, but rather the profitability of 
renewable energy and market behaviour (Interview 21FGM, 22JM). 
 
5.1.4. New data available  
 
The energy sector is considered one of the most innovative sectors in terms of data available, 
because of the sheer number of studies analysing the projections of the sector (Interview 
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5FGM). In recent years, studies about the vulnerability and the GHG emission of the sector 
have been conducted (INECC, 2018).  
 
In the National GHG Inventory it was found that the major emissions come from the 
consumption of fossil fuels (64%) (INECC, 2015). In 2013, the oil and gas sector accounted for 
12% of total emissions, and the electricity sector for the 19% of the emissions (INECC, 2013). 
The last accounted for the 20% by 2015 (INECC, 2018, p. 53). The Mid-Term Strategy on 
climate change points out that this sector has experienced important technological changes 
in past years. For instance, between 2010 and 2013, a retirement of conventional thermal 
power plants and gas turbines occurred, with new combined cycle and wind plants being built. 
In terms of GHG emissions by 2015, the use of combine cycle contributed with 9.0% of the 
emissions; thermoelectric, 3.7%; coal power stations, 4.6%, turbo gas, 0.5% and internal 
combustion, 0.2% (INECC, 2018, p. 53).   
 
There has been an evolution in the energy matrix that responds to national and international 
factors. According to SENER, “the constant increase in energy consumption worldwide, 
together with the goals of mitigating the impact of climate change, have forced to take into 
account a greater participation of renewable energies in the energy matrix, and to cover this 
demand with environment-friendly sources” (SENER, 2017, p. 12). At the same time, there 
have been encouraging projections regarding renewable energy. For example, the Atlas of 
Zones with High Potential of Clean Energy (AZEL: Atlas de Zonas con Alto Potencial de Energías 
Limpias) and the National Inventory of Renewable Energy (INEL: Inventario Nacional de 
Energías Limpias) are data that supports the energy transition.  According to INEL, there is an 
inventory and corresponding maps to show the potential of solar, wind, geothermal, wave 
and biomass energy (SENER, 2014a). 
 
The Prospective of Renewable Energies 2017-2031 is a policy instrument that contains both 
historical and prospective information on all those renewable energies considered in the 
Electricity Industry Law. These projections point out that “renewable energy plays a very 
important role in the generation of electricity and in the transport sector (SENER, 2017). This 
Prospective says that between 2017-2031, renewable energy will increase annually at a rate 
of 7.4%, with solar photovoltaic being the biggest participant, with 368 GMh by 2017 and 
13,396 GWh by 2031 (SENER, 2017, p. 13). This tendency, however, needs be analysed, since 
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with the arrival of Lopez in 2018 the projections regarding renewable energy are not 
promising.  
 
New data are available, but according to experts, the problem is not always the lack of 
information, but the use of this information to take better decisions. In addition, there is a 
clear interest among some politicians to keep fossil fuels as the main source of energy 
(Interview 21FGM, 9CSM).  
 
5.1.5. Innovation in the way that policy is made  
 
The reform approved in 2013 was an important process in defining polices in the energy 
sector. Although one of results of this reform was the creation of the LTE, experts from civil 
society, academia and the private sector have noted that the reform was heavily driven by the 
interest in producing fossil fuels, including non-conventional sources (Interviews 9CSM, 
10CSM, 23PSM, 22JM).  
 
The creation of the CELs and the celebration of auctions to allow further participation of 
renewable energy are innovative tools that support energy transitions. However, 
governmental representatives from the energy sector do not see climate change as being 
central to the process, but rather a co-benefit (Interviews 5FGM, 21FGM), while climate 
experts see this as a result of the LGCC (Interview 9CSM). 
 
In other words, important steps have been taken to include climate change in energy policies, 
but they have yet to achieve mainstreaming within the process. To what extent this has been 
reflected on the public expenditure will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5.2. Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the energy sector 
 
The role of the state in the energy sector is important because it has most control over the 
energy entities. Though the 2013 reform changed some of these roles, the state remains a 
principal player in the decision-making process. This is even more relevant under the Lopez 
administration, which plans to re-nationalize the oil industry. 
 
Nevertheless, there is wide recognition that public money is not sufficient to fulfil the actions 
that the sector needs to modernize, which is why, according to the government, private 
 138 
investment, is necessary. According to PEMEX, the cost of exploration and exploitation of the 
oil industry is approximately USD 60 billion. As the actual budget of the PEMEX is USD 27 
billion, it could not cover the costs by itself, which is the reason the energy reform was useful 
from their point of view (SENER, 2017, p. 5).  
 
Figure 5.1 shows the reduction in the production of oil (blue line) and the increase in 
extraction investment (grey line). This demonstrates that as investments increase, the results 
are decreasing.  
 
Figure 5. 1 Reduction of oil production (blue line) and the increase in the investment of oil 
production (grey line) 
 
Source: SENER, 2017 
 
In the case of gas production, Mexico used to be self-sufficient. However, in recent years the 
import of gas has been growing, as shown in Figure 5.2. According to the former government, 
this is because it is cheaper to import gas than to produce it (SENER, 2014). 
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Figure 5. 2 Consumption, production and importation of natural gas in millions of cubic 
feet per day (period 1997-2013) 
 
Source: SENER, 2014 
 
The cost of energy activities has changed, and with it the behaviour of public budget. In order 
to assess such behaviour, I conducted an analysis to understand to what extent climate related 
activities have been mainstreamed in the public budget (current and investment) of the 
energy sector from the 2012 until the 2018. Three factors within the public budget were 
analysed: 1) public budget allocated for the operation of SENER related to energy transition 
and sustainability; 2) public budget allocated to the funds that promote the energy transition; 
and 3) public budget allocated to activities such as oil exploration and exploitation within 
PEMEX, versus renewable energy projects within CFE. 
 
In the first exercise, I analysed the allocation of public budget and the institutional 
arrangements related to sustainability within SENER. Changes in the amount given to certain 
areas within the SENER were observed. For example, there used to be a Vice Minister of 
Energy Planning and Technology Development, now called the Vice Ministry of Planning and 
Energy Transition, which was in charge of overseeing the policies related to renewable energy 
and energy efficiency, and whose budget has been decreasing in the last years going from USD 
2,152,540 in 2012 to USD 1,552,040 in 2018. Other areas such as the General Direction related 
to Clean Energy and the General Direction for Research Development, Technology and 
Environment (later the General Direction of Energy Efficiency and Technological Innovation) 
were created. However, these areas also had budget changes. The first went from USD 
777,299 USD in 2016 to USD 610,264 in 2018 and the second went from USD 522,375 in 2016 
to USD 578,233 in 2018 (SHCP, 2012-2018).  
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This exercise shows that sustainability has been integrated in certain areas within the central 
sector, but that it still receives limited financial support in comparison to the institutions 
charged with fossil fuel activities. The allocation of budget to the Vice Ministry of 
Hydrocarbons for instance, has been fluctuating with an increase in the allocation of budget 
from USD 1,693,490 in 2010 to USD 1,930,690 in 2018. 
 
The second exercise that I conducted was based on the allocation of budget to the energy 
transition funds. Back in 2007, the LAERFTE pointed out that “in the federal public expenditure 
for the fiscal year in 2009, three billion pesos would be allocated to the Fund for the Energy 
Transition and the Use of Sustainable Energy, FOTEASE” (LAERFTE, 2007, Article Tenth 
Transitory). The FOTEASE has received a budget since 2012, but with reductions in its 
allocation throughout the years. In 2015 the FOTEASE as a budget classification was removed 
from the budget and a new classification was created called, “Funds for the Energy 
Diversification” that, according to a representative of the Energy Ministry (Interview 21FGM), 
is the same fund, but with significantly less budget than the first year of operation in 2012, as 
shown in Figure 5.3.  
 




Sources: Own elaboration with information from (SHCP, PEF 2012-2018) 
 
Another important financial tool resulting from the 2013 reform was the Mexican Oil Fund for 
Stabilization and Development (FMPED, Fondo Mexicano de Petróleo para la Estabilización y 
el Desarrollo), which is under the control of the Finance Ministry. This Fund captures the 
income (other than taxes) received by the State for all hydrocarbon exploration and 
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exploitation projects developed by public or private state enterprises, both through 
allocations and contracts (Mexican Government, 2013, p. 26). 
 
In order to reduce the dependence on income coming from oil exploitation, the energy reform 
established that the Fund would transfer up to 4.7% of GDP to the public budget, and the rest 
of the money raised will be saved. The Bank of Mexico, which has had a strict policy of saving, 
is the trustee of this Fund. An interesting element is that this Fund was also mandated to 
distribute some of its resources into different funds, such as the Hydrocarbons Fund and the 
Fund for Energy Sustainability -this one, managed by SENER and the National Council managed 
the last for Science and Technology (CONACyT, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología)-, 
however, according to budget information from 2017, most of the flows went to the 
Hydrocarbons Fund and none at all to the Energy Sustainability Fund (FMPED, 2017).  
 
Until 2018 the Fund operated in a transparent way because, according to the official website, 
“all the information related to the fund […] should be available to the population” (FMPED, 
2017). However, in 2020 the information was not found publicly. 
 
Finally, in order to compare the budget allocation for sustainability in the energy sector, I 
analysed the budget allocated to oil exploration and production (analysing the pipeline of 
projects of PEMEX) and the budget allocated to renewable energy for power generation 
(analysing the pipeline of projects of CFE), both between 2014 and 2018. 
 
In 2014 there were 76 exploitation and production projects, 80 in 2015, 68 in 2016, 87 in 2017, 
and 79 in 2018. This reflects the increase in the number of projects in recent years. Figure 5.4 
shows the cost of these projects per year (blue bar), and the amount of budget that was 
allocated with public resources (grey bar). 
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Figure 5. 4 Cost and expenditure for oil exploitation and production (period 2014-2018) 
 
Sources: Own elaboration with information of PEF, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the increase in the cost of exploitation and production of oil in recent years. 
As governmental and non-governmental representatives stated, in the case of Mexico, the 
cheap oil is depleted and new projects in deep water and through other, expensive techniques 
need to be used (Interviews 1FGC, 9CSM, 10CSM, 22JM).  
 
Figure 5.5 shows the allocation of public budget. In the case of the power generation, the 
figure shows the total cost of projects per year (blue bar), the total budget allocated with 
public resources (grey bar), and the total amount of budget allocated specifically for 
renewable projects (green bar). 
 
Figure 5. 5 Cost and expenditure for power generation including renewable energy 
projects in CFE (period 2014-2018) 
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Sources: Own elaboration with information of PEF, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. 
 
This shows that the cost of projects to generate electricity has increased in recent years. It 
also shows that public money invested to fulfil the projects has varied, with an increase 
observed in the past year. Meanwhile the amount of money used to support renewable 
energy projects was limited, and even decreased by 2017. In 2018, for instance, the allocation 
of money for renewable energy was 2.18% out of the total budget of power generation 
projects.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the number of projects related to renewable energy and the budget allocated 
from 2014 until 2018. For instance, in 2014 out of 444 projects in the pipeline of CFE, 27 were 
related to renewable energy, and only 11 received public budget. A slight upward trend saw 
14 out of 29 projects receiving public budget in 2016, before a decline in subsequent years.  
 
 
Table 5. 2 Number of projects for power generation in CFE, including renewable energy 
projects (period 2014-2018) 
Year Number of projects 
in total 






2014 444 27 11 
2015 478 27 13 
2016 441 29 14 
2017 234 25 10 
2018 319 19 7 
Sources: Own elaboration with information of PEF, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. 
 
It is important to emphasize that 2014 was the last year in which PEMEX and CFE received 
public sources as directly controlled entities of the government (during Enrique´s Peña 
Presidency). In 2015, both entities appear as productive entities of the state that are not 
within the public expenditure of the central sector. This was a direct result of the 2013 reform.  
 
In this sense, we can conclude that during this period from 2014-2018 when renewable energy 
production grew, public money did not play an important role, and that mainly private 
investment took place. In Figure 5.6, a comparison between the total budget of the sector, 
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the budget for exploration and production of fossil fuel and the budget for renewable energy 









Sources: Own elaboration with information of PEF, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 
2018.  
 
Figure 5.6 shows that public money allocated to oil exploitation and production (blue line) is 
higher than the amount of money dedicated to the whole administration of the sector (green 
line), and much higher than investments in renewable energy projects in power generation 
(yellow line). As a reference, the investment in renewable projects represents 0.56% of the 
investment in oil exploration and fossil fuel production in 2018.  
 
In other words, it is possible to say that, even though there has been progress in the allocation 
of public expenditure related to climate change in this sector, it is considerably lower in 
relation to the allocation of money that contributes to the generation of the problem itself. In 
conclusion, climate change has not been mainstreamed in the public expenditure of the 
energy sector, although there are policies and actions that can motivate its treatment in the 
short and medium term.  
 
Although the trend towards fossil fuel investment is unchanged under the mandate of Lopez, 
the promotion of renewable energy is declining.  As observed in an analysis of the budget in 
2019, the budget allocated for the production of fossil fuel in the energy sector is 92.3% while 
the budget for other types of energies is 7.7%, which includes renewable energy but also 
hydropower and others (SHCP, PEF, 2019). A concern regarding this trend is that a large 
amount of public resources is now dedicated to shale gas and deep-water exploration, with 
Figure 5. 6 Allocation of public expenditure: fossil fuels versus renewable energy in 
USD (period 2014-2018) 
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an allocation of USD 319,656,023 (SHCP, PEF, 2019). This is despite AMLO pointing out that 
he would not allow fracking during this mandate (Ramirez, 2018).  
 
The scenario for the future is uncertain because, in the Strategy for the Transition to Promote 
the Use of Clean Technologies and Fuels (Estrategia para la Transición y Promoción del uso de 
Tecnologías y Combustibles limpios) presented in January 2020, one of the goals is to “Increase 
the generation of electricity with clean and renewable energy, and fulfill the commitments in 
relation to climate change and emission reduction, taking care of the adequate energy balance 




5.3. Discussion of levels of climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgeting 
process of the energy sector in Mexico 
 
The analysis of the levels of climate change mainstreaming in the energy sector following 
Daly´s (2005) proposal, shows that there was progress in areas such as the inclusion of climate 
change in the rhetoric and discourse of the energy sector, however this varied depending on 
the government in power. For instance, during the period of Calderon´s Government (2006-
2012) there was an explicit interest in climate change, while in the context of Peña´s 
Government (2012-2018), it was considered as a co-benefit, and recently in the case of 
Lopez´s Government (2018-2024), has not been considered as part of the discourse or rhetoric 
in the energy sector during the first year of operation. 
 
Furthermore the limited progress in the discourse in previous governments was also complex, 
since the goals were not fully related to the transition towards renewable energy sources, but 
towards new technologies such as fracking and the extraction of resources such as gas, that 
some politicians insisted in calling “clean energy”.  
 
Regarding the mainstreaming process at the institutional level, it was found that, with the 
latest reforms, the institutions related to the oil sector have been strengthen, while the 
institutions of the electricity sector were also mandated to further promote renewable 
energy.  There has been progress with the creation of arrangements such as the Vice Ministry 
of Planning and Energy Transition and other general directions that were created in the Energy 
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Ministry. Although the energy sector has been engaging more in seeking to reduce emissions, 
it is not always under the goal of dealing with climate change but is more related to the price 
of oil and other technologies (Interview 5FGM). 
 
Furthermore, although there are tools that are helping to include climate change 
considerations in energy policies, such as the LTE, changes in the application of these 
instruments have impacted their effectiveness, creating uncertainty about the future of low 
carbon development promises, such as the case of the CELs.  
 
Regarding the existence of new data, the energy sector has been progressing to produce more 
information about renewable energy, but how the information is used by different areas and 
entities within the energy sector presents a challenge. Moreover, there is a clear interest from 
some politicians in keeping fossil fuels as the main source of energy, which makes the energy 
transition highly difficult (Interview 21FGM, 9CSM).  
 
This last point, in the case of the energy sector, shows there is very limited climate change 
mainstreaming progress, deemed a fragmented endeavour, the term Daly (2005) uses for the 
weakest mainstreaming effort. While some parts of the sector are trying to improve the 
efficiency of the energy transition, others (the politically stronger) are not interested in that 
pathway.  
 
In this sense, there is no innovation in the way that the energy sector is making policy, and 
climate change has not been mainstreamed either in the planning process or in budget 
allocation. In this last point, it was observed that the amount of public resources allocated to 
fossil fuels represents close to the 90% of the budget of the energy sector in recent years, 
while it was demonstrated that progress in the promotion of renewable energy is not the 
result of public investments, but rather other types of resources, such as private investments.  
 
The budget that CFE is investing in renewable energy projects is very limited (as low as 2.18% 
in 2018). Not only is the number of projects in CFE´s pipeline miniscule, but also around 40% 
of the renewable projects that are in the pipeline do not even receive public resources. If CFE 
does not prioritise investment in these projects, this could be harmful for the energy transition 
(Interview 9CSM, 22JM).  
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Nevertheless, is important to highlight that the role of the state remains key to achieve the 
energy transition, though the allocation of public sources to increase research and technology 
development, as well as to ensure a good the dispatch of the renewable energy with smart 
grids. In the next section I will discuss what conditions promote and hinder this limited 
progress in mainstreaming climate change in the energy sector, particularly in the public 
expenditure. 
5.4. Conditions that promote or hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget 
of the energy sector in Mexico 
 
In Mexico there are general conditions that promote or hinder mainstreaming climate change 
in the public budget that are similar to those analysed in Chapter 4. However, in this section, 
I will introduce those that are specific to the energy sector.  
 
Conditions that promote climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the energy 
sector in Mexico 
 
One of the achievements of the energy reform that took place in Mexico in 2013 was the 
inclusion of the LTE. Although it was the last law approved in the entire reform, it allowed for 
the continuation of the debate regarding the role of the energy sector in the compliance of 
the Paris Agreement, and also recognized the existence of the Climate Change Law to further 
connect energy and climate policies (Interviews 9CSM, 22JM). A high-level representative of 
the energy ministry stated that this instrument will provide certainty to the private sector to 
continue working on renewable energy (Interviews 5FGM).   
 
In addition, the reform has allowed for the creation of specific areas within the energy 
ministry to work on energy efficiency and renewable energy as well as other decentralized 
entities such as the Commission for the Efficient Use of the Energy (CONUEE, Comisión 
Nacional para el Uso Eficiente de la Energía). Although with the arrival of Lopez in 2019, there 
is little interest in these matters, another condition that promotes the development of 
renewable energy is the recent drop in the prices of these technologies. This last point has 
served as guidance to increase the participation of the private sector, which is now the major 
investors and promoters of renewable energy in the country. While the case of the 
international cooperation plays a minor role, focus mainly in energy efficiency programs 
(Interviews 5FGM, 7FGM). 
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Conditions that hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the energy sector 
in Mexico 
 
The approval of the Energy Reform in 2013 served as well to incentivize the participation of 
private and foreign capital in the expansion of the fossil fuel sector, which is a major 
constraint for climate policy. The aim was to substitute the role of the national oil company 
with private investments, an idea that changed with the arrival of Lopez in 2019, who wants 
to strengthen the role of PEXEM. Both visions, however, are centred on the idea of producing 
more oil and even using non-conventional methods, such as fracking, to extract oil and shale 
gas, which has several social and environmental impacts (Interviews 1FGM, 9CSM, 22JM). 
 
In this sense, the reform strengthened a sector that was already reluctant to transit towards 
a low carbon pathway. This produced a carbon lock-in within the Mexican economy, which is 
highly dependent on fossil fuels to generate revenue even though oil reserves are declining. 
The economy therefore sits in a fragile state. Producing electricity with renewable energy, 
meanwhile, has become more profitable in recent years and the government should take 
advantage and use this moment to diversify the energy matrix as well as the financial system 
in the country, but the government is not sending the right signal to the private capital that 
aims to invest more in these technologies (ICM, 2019).  
 
The growing interest in fossil fuels is also creating tension among major donors that have 
been investing in climate policies in Mexico as well as other financial institutions that doubt 
the motivation of Mexico to tackle the problem. This risks the access of Mexico to climate 




The energy sector is the most important sector to analyse in the context of climate change 
because it is the main source of GHGs in Mexico. The analysis of the levels of climate change 
mainstreaming in the energy sector shows that there are limited efforts to integrate climate 
change in the sector, which is rather a fragmented endeavour. 
 
Although climate change was included in the energy sector’s lexicon for many years, 
particularly in the context of international agreements, this has been changing depending on 
the government in place; while some presidents were promoters of the energy transition, 
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such as Calderon, the more recent government under Lopez is highly focused on fossil fuels 
and fails to mention climate change.  
 
Regarding the creation of institutions, progress has been made towards the creation of areas 
that work on energy efficiency and renewable energy, but power is also growing in areas that 
work in fossil fuels. In addition, policies and legal tools were created, such as the LTE, but 
compliance is struggling because of changes in the direction of the energy sector. Some 
innovative tools, such as the CELs, are now at risk because the energy ministry aims to change 
their initial purpose thereby derailing the goal to achieve the energy transition.  
 
Regarding mainstreaming climate change in the public budget of the energy sector, the public 
budget does not play an important role in the energy transition. Rather, it is almost entirely 
focused on fossil fuel production. Although there are conditions that promote the climate 
change mainstreaming processes, such as the legal framework and the drop on the prices of 
the renewable energy technologies; there are conditions that hinder such a process, such as 
the high dependency on fossil fuels and the creation of new policies that aim to strengthen 
this sector, as well the high levels of corruption and lack of political will to transition towards 
a low carbon future.   
 
Therefore, the energy sector, the most important sector in the achievement of a low carbon 
future, is far from mainstreaming climate change. This puts at risk the compliance of 


























Colombia is one the countries in Latin America that has been active at the international level 
in the context of the United Nation Convention Framework on Climate Change as well as 
progressing in the construction of an institutional architecture and policy framework to deal 
with climate change at the national level. In addition, Colombia is one of the main recipients 
of international cooperation in the form of Overseas Development Aid and one of the few 
countries that has been allocating public budget to tackle the problem in an explicit manner. 
Nevertheless, Colombia is also relying on the production of fossil fuels and other extractive 
activities that act in opposition to the climate goals. 
 
In this context, this chapter assesses the extent to which Colombia has been mainstreaming 
climate change in the planning and budgetary process, in order to identify what conditions, 
promote or hinder this process. My argument is that, while Colombia is an active climate 
leader at the international level, its dependency fossil fuels and extractive activities is dragging 
the country towards a carbon lock-in, which must be rectified if the climate goals will be 
achieved. 
 
 As in the case of Mexico, Colombia is explored through a literature review and a set of elite 
interviews. To present the findings, this Chapter is broken into five main sections. The first 
section assesses the levels of climate change mainstreaming based on Daly´s (2005) 
methodology. The second section analyses the nature of public finance in Colombia and the 
levels of climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the country and, particularly, 
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in the environmental sector. The third section discusses the findings related to the levels of 
mainstreaming. The fourth section analyses the conditions that promote or hinder 
mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgeting process and, to close, the fifth 
section draws some conclusions.    
 
6.1. Colombia in Context 
 
Colombia is a country with a population of 48.2 million inhabitants (DANE, 2020). In 2017 it 
had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of USD 6,301 (World Bank, n.d.). However, in 
recent years the country has experienced rapid economic growth as well as an improvement 
of social and economic policies. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (2005) “the solid registered growth has been boosted by the oil and 
mining boom, foreign direct investment in the commodities sector, as well as investment in 
general” (p. 4).  
 
The history of Colombia over four decades, starting at the end of the 1960’s, was characterized 
by significant episodes of violence and insecurity related to drug trafficking, armed conflict 
and other illicit activities, which have been concentrating the attention of the government 
(Paez, n.d.). Nevertheless, in economic terms, Colombia is growing. In the period 2010-2012, 
the state had an average growth rate of 4.2% per year and around 4.8% in the period of 2010-
2014 (Colombian Government, 2014, p. 656).  
 
In the context of the UNFCCC, Colombia is considered a developing country, part of the Non-
Annex I countries. However, on the 25th of May 2018 the OECD approved the entrance of 
Colombia into the organization, becoming the 37th member among the major economies of 
the world (OECD, 2018).  
 
Regarding climate change, Colombia is considered one of the most vulnerable countries in the 
world (Florez et al., 2016). In 2010 and 2011, the country experienced a severe winter period 
produced by “La Niña” effects, which impacted the economy and the population (Florez et 
al., 2016). The phenomenon affected 87.5% of the territorial departments and 93.03% of the 
municipalities (Nuñez, 2016, p. 8). The economic loss was approximately 0.6% of the GDP in 
the period 2011-2014, resulting in a state of emergency (Florez et al., 2016).  
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In 2015-2016, another meteorological phenomenon called “El Niño” impacted the country. 
The rains increased river levels, such as the Magdalena River, as well as affecting the 
“páramos”, one of the most important and strategic ecosystems in the country (Florez et al., 
2016).  
 
Colombia is not only highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, but also contributes 
to GHG emissions. The National Determined Contributions (NDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC 
reported that, in 2010, the country produced 0.46% of global GHG emissions. The main 
sources of emissions are agriculture, forestry-silviculture and other land uses (130.36 MTon 
of CO2eq), followed by the energy sector (71.21 MTon of CO2eq), the waste sector (13.71 
MTon of CO2eq) and the industrial sector (8.69 MTon of CO2eq) (Colombian Government, 
2015, p.1). 
 
Deforestation is a major source of GHG emissions in the country. According to the Institute of 
Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (IDEAM, Instituto de Hidrología, 
Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales), a total of 140,356 hectares were deforested in 2014, 
around 16% more than in 2013 (120,934 hectares) (Florez et al., 2016, p. 48).  
 
These facts are important to understand the extent to which the country has been 
mainstreaming climate change in the planning policy framework in response to this. As with 
Mexico, this chapter analyses Colombia based on the five levels of mainstreaming proposed 
by Daly (2005) adapted to the climate change agenda as it was explained in Chapter 2: 1) Level 
of discourse or rhetoric analysis; 2) Level of institutional or structural change; 3) Innovation in 
the way that policy is made; 4) New data available and 5) Innovation in the tools used to make 
policy. However, as was stated in Chapter 2, I included a sixth level - the levels of 
mainstreaming climate change in the public budget - the core of this thesis.  
6.1.1. Level of discourse or rhetoric  
 
Colombia ratified the UNFCCC in 1994 through Law 164, with the aim of “seeking alternatives 
to conduct actions to deal with climate change, […] based on the principles of common, but 
differentiated responsibilities…” (MADS, n.d.). Since then progress has been seen in the 
discourse and rhetoric, particularly with the inclusion of the topic in the National 




The first PND that reflected environmental issues was the Plan 1990-1994, elaborated under 
the mandate of César Augusto Gaviria from the Liberal Party24 (Colombian Government, 
1990). During this period, the Environmental Ministry (MADS, Ministerio de Ambiente y 
Desarrollo Sustentable) was created.  
 
Under the mandate of Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) the PND included a chapter related to 
sustainable development but no mention of climate change was included (Colombian 
Government, 1994). In the same way the PND 1998- 2002, developed by Andrés Pastrana 
from the Colombian Conservative Party, highlighted that increased levels of deforestation and 
environmental damage could affect the financial and commercial sectors as well (Colombian 
Government, 1998). 
 
The PND 2002-2006, under the mandate of Álvaro Uribe (first period), included a chapter 
promoting sustainable economic growth, declaring that the country had to work within the 
context of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol (Colombian Government, 2002). During the 
second period of Uribe, the PND 2006-2010 included a strategic line about environmental and 
risk management (Colombian Government, 2006).   
 
Until this moment, the rhetoric and discourse of the government focused on an agenda of 
security and the necessity to re-establish peace in the country, mentioning in very short 
phrases the environmental agenda. However, during the first period of the government of 
Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2014), elements regarding climate change were included in the 
PND (Colombian Government, 2010). The same included the “Action Plan for the Attention 
of Emergencies caused by the Winter Wave 2010-2011” (Colombian Government, 2010: 273), 
as well as promoting the formulation of the National Adaptation Plan (IDEAM, 2018a).  
 
All governmental representatives interviewed for this thesis believed climate change was 
included in the PND because of the impacts experienced with the “La Niña” effect. 
Representatives of the National Planning Department (DNP, Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación) pointed out “by the time that Santos was taking the Presidency, the National 
 
24 Gaviria took the power after the candidate, Luis Carlos Galán, was murdered in 1989. It was under the mandate 
of Gaviria that the National Assembly created the National Constitution of 1991, which now guides the country 
(1991 updated in 2016). 
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Development Plan was ready, but they had to change it to include the effects of La Niña 
because of its impacts” (Interviews 15FGC).  
 
It was, however, during the second presidential period of Santos (2014-2018) when the PND 
explicitly included the topic of climate change as part of the “Green Growth Strategy”. In this 
PND, the government not only included aspects relating to the reduction of vulnerability, but 
also the necessity to progress towards low carbon and sustainable growth. One of the goals 
of the PND was to create sectorial plans in seven ministries with adaption and mitigation goals 
for 2020 and 2030, in the context of the Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy 
(Colombian Government, 2018).  
 
Governmental and non-governmental representatives recognized that including climate 
change in the PND, the most important planning document of Colombia, allowed this topic to 
be discussed in high-level meetings (Interviews 11CSC, 12OIC, 7FGC).  
 
President Santos attended different meetings, such as the high-level meeting organized in 
2014 by the former General Secretary of the United Nations Ban Ki Moon, the COP21 of the 
UNFCCC, the One Planet Summit and others. The discourses highlighted the commitment of 
Colombia, pointing out “climate change is a reality that many countries are already facing” 
(Santos, 2014). During the COP21 the President presented the commitment to reduce 20% of 
GHG emissions by 2020 based on a business-as-usual scenario (Santos, 2015). 
 
One of the main commitments that President Santos emphasised was to reduce 
deforestation, reflected in the plan, Amazonia Vision (Visión Amazonía).  He also stressed that 
the main goal is to achieve domestic peace as a way to protect the environment (Santos, 
2015). 
 
Although Colombia’s proactive role at the international level is recognized, which is also 
reflected in his speeches (Interview 7CSC), the criticism of the discourse of President Santos 
was that the levels of environmental regulation in general have been reduced. As well, other 
policies that are contrary to the environmental agenda have been prioritized. For instance, 
the increasing licences to the mining and oil sectors are inconsistent with the environmental 
and climate agenda (Martinez, 2015; interview 6CSC).  
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This is a problem that remains important with the government of Ivan Duque, who took the 
power in 2018. In his PND 2018-2022, goals were included to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change in an explicit way (Colombian Government, 2018a). However, a representative from 
academia explained that the problem in Colombia “is that the discourse goes to a certain 
point, but the actions go to another” (Interview 6CSC). This is because the country “lives off 
mining and oil activities and we need to makeover what we do at the national level” (Interview 
6CSC). The expert suggests that, although Colombia has ratified international agreements 
related to sustainable development, their actions are still highly focus on fossil fuels and 
extractive activities (Interview 6CSC).  
 
6.1.2. Levels of institutional or structural change 
 
In 2016, the National System of Climate Change (SISCLIMA, Sistema Nacional de Cambio 
Climatico) was created through Decree 298. This was the first attempt to mainstream climate 
change at an institutional level in the federal government (Interview 11 CSC). The creation of 
SISCLIMA is based on policy mandate 3700, created by the National Committee of Economic 
and Social Policy (CONPES) in 2011. It is called “Institutional Strategy for the Articulation of 
Policies and Actions on Climate Change in Colombia" (Colombian Government, 2018). 
Representatives from MADS pointed out that CONPES 3700 was the basis for the institutional 
strategy to articulate policies and actions on climate change (Interviews 9FGC, 1FGC). 
 
Nevertheless, the CONPES is a political guideline that does not have legal force. An academic 
representative stated that this “is weak and does not have a long-term effect” (Interview 3AC) 
because it is a mandate that comes from the Federal Government, but in terms of hierarchy, 
it is below a law. During the time of writing this thesis, Colombia was attempting to create and 
implement a law that can comprehensively mandate and regulate actions related to climate 
change (Interview 1FGC), which will be discussed later. 
 
In general, SISCLIMA is the space “to coordinate, articulate, formulate, follow up and evaluate 
the policies, norms, strategies, plans, programmes, projects, actions and measures on 
adaptation to climate change and mitigation of greenhouse gases” (Decree 298, 2016, Article 
1). Within SISCLIMA the Inter-ministerial Commission of Climate Change (CICC: Comisión 
Intersecretarial de Cambio Climático) was created. The CICC is the entity that coordinates and 
guides the implementation of the national policy of climate change, integrated by eight 
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Ministers25 (Decree 298, 2016, Article 7). The decree promotes the participation of Ministers 
and the director of the DNP, which “empowers the mandate because it coordinates the work 
of the ministries”, according to governmental representatives (Interviews 13FGC, 14FGC); 
while the Minister of MADS is the coordinator of the CICC (Decree 298, 2016, Article 7).  
 
In SISCLIMA, other governmental actors also participate who are relevant for the 
implementation of climate action, such as IDEAM, the territorial entities and the Regional 
Autonomous Corporations (CAR, Corporaciones Autónomas Regionales), which are the 
environmental authorities within the territorial departments. According to MADS the 
participation of CARs is important, and almost 100% of corporations included climate change 
in their planning process for the period 2016-2018 (IDEAM, 2017, p. 397; Interview 13FGC). 
 
IDEAM is the technical arm of SISCLIMA that is in charge of producing information related to 
GHGs, vulnerability scenarios and other relevant technical information for the decision-
making process. IDEAM is also responsible for producing the communications that are 
submitted to the UNFCCC (Interview 13FGC). 
 
While governmental representatives recognize the need to engage different sectors in the 
mainstreaming process, there is major concern that the Climate Change Direction of MADS is 
dealing with most of the work, and that full engagement of other ministries is still needed 
(Interview 11CSC). The strategy of the Direction is to promote the creation of climate offices 
within different ministries, but it is still a work in progress (Interview 9FGC). A civil society 
representative explained that, if Colombia does not manage to include other ministries in a 
more structural way in the climate debate, is not going to be possible to tackle climate change 
“because the Environmental Ministry does not have the political weight to do it” (Interview 
6CSC).  
 
In terms of governance, both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders who were 
interviewed recognized the importance of the participation of the DNP. This is because the 
DNP is the entity that coordinates the whole public policy process and its involvement in the 
 
25 Members of CICC: Environment and Sustainable Development (Ministro de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sustentable); 
Interior (Ministro del Interior); Finance (Ministro de Hacienda); Agriculture and Rural Development (Ministro de 
Agricultura y Desarrollo Rural); Mines and Energy (Ministro de energía y minas); Transport (Ministro de 
Transporte); Foreign Affairs (Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores); and the Director of the National Planning 
Department (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) 
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creation and implementation of climate policies is seen as an important step to achieve the 
mainstreaming goal (Interviews 7FGC, 11CSC, 12OIC).  
 
A DNP representative explained that the Department is participating in climate policies 
because “climate change has brought social and economic costs to the country and that 
demands a high level of attention” (Interviews 7FGC). In this sense, DNP is leading the 
development of the “Green Growth Strategy, as well as is leading the Financial Management 
Committee (CGF, Comité de Gestión Financiera) created by the Decree 298 as well, to 
incorporate climate change criteria into the planning, execution and economic and financial 
evaluation cycles of Colombia. This Committee was created at the same time as the Foreign 
Affairs Committee (CAI, Comité de Asuntos Internacionales) under the coordination of the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry (Decree 298, 2016, Article 8).  
 
The Committee is considered an important institutional arrangement because it joins not only 
governmental representatives (DNP, the Finance, Environment, Industry, Foreign Affairs 
ministries, the Presidential Agency for International Cooperation, IDEAM and the Adaptation 
Fund), but also makes an effort to include entities such as national development banks 
(Bancoldex, Findeter, Finagro) and the Green Protocol, which is an initiative to encourage 
commercial banks to engage with climate action  (DNP, 2018; Interview 15FGC).  
 
Although a division of work is observed among the different institutions of the Colombian 
government, the problem is the maintenance of the teams, because there is high staff 
turnover, which means previous knowledge is often lost. For example, in the Climate Change 
Direction, there are around 20 members of government, plus another 30 consultants, who 
can leave at any time without passing along their knowledge (Interview 1FGC). According to 
a former governmental representative, “thankfully, the key people who have been involved in 
the creation of key policies have remained. This is also part of the reason why Colombia has 
been consistent in their position at an international level” (Interview 11CSC). 
6.1.3. Innovation in the tools used to make policy  
 
Important policy instruments were identified that were created thanks to discussions, 
research and other tools that are helping to better understand the state of climate change in 
the country. The most relevant instruments developed in Colombia are:  
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1. The Colombian Low Carbon Development Strategy (ECDBD, Estrategia Colombiana de 
Desarrollo Bajo en Carbono);  
2. The National Adaptation Plan (PNACC, El Plan Nacional de Adaptación); 
3. The National Strategy for REDD+ (ENREDD+, Estrategia Integral de Control a la 
Deforestación y Gestión de los Bosques);  
4. The National Plan of Disaster Risk Management and the Strategy of Financial 
Protection from Disasters (Plan Nacional de Manejo de Desastres y la Estrategia 
Finaciera para Protección de Desastres).   
5. The National Strategy on Climate Finance (ENFC, Estrategia Nacional de 
Financiamiento Climático) was created in 2017. 
 
Governmental representatives believe that the creation of these instruments was a major 
step forward thanks to improved information gathering, providing a better idea of what 
actions can be put in place to face the problem (Interviews 13FGC, 14FGC). Furthermore, the 
inclusion of the Green Growth Strategy into the PND (2014-2018) was a major, because this 
strategy aims to support productive sectors with the internalization of sustainable principles 
(Interview 11FGC). 
 
However governmental and non-governmental stakeholders consider that the most relevant 
tool to make climate action possible is the Climate Change Law that was approved in 2018, 
after at least two years of discussion (Interviews 11CSC, 13FGC, 14FGC, 17LPC). The approval 
of the Law was relevant because in 2018 Colombia had elections and a new government took 
over, and the aim was to avoid a political change that could affect the evolution of climate 
policy (Interview 15FGC). 
 
Although the Climate Change Law did not pass as quickly as the environmental ministry hoped, 
the peace process in Colombia helped to build a new narrative about the topic. President 
Santos received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work in constructing agreements with the armed 
groups to end the violence in the country (Nobel Prize, 2016). In that sense, although the 
environmental agenda was not considered at the beginning of the peace negotiations, the 
problem of deforestation became clear during the process, as the production of cocaine leads 
to the cutting of thousands of trees.  
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As a result, a fund called “Sustainable Colombia26” (Colombia Sostenible) was created with the 
support of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) (Colombian Government, n.d.).  This 
was done in order to integrate both agendas with a strong focus on the reduction of 
deforestation. This topic will be discussed further on. 
 
All those interviewed agreed that the peace process is the main concern of the government. 
However, the possibility to “integrate climate change into the peace agenda is an opportunity 
for Colombia” (Interview 3AC). If the country manages to do this in an effective way, it will be 
an example of an innovative approach to tackle climate change and to face other structural 
problems (Interview 3AC).  
6.1.4. New data available  
 
Governmental representatives acknowledge that one of the major challenges that Colombia 
has faced is producing and gathering data. Over time, however, it has been possible to gather 
enough information to establish goals and to define what is needed.  
 
Colombia has submitted three national communications in the context of the UNFCCC as well 
as two Biannual Updated Reports. These tools have been the way to collect data regarding 
key sectors in the country. The update of the GHG inventory, which is guidance to determine 
the key sectors that need to reduce emissions, was included within these instruments. In 
addition to this, the country is making progress identifying vulnerable areas through 
vulnerability maps produced by IDEAM (2017). 
 
On the other hand, each of the policy instruments that constitute the National Policy of 
Climate Change has their own processes to collect data. For example, the ECDBD was built 
based on eight sectorial plans. These identified the key measures that the country can 
implement in order to reduce emissions in productive sectors (Interview 9FGC). The analysis 
conducted also identified abatement cost curves, as well as National Appropriate Mitigation 
Actions (NAMAs). 
 
Different policy instruments were also a part of the PNACC over the years. The identification 
of adaptation actions has been more complex, and representatives of the MADS 
 
26 Information about the Fund is available from http://www.colombiasostenible.apccolombia.gov.co/ 
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acknowledges that, “the construction of the PNACC will be a continuous process, which will be 
constantly fed back to the extent to which information about the threat posed by climate 
change” (MADS, 2018).  
 
The integration of the Colombian NDCs is another example of a process where data played a 
major role (Interview 4FGC). In collaboration with academia, in particular, the University of 
the Andes, the Federal Government managed to analyse several measures that could guide it 
towards a low carbon development pathway. A representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
highlighted that “this analysis of the measures helped to provide information to the central 
government to better decide which measures could be considered in the contributions” 
(Interview 4FGC).  
 
In addition, the Colombian government is working on a system to measure, report and verify 
(MRV) emissions, the reduction of emissions and a system to track climate finance.  The 
purpose of these systems is to keep producing data about the status of emissions, actions and 
finance. This will allow the country to better define its progress and how far it is from its 
commitments (Interview 14FGC).  
 
According to the third communication submitted to the UNFCCC, the MRV on climate finance, 
for instance, aims to provide better quality information related to the financial flows. This will 
allow better decisions to be made, relating to the management of public sources, and to a 
greater understanding of the need to leverage other international and private sources 
(IDEAM, 2017, p. 431). Therefore, the MRV could also be used as a tool to improve and 
innovate the way that Colombia creates policies.   
6.1.5. Innovation in the way that policy is made  
 
As stated earlier, Colombia has progressed in terms of climate policy because the topic is 
included in the most important policy instrument, the PND. Although the explicit mention of 
climate change was only integrated in the PND 2014-2018, climate change is a topic that has 
been treated by other instruments prior to this. 
 
Based on that, Colombia has created instruments that aim to build a policy framework (Figure 




Figure 6. 1 Climate Policy Framework in Colombia 
 
Source: Own elaboration using information from the Plan Integral de Cambio Climático del 
Department del Chocó (2015), and the Climate Finance National Strategy (2017). 
 
IDEAM (2016) highlights that, “to bring the country to be resilient to change climate and low 
in carbon, requires a robust inter-sectorial and inter-institutional coordination, more than 
sectored climate change… we have to take it towards mainstreaming to be able to respond 
effectively to the character multidimensional of the phenomenon” (p. 38).  
 
This assessment showed that Colombia has been creating instruments and policies to tackle 
climate change. In the words of IDEAM (2016) “the Colombian Government has had a genuine 
interest in adding efforts, establishing coherences and articulating climate change 
management in an integrated way” (p. 47). In its NDCs the Colombian government commits 
to reduce 20% of GHG emissions by 2030, but with the aim of cutting and additional 10% with 
international support (Colombian Government, 2015).  
 
While there is innovation, further coordination and budgetary support is needed to fully 
complete tasks. The IDEAM points out “in budgetary terms, the resources for climate change 
should increase, if that happens, other stakeholders will see the priority that the country gives 
to the subject” (IDEAM, 2016, p. 47). In that sense, it’s important to understand to what extent 
climate change is mainstreamed in the allocation of public sources to implement and to 
achieve the country’s commitments, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
 162 
6.2.  Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Colombia 
 
The aim is to understand to what extent climate change is mainstreamed in the public budget 
and under what conditions that allocation has taken place in Colombia.   
 
Costs of climate change and sources of climate finance 
 
The CEPAL, the DNP and the IADB conducted a study that found that, in the worst-case 
scenario, annual losses for climate change could be 0.50% of the GDP in Colombia. However, 
this analysis only considered economic sectors that represent 4.3% of the GDP (CEPAL, et al., 
2014, p. 10).  
 
According to the National Strategy on Climate Finance, the cost of implementing key actions 
to reduce emissions by 20% (66.5 MtonCO2 eq.) could be around USD 17,109 million; this is 
USD 3.1 billion, annually (CGF, 2016). This amount considers the economic losses from the 
impact of “La Niña” 2010-2011 (CGF, 2016). In that sense, according to a DNP representative, 
tackling climate change requires the availability of economic and financial systems to deal 
with the impact of climate change and to invest in alternatives to achieve the green growth 
that the country has committed to (Interview 9FGC).  
 
Colombia is one of the major recipients in Latin America of international cooperation from the 
Official Development Assistance (ODA). In recent years, international support from the OECD 
countries has increased as illustrated in Table 6.1.  
 
Table 6. 1 Evolution of Total ODA Net in Colombia in millions of USD (period 2011-2015) 
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Amount 1017.7 764.2 857.5 1224.2 1347.5 
                        Source: Own elaboration with OECD data (for the period 2011-2015) 
 
It is not clear how much of this ODA is dedicated solely to climate change. However, the 
Climate Funds Update shows that Colombia was the fourth largest recipient of financing from 
climate funds in Latin America by 2015 and the third largest recipient by 2016 (Bird, et al., 
2016; Bird et al., 2017).  
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According to all the government representatives interviewed, the financial support received 
from international cooperation is one of the most important drivers for climate action in the 
country, “without it climate action would be limited” (Interviews 1FGC).  The First Biannual 
Updated Report submitted by Colombia to the UNFCCC pointed out that the support received 
from international cooperation was approximately USD 30 million over the period of 2010-
2014 (IDEAM, et al., 2015).  However, a civil society representative claims that a lack of 
transparency makes it difficult to understand where the money is and how these resources 
have been used (Interview 6CSC). 
 
Prior to the entrance of Colombia to the OECD, there was a debate about the potential risks 
that this could have in the access to funds. While some civil society representatives debated 
that being part of a rich group of countries could affect its access to grant aid (Interviews 
6CSC), government representatives feel that this will be positive step because Colombia can 
improve environmental standards that can help its performance and therefore access to more 
aid (Interviews 4FGC).  
 
For instance, representatives from the government of Colombia consider that the Green 
Climate Fund is an important mechanism to fulfil the country’s needs, since the Fund is already 
supporting different programs (Interview, 15FGC). However, most of the people interviewed 
agree that the role of public finance and the allocation of national resources is still necessary 
to guide and to leverage the participation of other financial sources (Interviews 4FGC, 2FGC, 
1FGC, 7FGC, 11CSC, 10AC, 12IOC, 13FGC, 14FGC).  
 
The next section focuses on the extent that climate change has been mainstreamed in the 
public budget, analysing the general context of the public finance system in Colombia.  
 
6.2.1. Public finance in Colombia: General context  
 
Since the global financial crisis of 2008, Colombia has experienced rapid economic growth 
based on trade and large flows of foreign direct investment, but also based on recovered 
domestic demand, driven by government consumption (OECD, 2015).  
 
Global dynamics also affect the country. The global growth of China, the economic behaviour 
of United States, geopolitical risks and changing prices affect Colombian’s mining, oil and coal 
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exports (OECC, 2015, p. 14). Although Colombia is better prepared for these changes, the 
country faces a constant issue, as do many Latin American countries: balancing the public 
finance system (OECD, 2015). This is important to strengthen the capacity to generate 
revenue to cover all the expenditure needs in strategic sectors.  
6.2.2. Revenues  
 
The OECD (2015) claims that the fiscal policy framework in Colombia is robust. In 1991, the 
National Constitution, the most important legal document that guides the principles and 
actions of the country, included fiscal sustainability as one of the most important elements of 
public policy. Furthermore, there was a fiscal reform (integrated by three main laws27 that 
aimed to balance the central government and adjust the economic cycle and the oil and 
mining prices (Calvijo, et al., 2013; OECD, 2015).  
 
In Colombia, the oil and mining sector have been important for revenue generation. The 
Mining and Energy Ministry (MinMinas, Ministerio de Energía y Minas) projected a boom in 
the energy-mining sector for the period of 2010-2020. The Ministry reported that the 
estimated direct foreign investment went from USD 1.3 million per year in 2000-2005 (1.2% 
of the GDP), to approximately USD 5.2 million per year from 2006-2010 (2.1 of the GDP) and 
USD 9.4 million per year from 2012-2014 (2.3% of the GDP) (Calvijo et al., 2013, p. 43). 
 
The projected number of oil barrels produced was estimated to be 1.6 million by 2020, 
representing a 46% growth (Calvijo, et al., 2013, p. 43). However, by the beginning of the 
2020, the production of oil was 883.872 barrels. Although the oil production decreased in 
comparison to other years, the gas production grew 5.6% in January 2020 compared to 
previous year (El Tiempo, 2020). According to the OECD, the challenge is to ensure efficiency 
in the future operation of Ecopetrol (the public company that also has private shares) so that 
permanent negative impacts are avoided. However, as in the whole region, the production of 
oil will decrease in the future (OECD, 2015, p. 19). 
 
A Finance Ministry presentation illustrated that in 2013 the income from oil represented 3.3% 
of the GDP, but in 2014 it had reduced to 2.6% and in 2015 it had decreased further to 1.1% 
(Minhacienda, n.d.). Table 6.2 illustrates income projection for Colombia and shows that 
 
27 Law 1370 [2009]; Law 4825 [2010]; and Law 1430 [2010]; as well as tax law 1607 [2012] 
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dividends from Ecopetrol will not represent a significant portion from 2016 onwards (OECD, 
2015, p. 19). 
 
Table 6. 2 Income and budgetary projections of the Central Government in percentage of 
the GDP (period 2014-2025) 
Income 2014 2015 2016 2020 2025 
Tax Income 17.0 17.0 16.9 16.4 16.0 
Other taxes - - - - - 
Dividends of 
Ecopetrol 
1,4 1.0 - - - 
Source: OECD, 2015. 
   
Therefore, there is growing pressure to increase income collection in an effective and 
equitable way. The income of the central government is around 20% of GDP, which is low in 
comparison to the OECD countries, and even in relation to other Latin-American countries 
(OECD, 2015).  
 
In general, there are three main challenges related to income collection: tax evasion, high 
exemptions and weak tax administration (OECD, 2015, p. 20). Tax evasion is close to 2% of 
the GDP. As well, the tax administration has limited control of customs because of the lack of 
personnel and other administrative limitations. Similar to Mexico, informal employment, for 
instance, represents between 50 and 70% of total employment (OECD, 2015, p. 34). Groups 
such as young people, women, less qualified workers and those displaced by political violence 
are more likely to work informally, which means that they do not contribute to the tax system. 
 
Besides that, another issue is that local governments receive around 30% of their income from 
the central government. Although this has been reduced over time, it puts a lot of pressure 
on the system (OECD, 2015, p. 15). 
 
In recent years, Colombia has implemented fiscal reforms that include measures related to 
the environment and climate change. The country approved a carbon tax, with revenues that 
represent 3.6% of the total income, in comparison to OECD countries with revenues of 5.7%. 
These taxes are for national consumption of fossil fuels, particularly liquid fuels and LPG gas 
(Interview, 2FGC). The established price per ton of CO2 is 15,000 Colombian pesos, around 
 166 
USD 5 per ton (MADS, n.d.2). The key concern is that the cost of taxes applicable to fossil fuels 
do not adequately account for the environmental impact (Interview 11CSC). However, the 
OECD (2015) considers fuel prices in Colombia to be closer to international standards in 
comparison to other oil producers in Latin America. 
 
According to the Finance Ministry representative and others, the ideal scenario is to tax fuels 
based on their energy content, GHG emissions, and their environmental impact in terms of 
pollution (Interview 2FGC; CEPAL et al., 2014, p. 25). The problem is that many activities are 
exempt from this tax, such as construction, electricity, transport, and financial services as well 
as other services. This causes an estimated income loss of approximately 2.4% of the GDP 
(OECD, 2015).  
 
Another important element for the revenue is the royalties, which is the income that the 
country receives from mining and oil permits and licenses28. The Constitution established that 
all royalties are allocated to local governments and not to the central government, yet few 
municipalities benefited from these royalties (Calvijo, et al., 2013, p. 39).  
 
In order to better control these resources, a National Fund for Royalties and Autonomous 
Regional Corporations (CARs) was created. In 1994, the DNP was appointed to manage the 
Fund. However, the royalty system has been highly criticized because of alleged corruption 
and operational inefficiency (Interview 10AC). The aim of the Fund was to redistribute the 
resources to departments and municipalities that are not direct beneficiaries of royalties but 
this “never happened efficiently”(interview 10AC) and it was found that resources were 
sometimes reallocated to municipalities that already receive direct benefits (Calvijo, et al., 
2013, p. 40). 
 
On average the royalties represent 1.1% of the GDP per year. Recently DNP has been working 
to integrate climate change in the allocation of funds from the Royalties System, but there is 
still resistance to making major reforms to the actual legislation to fully mainstream the 
climate perspective (Interview 15FGC).  
 
 
28 The National Constitution from 1991 ratified that subsoil is the property of the state, and approved 
compensation payment to local states (territories) for environmental damages incurred by exploitation 
of non-renewable resources (Colombian Government, 1991, Articles 332 and 360). 
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In 2017, as a result of additional income from royalties, an extra budget of USD 200 million 
(for the period 2017-2018) was allocated to climate action, which was a “surprise” (Interviews 
2FGC, 15FGC). A representative from DNP commented “the aim is not only to integrate new 
consideration for climate change, but to also establish a new framework to improve the 
investment of royalties by centralizing the planning and execution of projects, which will 
improve the investment framework” (Interview 15FGC). 
 
The topic of the country’s revenue is complex, and this has a direct relationship with the 
amount of money that the country has to deal with all budgetary needs, including climate 
change, as it will be analysed in the next section. 
6.2.3. Public budget and expenditure  
 
According to the Finance Ministry the public expenditure, “is the most important financial 
management instrument of fiscal policy and represents when public spending is programmed 
and recorded and the rules for its execution are established” (MisFinanzas, 2018). 
 
As stated previously, the level of expenditure relies on the levels of revenues and in Table 6.3 
the relationship between these two areas is shown. Even though income was growing, the 
expenditure was controlled; it was not exceeding existing resources. 
 
Table 6. 3 Comparison between revenue and public expenditure in millions of USD (period 
2013-2017) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue*  180,185   187,145   199,911   203,108   221,304  
Public 
expenditure** 
 158,275   170,460   184,573   183,369   208,175  
Source: Historic information- General Direction of Public Budget- Sub direction of Analysis and budget 
consolidation, Finance Ministry (MinHacienda), 2018.  
*Information about the total revenue collected for the National Public Budget  
**Information about the budget that includes function, debt and investment  
 
In order to illustrate the strategic allocation of public resources, I conducted an analysis based 
on the allocation of budget for the last four years specifically for the environment, energy and 
planning sectors, which can be seen in Table 6.4. 
 
 168 
Table 6. 4 The allocation of public budget in selected sectors in millions of USD (period 
2014-2018) 
Sector 2014 2015 2016 2017 
 Environment and sustainable 
development  
425 458 463 508 
 Mining and energy  2,591 3,093 2,911 3,264 
 Planning   398 324 368 394 
TOTAL of the country without debt   131,160   138,776   143,806   159,276  
Source: Historic information- General Direction of Public Budget- Sub direction of Analysis and budget 
consolidation, Finance Ministry (Minhacienda), 2018. 
 
The allocation of public budget in the environmental sector is around six times less than in the 
energy sector (average per year), while it is 1.2% more than the planning sector. The budget 
of the environmental sector has been growing constantly, while in the energy sector it 
decreased in 2016 but then increased again in 2017. The planning sector has been more or 
less constant although it decreased slightly in 2015 and 2016.  
 
The public budget evolves as a reaction to national demands, and in the case of Colombia 
there are several social programmes that have been demanding more public resources. 
Notable examples include the peace agreement with armed groups, the provision of 
employment and the relocation of communities and families that relied on cocaine 
production, among others (OECD, 2015, pp. 19-20). Other areas such as investment in public 
infrastructure is expected to increase by 2020, however the challenge is to define where these 
needed resources will be found (OECD, 2015). 
 
In general, the expenditure of the government went from 10% of the GDP in 1990 to 22% in 
2005. However, there are other problems such as the internal and external debt that went 
from 14% of the GDP in 1995 to 50% in 2006 (OECD, 2015). For that reason, important policies 
must be implemented, and the cut of the public budget is one of the resources that the 
government considers in balancing the economy. 
Colombia, like many other developing countries, faces pressure on the public budget. 
Nevertheless, the impacts of climate change here are evident and are also impacting the 
public finance system.   
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6.2.4. Public Budget for Climate Change   
 
Asa result of the impacts of climate change in Colombia, such as the “La Niña” effect, the 
government has been spending public money to deal with the social and economic losses. 
With the creation of the PND of 2014-2018, the inclusion of a Green Growth Strategy as well 
as other risk management initiatives, the country allocated financial resources for climate 
change measures and created a number of financial mechanisms, operated primarily with 
public sources.  
An analysis conducted by the UNDP as part of the Readiness Program of the GCF, pointed out 
that Colombia has been investing around USD 420,600 million (average per year) in climate-
related activities (IDEAM, 2017, p. 440). From 2011-2015, the investments were divided as 
follows: the federal government provided 54% (USD 227,644 million per year), local 
governments provided 31% (USD 130,815 million) and the Royalties System provided 15% 
(USD 62,171 million) (IDEAM, 2017, p. 441). 
In terms of the sectorial allocation, the analysis pointed out that the main sectors that allocate 
public resources associated with climate change are risk management and the environmental 
sector, which between both of them covered 70% of the expenditure (38% and 32%, 
respectively) (IDEAM, 2017, p. 445). 
The analysis also identified other mechanisms that have been receiving pubic budget and that 
are relevant to deal with climate change. For instance, the National Adaptation Fund (Fondo 
Nacional de Adaptación) was created “to attend the construction, reconstruction, recovery 
and economic and social reactivation of the areas affected by the events derived from the La 
Niña phenomenon of the years 2010 and 2011” (MinHacienda, n.d.). This Fund is attached to 
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.  
Between 2011 and 2013, the investments of this Fund were 36% of the total investment of 
the government during the period 2011-2015 (USD 13,284 million). Although the Adaptation 
Fund was created with a vision of reconstruction, the PND 2014-2018 gave the Fund the 
faculty to execute integral projects of risk management and adaptation to climate change in 
an explicit way. Its mandate is to operate with a multi-sectorial and regional approach and to 




On the other hand, the Colombia in Peace Fund (Fondo Colombia en Paz) was created through 
in April 2017, “to serve as a vehicle for implementing the peace programmes and projects to 
be implemented by the government” (Colombian Government, 2018). According to the 
Finance Ministry, from October 2017 to April 2018, the fund received approximately USD 
263,627 million. The main financial sources were the national budget, and other private and 
public resources. This fund has 13 sub accounts related to the peace agreement (Colombian 
Government, 2018).  
 
An academic representative pointed out that this Fund represents an important instrument 
to watch, and that its success will depend on the levels of transparency and accountability 
(Interview 3AC). Importantly, financial flow information from the funds is published and can 
be accessed on the website of the Finance Ministry.  
 
At the same time, the Sustainable Colombia Fund (Fondo Colombia Sostenible), was created 
as an important financial instrument to deal with environmental issues (Interview, 12OIC). 
The fund seeks “to maximize the environmental dividends of the peace in Colombia, primarily 
in the territories that were affected for the armed conflict and that are rich in biodiversity” 
(Colombian Government, n.d.). The operation of the Fund is under the operation of the 
Colombia in Peace Fund, to avoid duplication of efforts. This Fund did not receive resources 
from the Colombia in Peace Fund in the first years of operation while bilateral cooperation 
provided an important source of income. The expectation was to receive USD3.3 billion by 
2020; the resources come from private sector, philanthropy, bilateral cooperation and 
national resources. Most of the bilateral cooperation comes from Norway, Germany, United 
Kingdom (join USD$14,250,000), Sweden (USD$1,575,437) and Switzerland (USD$2,750,000) 
(Colombian Government, 2015; Colombian Government, n.d.). 
 
With 13 lines of operation, this Fund is also called “the Green Climate Fund of the Post-
Conflict”, which is managed by the IADB, and is a result of the collaboration of governmental 
entities such as DNP, MADS, the Agricultural Ministry, the Presidential Cooperation Agency, 
and the High Counsellor for Post-Conflict (Colombian Government, 2015; Interview 12OIC). 
The aim is to use this fund to reduce 20% of the GHG emissions, reduce deforestation by 90 
thousand hectares and reduce loss of natural forest, which are part of the NDCs; what is not 
clear in the second year of President´s Duque period is what is the future of these funds.  
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Finally, another important step was the creation of the MRV System for climate finance, being 
Colombia the first country in Latin America to create and operate a system to track financial 
flows (DNP, 2019).  
 
The construction of this system was also part of the Readiness Program of the GCF that was 
implemented by the DNP with the technical support of WRI and GFLAC. The aim was to 
establish a tracking system than can show where the financial flows are allocated, including 
public expenditure, to better understand where the gaps and opportunities are to invest on 
adaptation and mitigation actions. According to DNP representatives, the MRV on climate 
finance is a tool that has instilled confidence in donors and other institutions, because it shows 
willingness of the country to act transparently on climate change (Interviews 7FGC, 15FGC).  
 
6.3. Discussion about the levels of climate change mainstreaming in the policy and budget 
of Colombia 
 
The analysis of mainstreaming based on Daly´s (2005) methodology shows that Colombia is 
progressing towards climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgetary process; 
however, this is still in a limited transversality format.   
 
In terms of discourse and rhetoric, climate change has been part of the discourse although 
this varies depending on the government in power. For instance, during the government of 
President Santos, particularly in his last period, climate change became a relevant topic on the 
public agenda; this was also thanks to the inclusion of climate change in the peace agenda and 
because, the government recognized the vulnerability of the country to climate events, such 
as the impacts of La Niña. The arrival of President Duque also continued the discourse 
regarding the importance of climate change but there is a perception that the topic that is 
dominating the public agenda is the peace agenda.  
 
Regarding mainstreaming climate change at an institutional level, there is progress through 
the creation of specific entities to deal with the issue such as the SISCLIMA and the CICC. 
Although the ministry that remains central to policy development is the environmental 
ministry, one relevant condition that explains the progress of climate policy in Colombia is the 
involvement of the DNP in the environmental and climate agenda. This is because the NPD 
coordinates the work of the central government. 
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In relation to tools to make policies, there are policy instruments that aim to bring climate 
change to more sectors, such as the eight sectorial programs that were the base of the Low 
Carbon Development Strategy. Furthermore, the approval of the Climate Change Law in 2018 
is also an important and an innovative tool to deal with climate change and to support the 
mainstreaming process, including the allocation of public budget. At the same time, Colombia 
has understood the importance of increasing financial resources, as a way to comply with 
policies and the creation of the Committee for Financial Management is one of the most 
relevant steps regarding climate finance.  
 
Using innovative means to tackle climate change is evident through the bridging of issues, 
such as peace and security, with climate change impacts. For instance, while the production 
of cocaine leads to deforestation, the dissolution of criminal groups as part of security 
measures affects the creation of “jobs”. The counter effect of this new situation is that 
communities are using forest resources to generate income, thereby increasing deforestation 
levels, which is one of the main sources of GHG emissions. In this sense, the aim is to create 
policies that consider these two connected agendas (Interview 15FGC). Under the mandate 
of President Santos, there were proposals to create a common agenda and new financial 
mechanisms, such as the Colombia in Peace Fund and the Sustainable Colombia Fund, but the 
President Duque’s strategy to connect both agendas is still not clear.  
 
Regarding mainstreaming climate change in the public budget and expenditure, there has 
been progress in understanding the amount of public investment flowing towards climate-
related activities. The creation of a MRV system for climate finance is a major step to present, 
in a transparent way, the data to improve the decision-making process. The challenge, 
however, is to disseminate this information across sectors and entities to create a general 
understanding of what climate change means and how to tackle it more effectively.  
 
Although this analysis is focused on the behaviour of governmental institutions, which could 
be considered technocratic, in the Third Communication submitted by the Colombian 
Government to the UNFCCC, it is recognized that the participation of non-governmental and 
foreign entities is necessary to achieve the mainstreaming goal, as Bacchi and Evelin (2010) 
and Dali (2005) suggest. In this sense, Bernal (2018) points out that the missing piece is to 
allow for the participation of non-governmental actors in governmental processes, noting 
“besides the role of the private sector in the CGF, civil society does not play a role in the 
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institutionalization of climate change in Colombia” (p. 23).  Accordingly, no structural change 
is observed in Colombia regarding climate change, but rather limited transversality in sectors 
such as the environmental one.  
 
6.4. Conditions that promote or hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget 
of Colombia 
 
Most of the people interviewed agree that the public budget is the tool that will most 
effectively guide the private and international sources of finance towards more effective 
climate actions. This is because public expenditure is considered the tool that will dictate the 
priorities of the country, and if climate change is not a priority, then it will be very difficult to 
achieve any national commitment. This is particularly relevant because Colombia has made 
an unconditional commitment to reduce 20% of its emissions by 2030, using its own 
resources, while it is willing to increase the goal to 30% reduction of emissions with 
international support. 
 
The analysis identified important endogenous and exogenous conditions that promote or 
hinder mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgetary process.  
 
Conditions that promote climate change mainstreaming in public budget of Colombia  
 
The main condition that is promoting climate action in Colombia is the presence of more 
climate events such as the phenomena of La Niña, which has showcased the vulnerability of 
the country. In this sense, the response has been the inclusion of climate change in the main 
planning instrument, which is the National Development Plan, and which guides the action of 
the state (Interview 7GFC, 13FGC). This has led to the creation of specific areas with technical 
expertise dedicated to deal with the problem. In this sense, the role of the DNP has been 
highly relevant to achieve important changes with regards to the climate change agenda, 
because it plays a major role in the coordination of the government and particularly within 
the climate finance agenda (Interview 15FGC).  
 
At the same time, there is evidence that Colombia has been progressing in the peace process, 
improving its levels of governance, after the crisis that spanned almost five decades (1960s-
2000s). Important measures have been taken, including economic, social and environmental 
measures, those are now allowing the country to regain trust from the international 
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community. One leading example is Colombia’s entry to the OECD (Interview 1FGC). Even 
though this is a contentious issue at the national level, it is considered an opportunity to keep 
building new and better governance and environmental standards (Interview 4FGC, 6CSC, 
3AC).  
 
This improvement is also reflected in the growing reception of international cooperation. 
Colombia is one of the main receptors of ODA and one of the five main receptors of climate 
finance in LAC, which, according to governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, is an 
important condition that has lead climate action at the national level (Interviews 5OIC, 11CSC, 
12OIC). In the same way, the creation of transparency tools, such as the construction of an 
MRV system on climate change, has increased donor confidence because it reflects a 
willingness to provide further information to improve effectiveness (Interview 5OIC). 
The approval of the Climate Change Law was also relevant to build trust and to provide more 
certainty about the climate actions of the country beyond governmental periods.  However, 
an important condition is the political will of governments to promote and incentivise the 
actions to tackle climate change. This was shown during the mandate of President Santos and 
the hope is that the recent participation of President Duque in events, such as the Climate 
Action Conference in 2019, would lead to a more responsive role in his remaining years in 
power. Leadership, as a condition, has also been shown in specific entities (Interview 17LPC).  
 
Conditions that hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of Colombia 
 
There are important aspects that constrain the progress of the climate change mainstreaming 
process, such as the weak attention that climate change has in the public agenda in 
comparison to the peace debate. This influences the operation of the government where 
there are no observed efforts to mainstream climate change beyond the environmental 
sector, which limits the possibility to produce structural changes (Interview 3AC).  This is also 
complex in the context of the role that regions and territories have because, even though 
they included climate change in their regional plans, they do not have enough resources to 
implement them (Interview 13FGC, 16SGC).   
 
In addition, there is a perception that, even though Colombia is improving data collection on 
climate change, not all ministries or local governments understand what constitutes climate 
 175 
action and therefore are struggling to include them in their planning processes or public 
budgets (Interview 14FGC).  
 
Furthermore, as with Mexico, Colombia is a country that struggles with tax collection, with 
fossil fuel and extractive activities being the main source of income (royalties) (Interview 
2FGC). This produces a path dependency on these activities that reduces the possibility to 
diversify the public financial matrix. This is considered one of the major hindrances of climate 
change action in the country (Interviews 6CSC, 8CSC, 10AC, 18OIC).  Furthermore, the 
resources collected from fossil fuel and extractive activities are allocated in an unbalanced 
way, where environmental and climate actions are not the main recipients or even on the list 
of priorities.  
 
Finally, as with many other countries in LAC, Colombia suffers from high levels of corruption 
that hinders the efforts to improve transparency, even though the country is part of the 
Alliance for Open Governments and has adopted a Law for the “Transparency and Rights to 
Access to Public Information” (Ley de Transparencia y del Derecho de Acceso a la Información 
Pública). Further work must take place to build trust among national and international entities 
(Interviews 6CSC). 
 
6.5. Conclusions  
 
Colombia is a highly vulnerable country that has been experiencing the impacts of climate 
change producing important social changes and economic losses. Based on the analysis of 
climate change mainstreaming, developed from Daly´s work (2005), it is possible to conclude 
that Colombia has been progressing at different levels to incorporate climate change in the 
planning and budgetary process, but it is still in a format of limited transversality. This means, 
according to Daly, that sectors have started to recognize the relationship with climate change 
to their activities, but not to the point that is needed to treat the problem in an integral way. 
 
Colombia has been progressing in incorporating climate change in the discourse and rhetoric, 
as well as at the institutional level, and using tools to create policy, such as the Climate Change 
Law. The speed of this evolution, however, is dependent on the interests of the government 
in place, where climate change is not always seen as a main priority and other agendas, such 
as the peace process, dominates public attention. This was reflected in the levels of budget 
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allocation to tackle climate change, which are growing but are still not enough to face the 
country’s challenges.  
 
Conditions, such as active participation at the international level and the receipt of 
international cooperation, are major promoters of climate action at the national level. 
However, the reliance on fossil fuel and extractive activities to generate revenue and produce 
budget is a major constraint as well as the little amount of attention that the topic has 




CHAPTER 7. ASSESSING CLIMATE CHANGE MAINSTREAMING IN 




In Chapter 6, I established that Colombia’s economy had been steadily growing thanks to 
several conditions, including significant foreign capital in key sectors such as the energy 
sector. While the energy sector is an important part of the economy, it is also one of the main 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions, because it relies on hydrocarbons and extractive 
activities.  
 
In this chapter, I conduct an analysis of Colombia’s energy mix to understand the extent to 
which climate change actions and responses have been mainstreamed in this sector, based 
on Daly’s (2005) work (see Chapters 1 and 2) applied to the climate change agenda. The aim 
is to analyse Colombia’s efforts to transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy for 
electricity generation. The chapter also seek to identify conditions that promote and hinder 
the climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgetary process of the energy sector 
as an important condition towards low carbon development, as discussed previously in this 
thesis. 
 
The analysis in Colombia is based on literature reviews and interviews and in order to present 
the findings this chapter is broken into five sections. The first section analyses the levels of 
climate change mainstreaming in the planning process of the energy sector; while the second 
part analyses the levels of climate change mainstreaming in the public budget and 
expenditure.  The third part provides a discussion on the findings. The fourth section analyses 
the conditions that promote and hinder mainstreaming climate change in the planning and 
budget of the energy sector and the fifth and last section provides key conclusions.  
 
7.1. Analysis of climate change mainstreaming in the energy sector  
 
In Colombia, approximately 78% of energy consumption comes from fossil fuel (UPME, 2015a, 
p.22). This sector is the second largest source of GHGs, having steadily grown in the last 
decades (IDEAM, et al., 2017). By 2014, the energy sector emitted 82.510 Gg of CO2eq while 
in 1990 it was 47.630 Gg of CO2eq, an increase of 73% in twenty years (IDEAM, et al., 2017, 
p.129). These emissions came from the transportation (37%) and energy industries (24%) 
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mainly. In the energy industry sector, 49% corresponds to power generation.  The categories 
related to the energy sector (transport, energy industries, solid fuels and other industries) 
represent 53% of the emissions (IDEAM, et al., 2017). 
 
While the energy sector is the second largest source of GHGs, it is also highly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate change. According to IDEAM et al., (2017), the reduced levels of 
precipitation has impacted the potential of hydroelectric power generation that generated 
close to 70% of the electricity in the country (Rico, 2018; Interview 13FGC), thereby increasing 
the demand for fossil fuels. There has been a variable increase in the consumption of coal, but 
gas has been growing faster, going from 6.180 millions of m3 in 2004 to 14.635 millions of m3 
in 2014 (IDEAM, et al., 2017, p.133).  
 
Since the energy sector plays an important role in GHG emission, this section analyses the 
levels of mainstreaming climate change in the energy sector with emphasis on the electricity 
generation subsector.  
7.1.1. Discourse or rhetoric 
 
In Chapter 6, I described the evolution of the climate agenda in the National Development 
Plan (PND for its name in Spanish), the most important planning instrument in the country. In 
the PND 2014-2018, a Chapter about “Green Growth” was included, which outlined the 
energy transition as an important part of sustainable development and the need to develop 
regulations and policies to better integrate alternatives and renewable sources that will 
generate electricity, primarily for non-connected areas (Colombian Government, 2014, p. 
182).  
 
Based on that mandate, “Vision 2050” was created in 2015 that promoted an urgent energy 
transition. According to the Energy and Mining Planning Unit (UPME, Unidad de Planeación 
Energética y Minera) this energy transition “is characterized by a shift towards renewable 
energies as the main mean of energy production, progressively reducing production with fossil 
fuels” (UPME, 2015b, p.8).  The report mentions that the main motivation is “the concern of 
developed countries for climate change and the production of carbon dioxide (CO2) as the main 
contributor to the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases” (UPME, 2015b, p.8). 
Adopting this narrative UPME acknowledged the relationship between the energy sector and 
climate change.  
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In the same line, in 2017, Colombia’s Minister of Mines and Energy, Germán Arce, during the 
mandate of Santos (before the Director of the National Adaptation Fund), said that the 
incorporation of non-conventional renewable energies is key in the diversification of the 
energy matrix, and that the government created guidelines such as the Law 1715 (which will 
be further analysed), “which ordered to incentivize these resources in the energy generation 
matrix” (Amat, 2017). 
 
However, further analysis of the PND also identifies important commitments and goals related 
to the production of fossil fuels in Colombia, which are contrary to such a goal. For instance, 
it says, “the national government's medium and long-term objective is to increase hydrocarbon 
reserves and production… to increase the country's competitiveness” (Colombian 
Government, 2014, p.176). The PND also says “for the national government it is important 
that the development of the hydrocarbon sector continue to be in harmony with social 
development and the environment” (Colombian Government, 2014, p.176).  
 
Recently a major debate has erupted regarding the interest of the government on 
unconventional fossil resources, such as shale gas (Interview 6CSC). UPME argues that 
fracking can work in Colombia as they have elsewhere, such as the United States, affirming 
that this “could mean an increase in fossil fuel production, depending on how their production 
costs evolve” (UPME, 2015b, p.10). UPME also says that the use of coal is a good alternative 
for the country, since they have important reserves for the upcoming 70 years (UPME, 2015b).  
 
This trend seems to repeat in the Duque government (2018-2022), since his Energy Minister 
pointed out that “we need the gas, because the sun and wind sources are variable and we 
need to establish a matrix that responds to the demand” (Atl Noticias, 2020).  
 
This same discourse shows that while climate change has been incorporated in governmental 
policies, Colombia’s preferences to harness non-renewable sources seem to conflict with 
sustainable energy plans articulated in the same development plans. This discrepancy has 
been cited by civil society representatives, which argues that President Santos has told the 
environmental community “what they want to hear”, without radically changing plans 
regarding activities such as extractive and fossil fuel activities (interview 6CSC), which is also 
the case of Duque´s for whom “the environment does not seem to be a priority” (El Libre 
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Pensador, 2018). 
7.1.2. Level of Institutional and Structural Change 
 
The energy sector is a scheme that combines the division of activities - free market open 
participation, and regulation by the State (XM, n.d.). This sector modality has been in 
operation for the last 10 years, although the participation of the state has been changing, as 
will be explained in further sections. 
 
The institution charged with regulation of the sector is the Energy and Mining Ministry 
(MinMinas, Ministerio de Energía y Minas). Located in the MinMinas is the UPME, which has 
a strategic role to "plan in an integral, indicative, permanent and coordinated way the mining 
and energy sector entities… to produce and disseminate information required for policy 
formulation and decision making” (UPME, 2015b, p.148). 
 
The MinMinas also has an office that deals with environmental and social matters (OAAS, 
Oficina de Asuntos Ambientales y Sociales). According to the PND (2014-2018), this office has 
as a goal “to strengthen the management of the national government, to mitigate the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with the development and growth of the mining and 
energy sector, and to adapt to the effects of the climate changes at the global level” (UPME, 
2015b).  In this sense, the OAAS is mandated to deal with climate change.  
 
Since the 1990s there have been important reforms in the sector. In the case of the electricity 
sector, the Laws 142 and 143 of 1994 are considered foundational for institutional 
development, to increase investments to expand the generation and transmission of 
electricity and for the program for the expansion of the gas consumption (UPME, 2015b). The 
objectives of these reforms were multiple, including the decision of the State to withdraw 
from direct management of activities in the electricity subsector, and instead focus on the 
inclusion of private actors in all phases of the energy chain (UPME, 2015b, pp. 154-156).  
 
In the case of hydrocarbons, there were also institutional reforms to increase oil reserves. 
During that period some institutions such as the National Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH, Agencia 
Nacional de Hidrocarburos) were created and the conditions of the country's oil contracts 
were modified, in order to make the exploitation of hydrocarbons more competitive and 
attractive to foreign investments (UPME, 2015b). 
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Later in 2010, the reforms were oriented towards the mining sector with the creation of the 
National Mining Agency (ANM, Agencia Nacional de Minas) and the restructuring of the 
UPME, to increase “competitiveness of the mining sector to maximize its contribution to the 
development of the regions and the country” (UPME, 2015b, p.153).  
 
Institutional changes were also made in the renewable energy subsector. After the dissolution 
of the Institute of Nuclear Matters and Alternative Energy (INEA, Instituto de Asuntos 
Nucleares y Energías Alternativas) in 1992, the UPME remained responsible for leading the 
promotion of renewable energy. 
 
Furthermore, with the creation of the CONPES 3700 from 2011, the Institutional Strategy for 
the Articulation of Policies and Actions on Climate Change promoted the participation of the 
MinMinas in the definition of climate policies creating the SISCLIMA, described in Chapter 6.  
 
MinMinas has also been promoting non-conventional energy as a way to keep diversifying the 
matrix and reduce GHG emissions (MinMinas, n.d.). Although there is a process to 
mainstream climate change at the institutional level, the institutions are still highly focused 
on the production of fossil fuels and the development of mining activities (Interview 17FGC, 
3AC, 6CSC).  
7.1.3. Innovation in the tools used to make policy 
 
As result of the PND 2014-2018, the first goal of the Green Growth Strategy was to “Move 
towards sustainable and low carbon growth”, and to “Promote the transformation of sectors 
towards more efficient and low-carbon pathways”, outlining that progress would be made in 
the regulation and implementation of Law 1715 (of 2014) on unconventional sources of 
renewable energy and energy efficient management (Colombian Government, 2014, p. 665). 
 
Besides the Green Growth Strategy, an important process that helped to engage the energy 
sector with the climate agenda was the Low Carbon Development Strategy (ECDBC, for its 
name in spanish), mentioned in Chapter 6. This is a short, medium and long-term strategy that 
aims to achieve economic growth without increasing GHG emissions and achieve the correct 
adaptation of the productive sectors (MinAmbiente, n.d.; Interview 17FGC, 9FGC). The 
process to consolidate this strategy in the energy sector was led by MinMinas. 
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This growing interest on the diversification of the energy matrix has been leading to the 
creation of other legal tools to make policies, such as the creation of the Law 788 that 
promotes the use of non-conventional energy (UPME, 2015a, p. 8). The Law was created by 
the Inter-sectorial Commission for the Rational and Efficient Use of Energy and Non-
Conventional Sources of Energy (CIURE, Comisión Intersectorial para el Uso Racionl y Eficiente 
de la Energía y Fuentes no Convencionales de Energía), and allowed for the creation of a 
Programme that established the goal to generate 30% energy in non-connected areas by 2020 
(UPME, 2015a).  Another important tool was the Decree 2114 (2008) that regulated the 
creation of Financial Support for the Provision of Energy in Non-Interconnected Areas Fund 
(FAZNI, Fondo de Apoyo Financiero para la Energetización de la Zonas No Interconectadas). 
  
However, the most important instrument to promote the use of renewable energy has been 
the Law 1715, created in 2014, that promotes the integration of non-conventional sources, 
mainly those from renewable sources, in the national energy system. In particular, the 
inclusion of wind projects, photovoltaic solar generation, geothermal energy and generation 
from biomass in the country's electric mix is sought (Colombian Congress, Ley 1715, 2014).  
 
This Law is considered an innovative tool for the promotion of renewable energy because it 
considered both incentives and financial mechanisms that could enable the implementation 
of projects (UPME, 2015a, p. 96). Although currently solar and wind energy have a marginal 
share in electricity generation, according to representatives of the environmental ministry, 
new renewable energy projects will be possible thanks to the implementation of this Law 
(Interviews 9FGC, 13FGC), because it will incentive the participation of private sector as well 
(Interview 8CSC, 2FGC). Despite this, Roa (2017) suggests that the absence of the regulation 
of the Law is constraining the progress of renewable energy projects.  
 
In addition, Colombia also included the energy sector in its National Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) that aim to reduce 20% of GHGs by 2030 (Colombian Government, 2015). Although 
the energy sector contributes 71.21% of the emissions of the country, a specific goal for 
electricity generation was not included.  However, the UPME pointed out in relation to the 
NDC, “that the mining-energy sector. . .  should prepare itself with an increase in the sector's 
capacity to measure, monitor, verify and report its emissions” (UPME, 2015a, p. 94). 
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Tools have been put in place to promote the diversification of the energy matrix and UPME 
(2015a) had said that renewable energy is the more feasible option to achieve such 
diversification. However other studies from the same institution have claimed that Colombia 
has more opportunities with conventional sources such as coal, because it is an abundant 
resource in the territory “which is why it could potentially be an input that guarantees 
reliability to the system at a low cost” (UPME, 2015a, p. 95). León (2018), points out that the 
actual regulation is complex and is not allowing to innovate and to use new technologies. 
7.1.4. New data available  
 
In the energy sector, information plays a major role, and “to have better policies to generate 
credibility and trust in the general public, it is essential that the support information is 
complete, reliable, timely and available using the current technological means...” (UMPE, 
2015b, p. 148).  
  
In this sense, the energy sector has been evolving based on the data collected, which shows 
its value in decision-making. For instance, fossil fuel reserves have been studied to determine 
the strategy of the country. By 2013, there were 2,444 million barrels of proven reserves, 
equal to 6.6 years (UMPE, 2015b, p. 84). Three years later, the official website of the 
MinMinas in June 2018, stated that the reserves were for 5.7 years (MinMinas, n.d.), which 
means that the reserves have been decreasing as shown in figure 7.1. This will surely have an 
impact on the energy matrix. 
 
Figure 7. 1 Projections of oil reserves in millions of barrels (period 2013-2025) 
 
 184 
Source: UPME, 2015b: 86 
 
Regarding natural gas, at the end of 2013 Colombia reported total reserves of 6.41 Tera-cubic 
feet of which 5.51 correspond to proven reserves, estimated for 11.7 years, including newly 
incorporated reserves (UPME, 2015b, p. 84). As the prospective predicted the consumption 
of gas grew significantly at a time when crude production has started to decline rapidly 
(MinMinas, n.d.). In the case of the gas production, it grew 5.6% in January 2020 compared 
to the same month of 2019, while the oil production fell 1.68% compared to January the 
previous year (El Tiempo, 2020). 
 
Since 2014, the UPME projected that hydrocarbon self-sufficiency would become 
unsustainable by 2018, however still fossil fuels play an important part in the total mix of the 
electricity subsector. In Figure 7.2, and as noted earlier, fossil fuel participation for electricity 
generation was almost 40% in 2015. 
 
Figure 7. 2 Energy matrix per source 
 
 
Source: UPME, 2015b: 94.  
 
The emissions from gas production have been increasing rapidly in the last years, contributing 
to 65% of GHG emissions, particularly from fugitive emissions (IDEAM, et al., 2017), due to an 
increase in the demand. However, in 2020, the Energy Minister stated that Colombia could 




In Figure 7.3, the projections in terms of emissions are shown, according to the IDEAM et al., 
(2017). The emissions will increase towards 2030 in a business as usual scenario if Colombia 
does not implement emission reduction measures.  
 
Figure 7. 3 Projections of GHG in Colombia in MtCO2eq (period 2010-2030) 
 
Source: IDEAM, et al., 2017 
  
In that context MinMinas (2012) has expressed its willingness to mitigate climate change 
through the ECDBC, aiming to access to foreign finance and technology transfer, among other 
things. The Strategy works in four lines: 1) Generation of energy; 2) Energy efficiency; 3) 
Fugitive emissions; and 4) Management of the demand, which can reduce 54,112 Gg of CO2 
eq by 2030 (IDEAM, et al., 2017). 
 
For electricity, there is data for the generation and transmission expansion plan for 2014-
2028, where UPME (2015a) is identifying opportunities to use renewable energy. In the most 
conservative scenario, the incorporation of 474 MW of wind energy into the generation matrix 
from the Guajira is assumed. With this addition, wind power would have a 2% share in the 
installed capacity of the national interconnected system. In the optimistic scenario, a 
maximum participation of 15% is estimated in 2028 (UPME, 2015a, p. 98).   
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In addition, the energy sector has been working on studies to determine its vulnerability to 
the negative impacts of climate change (IDEAM et al., 2017, p. 330). A study conducted by 
UPME point out that there are sources for electricity generation, such as the big dams, that 
are vulnerable to changes in hydrological cycles and decreased rainfall, as well as producing 
other types of externalities, and therefore it is not desirable to keep expanding these types of 
sources to generate electricity (UPME, 2015a, p. 93). Besides that, hydropower stations cause 
other social and environmental externalities (Interview 8CSC). According to Payal (2011), big 
hydroelectric projects are also major emitters of methane more powerful than the CO2 in 
terms of global warming, 72 times more powerful, according to the IPCC (2007).  
 
In this context, a new scenario is under discussion in the government, which is related to the 
incorporation of reserves from the production of unconventional hydrocarbons, such as shale 
gas, that could increase the levels of methane. According to UPME, unconventional 
hydrocarbons are “the most attractive alternative for the supply of hydrocarbons to develop 
in the medium and long term” (UPME, 2015b, p. 85).  
 
This analysis shows that data has evolved in order to diversify the energy matrix; however 
further analysis must take place to use this data to transform a sector that is still highly 
focused on fossil fuel. Representatives of DNP and the environmental ministry state that 
further research must be done to better support the energy transition (Interviews 1FGC, 
9FGC, 13FGC, 14FGC).   
7.1.5. Innovation in the way that policy is made  
 
The policies in the energy sector have been facing important challenges to adapt to global 
dynamics, in particular to internalize environmental and climate factors (Interview 15FGC). 
However, the creation of the ECDBC and the sectorial plan for the mining and energy sector, 
are important and innovative steps towards the reduction of emissions.  
 
To achieve these goals, some tools have been used to make policies, such as the Law 1715 
that promotes renewable energy. Nevertheless, there are policies that have increased their 
dependency on fossil fuels including non-conventional resources because, while MinMinas 
explores the potential to extract non-conventional fossil fuel as shale gas, the Ministry of 
Environment is working on the environmental requirements for its exploration. Governmental 
efforts to promote unconventional hydrocarbons have been criticized by governmental and 
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non-governmental representatives as contributing to a carbon lock-in thereby exacerbating 
the climate change problem (Interviews 14FGC, 6CSC).    
 
In this sense, the new policies for the extraction of unconventional fossil fuels are hindering 
Colombia’s progress towards climate change mainstreaming in the energy sector.  To further 
analyse the levels of mainstreaming climate change in the sector, the next section assesses 
the public budget to understand the role public investments have played to guide such 
processes and under what conditions this has happened. 
 
7.2. Assessing climate change mainstreaming in the public budget and expenditure of the 
energy sector 
 
As noted in Chapter 6, the energy sector plays an important role in the public finances of 
Colombia. According to UPME, the hydrocarbons sector has grown considerably in the last 10 
years, contributing to the income of the country. The contribution of the sector to the national 
government includes the utilities of Ecopetrol S.A, which is the national oil company that 
represents 20% of the current income of the country. If the royalties that come from the 
sector were counted, would be equivalent to 1% of the GDP (UPME, 2015b, p. 5). 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the oil export revenue from 2002 until 2013, where the increase in the 
dependency on this resource grew rapidly reaching 54% of the income in 2013 (UPME, 2015b, 
p. 41).  
 
Figure 7. 4 Participation of oil export revenue (period 2002-2013) 
 
Source: UPME, 2015b: 44. 
In Chapter 6 it was exposed that it was expected a decline in the revenue coming from 
Ecopetrol after 2016, however in 2019 it was observed an increase in the utilities of the 
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company in 14.7% (USD3.875 millions), the highest in the last 6 years (Reuters, 2019). This 
can change the tendency in terms of production, because the company announced in 2019 
the investment of 500 millions of US dollars during 3 years, for the exploitation of oil in non-
conventional deposits with the use of fracking (Campos, 2019), that could increase the 
production and therefore the revenue.  
 
Another important factor that has been playing a role in the public finance is the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) associated with the mining and energy sector, which represented 46% of the 
total income in 2014 (UPME, 2015b).  
 
Although fossil fuels play a major role in the revenues of the country, MinMinas is also aware 
of possible future changes. For instance, the UPME considers that coal is an alternative that 
the country can keep producing because it is cheap and abundant. However, the market for 
this product is changing rapidly at the international level, because many countries are 
strengthening their environmental standards. For instance, Europe, China and India used to 
be consumers of Colombian coal, but their demand is declining (UPME, 2015b), impacting 
income. However, the coal was not considered for the carbon tax because of the risk of 
affecting small producers (Interview 2FGC). This is relevant for Colombia because entry to the 
OECD requires strengthening environmental standards (Interview 4FGC).  
 
In terms of public expenditure, the reduction of income creates greater budgetary restrictions 
in the government.  As mentioned in Chapter 6, in the last decade, public spending 
contributed only 0.9% to the economic growth of Colombia (UPME, 2015b, p. 55). In 2015, 
there was an OECD report related to Colombia that emphasized the need to carry out an 
integral tax reform that substantially improves the collection in rent and indirect taxes, 
suggesting in addition, the gradual withdrawal of corporate income tax (UPME, 2015b, p. 56). 
In addition, the International Monetary Fund says that Colombia could reform existing taxes 
and energy subsidies, eliminating energy subsidies to focus on protecting the population with 
lower incomes (UPME, 2015b, p. 58). 
 
The entrance of Colombia to the OECD may be a key factor that keeps pushing the openness 
of the economy and also potential support for the energy transition. The PND 2014-2018 
states that is necessary, “to achieve a balanced and reliable composition in the electricity 
generation matrix, which is in accordance with the recommendations of the OECD to integrate 
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solutions of low intensity in carbon, such as non-conventional renewable sources” (Colombian 
Government, 2014, p. 189) 
 
The PND 2018-2022, recognizes that the reserves of oil will last until 2024 and gas reserves 
will last until 2029; it says that 73% of the energy consumption came from fossil fuels; as well 
points out that the royalties provide to the country with USD 1.8 millions to invest in social 
programs. This PND also says that one goal is “take advantage of other resources in our 
country to generate energy, reducing the impact of global warming”, increasing the capacity 
to generate electricity with renewable energy (solar and wind) going from 22,4 MW to 
1500MW (Colombian Government, 2018a). 
 
Although is early to assess the levels of mainstreaming climate change in the budget of the 
government of Duque, the next section analyses the extent to which the public budget has 
mainstreamed climate change in the energy sector until 2018.  
 
7.2.1. Public budget for the energy transition 
 
In order to analyse the extent to which climate change has been mainstreamed in the public 
budget of the energy sector, I analysed the public budget allocated to key categories: a) 
general budget to the Energy Ministry, b) public budget to renewable energy, c) public budget 
to hydrocarbons, d) public budget to natural gas, e) public budget to mining, and f) public 
budget to other relevant categories. The analysis was conducted considering the investment 
account for the years 2015-2018, based on public information on the official website of 
MinMinas. 
 
The analysis shows that the budget of the Ministry has increased, despite a reduction in 2017, 
as is shown in Table 7.1. In 2018, for instance, the budget allocated to the energy ministry 
represented 1.54% of the total budget of the country. It is important to note that allocated 
budget does not always equate to what is spent. For instance, while the budget of the 
MinMinas was USD 521 million in 2017, the actual expenditure by January 2018 was USD 907 
million. However, for the purpose of this analysis, the information included is related to the 
budget allocation because information about expenditure is not always accessible. The 
numbers presented aim to show tendencies in the budget allocation, its conversion to USD 




Table 7. 1 Budget of the central government and budget of the Mining and Energy Ministry 
in million of USD (period 2015-2018) 
Item 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total national 
public budget 
62,130 65,870 64,065 67,588 
Energy Ministry 
total budget  
788 777 521 1,046 
Source: Own calculations based on public budget data of MinMinas (2015-2018). 
 
Table 7.1 shows that, in 2016, there were programs created that aimed to consolidate the 
mining, energy and electric power subsectors. In terms of budget allocation, in 2017 the 
mining sector received USD 12 million; the hydrocarbons received USD 11 million; and the 
electric sector received USD 3 million. By 2018, the mining sector had its allocation reduced 
by USD 10 million, while the hydrocarbon sector almost doubled to USD 22 million and the 
electric sector also doubled to USD 6 million. 
 
According to a representative of the environmental ministry, this reflects the interest that the 
energy sector has in fossil fuels as all of these programs aim to increase the use of these 
sources, including power generation that has been led by gas (Interview 15FGC). Although 
the budget allocation for “Development of transport infrastructure, distribution and 
connection of the public natural gas service nationwide” went from USD 10 million in 2017 to 
USD 6 million in 2018. 
 
An interesting finding in the analysis of the public budget is related to the mining sector. 
Besides normal activities related to the sector, a program was created whose budget 
increased in the last four years. This program is “Improvement of the image and perception of 
the mining industry to facilitate the start-up of mining projects in the national territory”. This 
programme went from USD 610 million, in 2016 to USD 1,830 million and represents 16.77% 
of the budget for the “Productive consolidation of the mining sector”. This also included a 
program called “Support for the social and environmental management of mining and energy 





Table 7. 2 Productive Consolidation Programs of the Mining Sector, budget allocated in 
million of USD (period 2015-2018) 
Item 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Productive consolidation of the 
mining sector 
 2,017 12,654 10,913 
Sub- Improvement of the image and 
perception of the mining industry to 
facilitate the start-up of mining 
projects in the national territory 
732 610 1,138  1,830  
Sub- Support for the social and 
environmental management of 
mining and energy projects in the 
national territory 
1,830  - - - 
Source: Own elaboration with information of the public budget of MINMINAS for the period 2015-2018. 
 
This is an important finding as, according to three governmental representatives, this 
highlights an environmental conflict related to the expansion of the mining sector.  It can 
therefore be inferred that the government is protecting the image of the industry to keep 
expanding it (Interviews 7FGC, 14FGC, 15FGC).  
 
On the other hand, in 2016 a programme was created called “Design and implementation of 
mitigation and adaptation tools in the energy mining sector in the face of climate change”, 
which is the only explicit mention to climate change in the public expenditure of the energy 
sector. Nevertheless, the allocation of resources was reduced, from USD 762 million in 2016, 
to USD 305 million in 2018. This represents 0.0004% of the total budget of the sector in 2018. 
In 2017, it also created the “Sustainable environmental development of the energy mining 
sector” classification, whose budget was also slashed in 2018 as shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7. 3 Public budget for climate change and renewable energy in the energy ministry, 
in millions of USD (period 2015-2018) 
Item 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Sustainable environmental 
development of the energy 
mining sector 
- - 16,988 16,352 
Sub- Design and implementation 
of mitigation and adaptation 
tools in the energy mining sector 
in the face of climate change - 
national 
- 762 610 305 
Sub- Support and financing of 
unconventional energy sources 
and efficient energy 




Source: Own elaboration with information of the public budget of MinMinas for the period 2015-
2018. 
 
Furthermore, budget was identified for the “Support and financing of unconventional energy 
sources and efficient energy management programs nationwide”, created in 2016. This went 
from USD 4 million in 2016, to USD 10 million in 2018 (MinMinas, 2016).  
 
Other categories were identified in the budget that related to “information management in 
the mining and energy sector”. As I pointed out in previous sections, this is a valuable aspect 
for the evolution of the sector. This category went from USD 2 million in 2016 to USD 4 million 
in 2018. Meanwhile, the budget allocated for the “Sub- Design and execution of the strategy 
for national and international management of the environmental agenda of the Colombian 
national energy mining sector”, was USD 1 million in 2015 and then disappeared. According 
to a representative of the environmental ministry, this showcases the decrease of interest of 
the ministry in the environmental agenda (Interview 9FGC).  
 
Nevertheless, Colombia has been participating in other initiatives that aim to improve the 
production of extractive activities in the context of transparency, social and environmental 
principles, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). EITI is a global 
initiative that looks for better information in the mining sector to improve the decision-
making process (EITI, n.d.). There was an allocation of budget in 2018 of USD 453,341 that 
represented 0.0006% of the total budget of the sector that year. Finally, a program called 
“Sub- Design and implementation of tools for citizen participation in the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy nationwide” was identified that in 2015 was allocated more than USD 1 million and 
then disappeared. This can be observed in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7. 4 Public budget for mining activities, in millions of USD (period 2015-2018) 
Sector/Subsector 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Information management in the 
mining and energy sector 
- 2,003 4,022 4,815 
Sub- Formulation and execution of 
the environmental management 
strategy for the promotion of the 
sector under the principles of 
national competitiveness 
- 610 350 518 
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Sub- Design and execution of the 
strategy for national and 
international management of the 
environmental agenda of the 
Colombian national energy mining 
sector 
1,372 - - - 
Sub- Strengthening Access 
Information and transparency for 
the extractive activities at the 
National level- EITI 
- - 335 453 
Sub- Design and implementation of 
tools for citizen participation in the 
Ministry of Mines and Energy 
nationwide 
1,324 - - - 
Source: Own elaboration with information from the public budget of MINMINAS for the period 2015-
2018. 
 
There are other public resources that have an important role in the energy transition, such as 
the national funds in the energy sector, namely: 1) Financial support fund for the energization 
of non-interconnected areas (Fondo de apoyo financier para la energización de las zonas no 
interconectadas, FAZNI); 2) Social Energy Fund (Fondo de Energía Social, FOES); 3) Solidarity 
Fund for Subsidies and Income Redistribution, (Fondo de solidaridad para subsidios y 
redristibución de ingreso, FSSRI); 4) Financial Support Fund for the Energization of 
Interconnected Rural Areas (Fondo de Apoyo Financiero para la Energización de las Zonas 
Rurales Interconectadas, FAER); 5) Royalties National Fund (Fondo Nacional de regalías, FNR); 
and 6) Fund for Non-Conventional Energy and Efficient Energy Management (FENOGE, Fondo 
de Energías No Convencionales y Gestión Eficiente de la Energía).  
 
Although all the funds are relevant for the sector, I analysed the case of the FENOGE that was 
specific created in 2015 to promote the use of renewable energy in the country, based on the 
aforementioned Law 1715 (Article 10) and is operated by MinMinas. 
 
The Fund supports activities related to auto generation at the small scale, and it can finance 
studies and the substitution of equipment, among other things. Projects financed by the Fund 
need to comply with a cost-benefit analysis in order to be supported (Law 1715, Article 10). 
The analysis of the public expenditure of the Ministry shows that the allocation of resources 
to FENOGE has been increasing, as shown in Table 7.5. Since its first allocation the budget 
went from more of USD 4 million, to almost USD 9 million in 2018. 
 
 194 
Table 7. 5 Public budget allocated to the FENOGE in USD (period 2015-2018) 
Special 
funds  
2015 2016 2017 2018 
FENOGE  4,770,180 6,117,590 8,915,080 
Source: Own elaboration with information of Public budget of the MinMinas, 2015-2018. 
 
This trend shows that there is a process to keep financing renewable energy. This is a positive 
step towards mainstreaming climate change in the energy sector, although the allocation of 
money for FENOGE represented a mere 0.013% of the total budget of the sector in 2018.  
 
Other funds are highly relevant such as the Royalties National Fund that aims to redistribute 
income to the country from permits and concessions from extractive activities and has been 
integrating climate change within their operations, as mentioned in Chapter 6.  Although this 
particular fund is relevant to improve the allocation of funds, it also produces a contra effect, 
since it intensifies the dependency on oil and extractive activities.  
 
Therefore, there is an attempt to integrate climate change in the public expenditure of the 
energy sector, but it has not been mainstreamed since the main allocation of sources to the 
sector are still oriented to fossil fuels and mining. 
 
7.3. Discussion of levels of climate change mainstreaming in the planning and budgeting 
process of the energy sector 
 
The assessment, based on Daly´s methodology (2005), showed that progress to mainstream 
climate change in the energy sector is being made but it is still a fragmented endeavour, since 
areas that promote fossil fuel and extractive activities, which exacerbate the problem, are 
more powerful.  
 
There is growing inclusion of climate change in the discourse of key entities and stakeholders 
in the energy sector and in the elaboration of key policies, such as the National Development 
Plan, which guides the action of the energy sector. This is also related to the fact that, 
according to UPME, the energy sector is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
particularly hydropower energy. 
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At an institutional level, it is important to mention the participation of the MinMinas in the 
creation of the ECDBC, and of the UMPE in the creation of major analyses and projections to 
examine the needs of the sector in the context of climate change. While these entities are 
mainstreaming climate change in their projections, there is constant debate regarding the 
necessity to diversify the energy matrix versus the necessity to take advantage of the 
country’s conventional sources. In that sense, no structural changes were identified in the 
sector, but a growing debate exists about relevance of considering climate change to project 
the future of the sector. 
 
The use of innovative tools to make policy was identified.  Notably, the Law 1715 that 
promotes the use of non-conventional energy resources is an important step although 
regulation is still needed.  The existence of new data to improve mainstreaming climate 
change has shown that the energy sector is one of the most proactive sectors in terms of 
information generation, allowing for improved projections and, as a result, better decision-
making. In recent years, UPME has published several studies about the need to diversify the 
energy matrix. However, other data, such as the projections of oil and gas, are also influencing 
the decision-making process. 
 
In terms of innovation in the way that policy is created, there is evidence that Colombia is 
creating better policies to deal with climate change and that the energy sector has been 
playing an important role in such policies. However, the perception of representatives from 
governmental and non-governmental sectors is that Colombia remains highly dependent on 
fossil fuels and extractive activities. Furthermore, the concern in recent years is related to the 
role of unconventional resources and techniques, such as shale gas extracted by fracking, 
which has social and environmental externalities, as will be discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
The allocation of public expenditure indicates that, early on, funds earmarked for climate 
change-related activities existed in the public budget of the energy sector. As well, a new fund 
to promote renewable energy was created, the FENOGE. Unfortunately, the budget for these 
activities is limited, representing only 0.013% of the total of the sector in 2017 and 2018. 
 
Governmental and non-governmental representatives believe that, if Colombia wants to 
achieve low carbon development, it is necessary to engage more private and international 
capital but also other social and communitarian stakeholders (Interviews 8CSC, 9FGC, 10AC). 
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For this reason, environmental ministry representatives are not confident that climate change 
mainstreaming will be achieved until fossil fuels policies are “changed radically” (Interviews 
13FGC, 14FGC).  
 
7.4. Conditions that promote or hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget 
of the energy sector in Colombia 
 
Conditions were identified that promote or hinder mainstreaming climate change in the 
sector, many of which were the same as those identified in Chapter 6 regarding climate 
change mainstreaming in the policy and budget of Colombia. However, this section highlights 
those that are exclusive to the energy sector.  
 
Conditions that promote climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the energy 
sector  
 
The energy sector has experienced the impacts of climate change in its daily activities, which 
has helped to raise attention from the adaptation perspective, although not noticeably from 
the mitigation side (Interview 13 FGC). This growing interest is reflected in the participation 
of the MinMinas in the design of instruments, such as the ECDBC, and particularly the 
engagement of the Planning Unit in the Ministry, who is in charge of guiding the work of the 
sector (Interview 9FGC).  
 
In the same way, the creation of a specific legal framework to promote renewable energy in 
the energy matrix, such as the Law 1715, is a major step towards the energy transition. 
However, further regulation is needed to ensure the effectiveness of this Law (Interview 
8CSC). The inclusion of incentives and other public financial mechanisms have also served as 
a mechanism to attract the attention of private capital and international cooperation to 
support the energy transition. Even though Colombia´s public budget does not participate 
extensively in the production of renewable energy, there is a perception that improving the 
political will, as Santos used to have, President Duque, can still increase the use of renewable 
energy to keep working in energy transition in the next 10-20 years.  
 
Conditions that hinder climate change mainstreaming in the public budget of the energy sector 
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The narrative used in the government is that the energy matrix is clean because it is heavily 
based on hydroelectric power. However, scholars and non-governmental organizations 
consider this view of “clean energy” is incorrect because of the externalities that it has, and 
that it hinders the progress towards low carbon and climate resilient technologies, such as 
solar and wind power (Interviews 8CSC, 10AC). In addition, there is a growing challenge 
regarding the use of other sources and methods, such as the extraction of gas through 
fracking, which increases the risk of major GHG emissions, especially methane (Interview 
14FGC).  
 
The interest of the government in fossil fuel and extractive activities is also based on its 
reliance from these activities for revenue generation through concessions, which has been 
increasing the number of royalties that represent an important portion of the budget. This 
hinders the acceleration to include renewable energy and other low technologies in the 
budget, because it creates a vicious cycle (Interview 5OIC, 7FGC).  
  
The last point leads to long-term dependency on fossil fuel and extractive activities, directly 
opposing non fossil fuel sources. In this context, there is another challenge, which is the 
engagement of local and regional authorities to be part of the transition, since they play an 
important role in the promotion of fossil fuel and extractive activities and in the generation 
and use of public resources. If these entities are not engaged, it is difficult to achieve an energy 
transition (Interview 16LGC).  
 
7.5. Conclusions  
 
 
In Colombia, the energy sector plays an important role as a source of income but also as a 
source of GHG emissions. It is also considered vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, 
which effects the operation of hydroelectric power stations, a major source of electricity. The 
analyses of the levels of mainstreaming based on Daly’s (2005) work have demonstrated that, 
while the country is including some climate change elements in the energy sector as a way to 
mainstream the problem, this is still in the early stages and is rather a fragmented endeavour.  
 
It was shown that the discourse and rhetoric related to climate change has been evolving in 
the energy sector and that institutions, such as the UPME within the Mining and Energy 
Ministry, have acknowledged the importance of the energy transition, performing studies and 
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enabling the conditions for the creation of policies, such as the Law 1715, that promotes the 
use of renewable energy. However, there is no evidence that climate change is mainstreamed 
in a way that is innovative or that has produced a structural change in the sector.  
 
Instead, the dependence on oil revenue is a major hurdle that explains the extractive pattern 
that the country has followed and hinders the prioritization of climate change, which is 
reflected in the limited allocation of public budget to the energy transition. 
 
Based on the approach proposed by Daly (2005), it is possible to conclude that Colombia´s 
energy sector has not been able to mainstream climate change in the planning and budgetary 
cycle of the energy sector. The challenges ahead fall on the leadership of President Duque 
who, during his first year of office, showed limited interest in climate change. However, recent 
entrance into the OECD could play an important role to raise awareness to the problem in the 
coming years, where international cooperation will also rely on this sector, and whose 
resources might not be enough to achieve the transformational changes that the country 












CHAPTER 8. ANALYSIS OF THE CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE AND 
HINDER CLIMATE CHANGE MAINSTREAMING IN THE PUBLIC BUDGET 
OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES: THE CASES OF 




Climate change is an evolving problem that can be analysed from different angles because of 
the multi-sectorial and multi-dimensional nature of it.  This thesis asks the question under 
what conditions are developing countries mainstreaming climate change in their public 
budgets and what conditions promote and hinder such mainstreaming processes? In this 
thesis I have analysed the planning and budgetary process to tackle climate change in 
developing countries based on a mainstreaming approach, a recent concept in climate studies.   
The empirical research was based on two methods: The Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) in its fuzzy set format and a comparative case study approach.  
 
This Chapter discusses the findings obtained in Chapters 3 to 7, to provide an overall analysis. 
Different factors conditioned the behaviour of the state and particularly the allocation of the 
public budget in Mexico and Colombia, as well as other countries studied in the QCA method. 
However, two conditions appeared most relevant: first, the role of official development aid 
as an important promoter of climate mainstreaming in planning and budgetary processes; 
second, the reliance on capital flowing to and from fossil fuel production as a major constraint.  
 
This chapter argues the relevance of mainstreaming climate change in the planning and 
budgetary process to tackle the problem more comprehensively and the limited effect that 
this would have if countries remain dependent on fossil fuels to sustain their economies. 
Regardless if countries receive more international cooperation to tackle climate change, 
which has its own limitations, transformational change will not occur at the national level if 
countries are dependent on fossil fuels to generate revenues and if they keep using fossil fuel 
budget to vein interest in reducing emissions. For this reason, further strengthening of the 
public finance system is needed. To explain this, the chapter is broken into five sections. 
 
The first section discusses key findings obtained through the fsQCA to set the context for the 
discussion in the Latin American and the Caribbean regions. The second section discusses 
general findings regarding the levels of climate mainstreaming found in the case studies, 
Mexico and Colombia, which are meaningful to understand the conditions that promote and 
hinder mainstreaming climate change in the public budget. The third section discusses the 
role of international cooperation as a promoter of mainstreaming climate change in the public 
budget of developing countries, and the fourth section discusses the role of the dependence 
on oil and extractive revenues and budgets as the major constraint on such a process. The 
fifth and final section offers some conclusions and the answer to the research question.  
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8.1. Mainstreaming climate change in the public budget of Latin American and the Caribbean 
countries: the big challenge 
 
In this thesis I established that Latin America and the Caribbean region are diverse with 
significant economic, social and political differences that have created a division among 
countries, resulting in a “fragmented” region (Edwards & Roberts, 2016). Although the region 
is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, it is also responsible for 8% of the global 
GHG emissions, with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela responsible for 75% of 
emissions (Vergara, et al., 2013). However, the response to the climate problem varies from 
country to country. 
 
All the countries studied are part of the UNFCCC and they have developed climate policies. 
However, it was identified that most of the countries have limitations, particularly in the area 
of public budget allocation. As stated in Chapter 2, the allocation of public budget in central 
governments is the reflection of the priorities of a country. This is the reason why this thesis 
analyses the allocation of public budget labelled as climate change within the environmental 
ministries’ budgets, as well as the allocation of public budget labelled as renewable energy 
within the energy ministries’ budgets, of the 21 major emitters in the region (according to the 
WRI database CAIT). The aim was to understand to what extent countries have been 
mainstreaming the climate change problem in their planning and budgetary processes to 
comply with national and international climate commitments, and under what conditions that 
happens.  
 
It was identified that out of the 21 countries, in 2010 only 6 countries allocated budget 
labelled as tackle climate change, while in 2016 the number doubled to 12. The actual amount 
of budget available is still limited; in most of the countries is less than 1% of the environmental 
current budget. At the same time, the environmental budget represents in most of the 
countries less than 2% of the central government budget, which also shows the limited 
representation of the sector in the allocation of public resources. As I exposed in Chapter 2, 
there might be other financial resources that are not labelled as climate change that may be 
used to deal with the problem, but that impact is difficult to identify. 
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Latin America and the Caribbean is a region that must deal with different challenges, with 
limited growth (CEPAL, 2018a) and increasing levels of poverty (WB, 2015). In this context, 
LAC countries have presented their National Determined Contributions (NDCs), which are the 
measures that all the members of the UNFCCC submitted as commitments to tackle climate 
change in the context of the Paris Agreement that “aims to strengthen the global response to 
the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty” (UNFCCC, 2015). However, the fact that in 2016 only 12 of the 21 countries 
studied have allocated specific national resources to deal with climate change reflects the 
limited interest or capacity to tackle the problem through national financial means, which 
remains a major challenge.  
 
8.1.1. Conditions that explain the allocation of climate change budget in the 
environmental ministry and renewable energy budget in the energy ministry: the 
influence of international cooperation and fossil fuels.  
 
This research analysed five conditions in the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
method (Levels of climate risk; Official Development Aid received; levels of human 
development; Governance effectiveness and number of climate change policies), which have 
different effects in each of the countries. Not all of them were necessary and sufficient to 
explain the outcomes studied, which was the presence of climate change and renewable 
energy budget in the environmental and energy ministry, respectively. However, are relevant 
to understand the dynamics in the region.  
 
For instance, climate risk represented an important condition in the context of climate change, 
because the risk is not only a matter of geographic position, but it also relates to the capacity 
of states to respond to threats (Miklos, 2018). It was observed that many countries in the 
region were less vulnerable in 2015 than in 2009. Perhaps they were better prepared, such as 
the case of Brazil, but there are countries where the impacts were worst, such as Colombia 
and Chile, and others where the risk is constant, such as Honduras and Mexico.  
 
Although the levels of risk vary, this condition does not always lead to the allocation of further 
public budget to deal with climate change. For instance, Honduras, as a vulnerable country, 
spent 0.9% of its environmental budget on climate change. However, the case of Colombia is 
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significant because climate risk is leading to an increase of public budget to deal with climate 
change, increasing from 0.05% in 2010 to 2.58% in 2016.  
 
The analysis of human development proved that it is important to measure wellbeing beyond 
economic indicators such as GDP. It also showed the great disparity that exists among LAC 
countries. While Chile had the highest levels of human development, Guatemala and 
Honduras, for example, were comparatively low. Meanwhile, all of them have been improving 
from 2009 to 2015, according to the UNDP Index.  
 
Regarding the relationship between human development and public budget allocation, Tanzi 
and Schuknecht (2000) suggested that increased public spending is not necessarily correlated 
to human development in countries, but that if public spending is efficient and well-focused, 
an even lower spending percentage might be possible to see positive levels of human 
development. “Unfortunately, in many countries public spending is neither efficient nor well 
focused. The conclusion is that more public spending provides no guarantee that social welfare 
and the well-being of the masses will be improved” (2000, p. 12).  
 
Another condition that was analysed to understand the influence of institutional structures at 
the national level is the condition of governance effectiveness. This measures voice and 
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Generally speaking, all of the studied 
countries exhibit poor levels of governance. While countries such as Costa Rica, Nicaragua and 
Uruguay improved their levels of governance, others such as Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil 
and Venezuela did not and, in fact, some worsened. Venezuela had the poorest levels of 
governance in 2009 and 2015, while Chile had the strongest in both years, although in 2015 
was worse than 2009. The region has weak institutional structures, a situation that is 
increasing insecurity and reducing accountability 
 
Recent studies suggest that climate change will put further pressure on these weak 
institutions in the region, and that this is the reason why countries should start discussing the 
threats that climate change poses at the national security level affecting the fragile stability 
that countries currently have (Erthal, et al., 2019). 
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Another condition analysed, which is directly related to climate action, refers to the number 
of policies for climate action that exist in these countries. As stated before, all countries 
studied have developed policies related to climate change. Those with the largest number of 
policies were Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, while those with the smallest number were 
Nicaragua, Panamá and Paraguay. This is relevant because some countries, such as Colombia 
and Mexico with a high number of policies, spent less than 1% of the public budget for climate 
change in 2016, while Nicaragua with fewer policies spent 26.4%. This can be interpreted in 
many ways, but the key observation is that the number of policies may not be relevant if there 
are no resources to implement those that do exist.  
 
A highly relevant condition in this analysis was the level of Official Development Aid (ODA) 
received. Countries have received very different levels of support. In 2009 and 2015 the 
largest recipient of ODA was Colombia while the lowest was Trinidad and Tobago. While there 
are countries where ODA has been decreasing dramatically, such as Argentina and Nicaragua, 
others are slowing reducing, such as Brazil and Mexico. The fsQCA identified ODA as an 
important condition because it appears high in the necessity and sufficiency analysis to explain 
different outcomes. For instance, the absence of ODA is necessary and almost sufficient to 
explain the absence of climate budget in the environmental ministries, and also appears highly 
consistent to explain the absence of renewable energy budget in the energy ministries; the 
absence of ODA is also necessary and sufficient to explain the absence or low levels of 
environmental budget in relation to central governments budgets; and also the absence of 
ODA is necessary to explain the absence of fossil fuel budget in energy ministries, although in 
this case it is not sufficient.   
 
According to Ragin (2008), it is difficult to attribute a single condition to a specific outcome in 
social science, because events are rarely monocausal. To further explore the fsQCA results, 
two case studies were analysed in depth: Mexico and Colombia. 
 
8.2. Levels of mainstreaming climate change in Mexico and Colombia: a limited 
transversality effort. 
 
From the fsQCA, out of the twelve countries that included public budget labelled as climate 
change in their environmental ministries in 2016, only six of them also had this allocation in 
2010: Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Mexico. From these six 
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countries that showed a trend in tackling climate change, two case studies were selected, 
looking for similar cases with slightly different outcomes.   
 
The fsQCA analysis showed that ODA was necessary to explain the presence of climate budget 
in three countries: Colombia, Brazil and Bolivia. Colombia is at the same time the major 
recipient of ODA, reason why this country was chosen. Then Mexico was selected because of 
the six countries mentioned above is the one with major similarities than Colombia but slightly 
different levels of public budget labelled as climate change and received different amounts of 
ODA. In 2010, Colombia invested 0.05% of the environmental budget to climate change, while 
Mexico invested 2.14%. In 2016, Colombia increased to 2.58% and Mexico decreased to 0.10%. 
They have different levels of ODA, although they are both major recipients. Colombia received 
far more in 2009 and 2015 (1060.2 million and 1347.5 million, respectively) than Mexico 
(185.5 million and 308.9 million, respectively).  
 
Nevertheless, they perform similarly in other conditions. For instance, Mexico´s scores for 
climate risk were 56.67 in 2009 and 56.33 in 2015, which means that its vulnerability increased 
in recent years, while Colombia scored 78.83 in 2009 and 45.67 in 2015, which means that the 
levels of vulnerability also increased.  
 
Regarding Human Development, Mexico´s scores were 0.745 in 2009 and 0.762 in 2015, while 
Colombia had 0.685 in 2009 and 0.727 in 2015, which are similar in comparison to other 
countries; these two are in the mid- to higher end. In terms of governance, Mexico´s scores 
were 46.2 in 2009 and 41.89 in 2015, while Colombia had 47.1 and 40.78, respectively. Both 
countries share similar problems, such as insecurity related to drug trafficking. Finally, 
regarding climate policies, Mexico and Colombia are the highest with 6.3 in 2009 and 3.7 in 
2015 in the case of Mexico, and 4.3 and 3.7 in the case of Colombia, which means that both 
countries are somehow committed to dealing with climate change.  
 
In general, Mexico and Colombia share common national and international issues. At the state 
level, both face similar challenges such as dependency on oil and extractive activities, 
insecurity and high levels of unemployment. At the international level, both states have signed 
on and remain active parties in the context of the UNFCCC. Although they belong to different 
negotiating groups, Mexico is part of the Environmental Integrity Group while Colombia is part 
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of the Independent Association of Latin American Countries (AILAC) (UNFCCC, 2020), they are 
both considered active countries under the UNFCCC. 
 
Based on the literature review and elite interviews in both countries, five levels of 
mainstreaming adapted to climate change were analysed as proposed by Daly (2005) 
(discourse; institutional arrangements and structural change; innovation in tools to make 
policies; new data; and policy innovation levels), as well as the public budget, proposed in this 
research as the sixth level of mainstreaming. The analysis concluded that both countries have 
made significant progress towards climate change mainstreaming in some areas, but 
mainstreaming of climate change in the environmental sector is a limited transversality effort, 
while in the case of the energy sector, it is a highly fragmented endeavour, according to Daly´s 
definition of progress. That is, neither of them has achieved an integrated approach to 
mainstreaming with regards to the climate change agenda.  
 
For instance, as detailed in Chapters 4-7, Mexico and Colombia have integrated climate 
change language in the main public policy instrument: the national development plan. This 
has fluctuated, however, depending on the government in power. Similarly, the discourse of 
both countries has undergone change. In Mexico, the Calderon government (2006-2012) was 
considered progressive in relation to the climate agenda, as was the Santos government in 
Colombia (2014-2018). However, this discourse has not been consistent and varied across 
successive governments. Colombia changed president in 2018 and Mexico in 2019. The 
concern with the new leaders is that, although climate change should be a central topic in the 
political agenda, they haven’t treated it as such, since they are both highly interested in the 
extractive and fossil fuel industries (De la Fuente & Olivera, 2017; ACLF, n.d.).  
 
Although it is too early to make any conclusion about the behaviour of the new leaders, 
research showed that the political changes influenced the climate change discourse in both 
countries. There is no political trend to explain this behaviour, since Calderon was from a 
centre right party and Santos was from a centre left party, while Lopez is from a centre left 
party and Duque is from a centre right party. The political party, therefore, does not have a 
defined interest, but perhaps the interest of the individual or the main group in the 
government is significant. Besides that, it is important to highlight that, even though previous 
governments, such as Calderon in Mexico and Santos in Colombia, had an interest in climate 
change, they were also interested in strengthening the oil sector, while simultaneously 
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promoting the renewable energy sector. This means that their progressive vision on climate 
change was also hindered by interest in fossil fuels.  
 
At the institutional level, both Mexico and Colombia have created inter-ministerial 
commissions, tasked with discussing their respective national climate agenda as a cross-
cutting issue beyond the environmental sector. However, in practice, the environmental 
ministries are the ones dealing with most of the climate agenda. In this regard, there is a 
concern related to this environmental-centric approach that limits the participation of other 
ministries when both global and national commitments on GHGs require the participation of 
other sectors. Nevertheless, the aim shouldn’t be only to mainstream climate change in the 
rest of the ministries but also to strengthen the role of the environmental sector (where the 
climate change mainstreaming process has not been accomplished neither) that is budget-
limited, to support that process. 
 
In Colombia the engagement of the National Planning Department (DNP in Spanish) is 
considered the beginning of important changes to come (Interviews 1FGC, 3AC, 7FGC, 12OIC). 
The DNP coordinates the work of other ministers and has created innovative institutional 
arrangements to tackle climate change, particularly from the climate finance perspective, 
such as the creation of the Committee of Financial Management.  The case of Mexico is less 
progressive, although in recent years there is a more proactive role of the finance ministry 
(which, in terms of assignments, could be similar to the DNP). In 2019, the Mexican finance 
ministry joined the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate Action (CAPE) (WBG, n.d.), but 
there is no evidence that this has changed meaningful action at the institutional level, so far. 
Although there are steps toward greater integration of climate considerations in some policies, 
this has not led to other, far-reaching structural changes that would challenge business-as-
usual. 
 
An example of such a dynamic was found by analysing the tools to make policy and the actual 
climate policies developed in both countries. While the Colombian Low Carbon Development 
Strategy was an important attempt to identify the climate related actions of the different 
productive sectors, which may lead to a reduction in emissions, the analysis shows that this 
identification does not necessarily lead to substantive change in any of these sectors. 
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In Mexico, the Special Program of Climate Change (PECC for its name in Spanish) is also an 
example of the identification of actions in different sectors related to climate change. These 
actions were integrated in a specific program to set targets to reduce emissions and 
vulnerability, but this has not led to a mainstreaming process because the actions 
implemented were planned before in the sectorial programs, in a business-as-usual scenario, 
and not based on climate change needs.  
 
However, an important tool that has led the climate action in Mexico was the creation of the 
Climate Change Law, which was approved in 2012; and the Climate Change Law that was 
approved in Colombia in 2018. These Laws provide a level of certainty about climate action in 
the short, medium and long term. In both cases, the enforcement through legal systems is still 
missing.  
 
While in Mexico and Colombia there is an improvement in the generation of information to 
better understand the changing climate, as well as the mitigation and adaptation 
opportunities, this has not yet helped to improve the decision-making process beyond the 
environmental sector. This is particularly needed at the sub-national level, where further 
capacities are required. Nevertheless, both countries have presented progress reports and 
national communications to the UNFCCC - six by Mexico and three by Colombia. In general, 
important progress towards mainstreaming climate change was identified and the 
expectation is to keep this interest even beyond the political changes that both countries are 
recently experiencing. 
 
The assessment of public budget, which is the key element of this research, highlights that 
climate change has been integrated in different ways in the public budget of both countries. 
In Mexico, based on the progress that followed the approval of the Climate Change Law, a 
transversal annex in the public expenditure was created to identify the allocation of public 
financial sources associated with climate change coming from the different ministries that are 
part of the Inter-Ministerial Commission of Climate Change. Although the tool has been useful 
to make the allocation of resources transparent, it is not considered a tool that can change 
the way that the ministries operate with regard to climate change. Besides the fact that the 
methodology does not have a methodology, the annex is still not clearly connected to the 
climate policy in place in the country, as was expressed in Chapter 4. 
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The amount of money reported in the annex has been between USD 1,696,880 (MXP 34,514 
million) and USD 1,813,100 (MXP 36,878 million) between 2013-2017 with the lowest amount 
allocated in 2017. Although, in 2018, this figure increased to USD 3,234,622 million (MXP 
61,457,819,955), in 2019 it was significantly reduced to USD 1,847,622 million 29  (MXP 
35,104,823,138). 
  
In Colombia, important progress related to climate finance was observed, with the publication 
of the National Strategy on Climate Finance and the creation of the measuring, reporting and 
verifying system for climate finance that shows the amount of money allocated to climate 
change related activities. As part of this process and based on studies such as the CPEIR of 
UNDP, the country has been investing around USD 430,383 million on average per year in 
climate related activities (IDEAM, et al., 2017b). During 2011-2015, the investments were 
divided as follows: the federal government provided 54% (USD 763,747 million per year); local 
governments provided 31% (USD 438,883 million); the Royalties System provided 15% (USD 
208,584 million) (IDEAM, et al. 2017b, p. 37).  
 
In this case, although the amount of budget seems bigger in the case of Mexico, considering 
the size of the economy, it is quite low. For instance, in 2010, Colombia invested 0.05% of the 
environmental budget into climate change, while Mexico invested 2.14%. In 2016, however, 
Colombia increased this amount to 2.58% and Mexico decreased it to 0.10%.  
 
Although these are attempts to include climate change at the budgetary level, it does not 
prove that a mainstreaming approach exists, but rather an initial integration. This is mainly in 
the environmental sector. However, the analysis found that this is not significant in relation 
to the major investments that both governments are making related to fossil fuels and other 
extractive activities that are intensifying the problem, as was found in the analysis of the 
energy sector.    
8.2.1. Mainstreaming climate change in the energy sector of Mexico and Colombia: a 
fragmented endeavour 
 
The energy sector is highly relevant for the economy of both Mexico and Colombia, but it is 
also one of the major emitters of GHGs in the region. As I previously pointed out, there are 
 
29 Based in the Budget proposal for 2019 
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state-specific realities that explain the status of the energy policy in both countries, namely 
their historical dependence on fossil fuel and extractive activities. Although both states have 
made progress in the use of renewable energy, this is still limited to achieve an actual energy 
transition towards low carbon development in the energy sector.   
 
In terms of mainstreaming actions, the discourse in the energy sector has progressively 
emphasized the need for the state to transition towards renewable energy, although this is 
not always in tandem with the climate change agenda. Instead, this discourse is more likely to 
be associated with the economic and energy security agenda. Furthermore, the discourse 
about climate change within the energy sector has summoned a new, problematic narrative, 
since the term “clean energy” has gained support and includes other sources of energy, such 
as nuclear, hydropower and recently the use of gas (including shale gas) as clean energy 
sources. These resources, however, have other environmental and social externalities that 
can exacerbate the problem (De la Fuente & Olivera, 2017; Guzman, 2015).  
 
Regarding institutional arrangements, Mexico and Colombia have both progressed in the 
consolidation of institutions that promote the energy transition. However, they have 
simultaneously strengthened the institutions that produce fossil fuels. These simultaneous 
actions indicate an inconsistency in the energy sector with its climate related goals. Although 
from the point of view of the climate agenda the strengthening of the fossil fuel sector does 
not make sense, according to experts, there are factors that can explain that tendency. In 
particular, the fossil fuel industry lobby is still strong, particularly from the gas industry, and 
is gaining attention in both countries (Interviews 7AC, 6CSC, 10AC, 9CSM, 10CSM).  
 
Regarding the use of tools to make policies, both countries have made significant efforts in 
the regulation of the energy transition: in Mexico, the Energy Transition Law and in Colombia, 
the Law 1715. An important element is that both laws include incentives and financial 
mechanisms to promote the use of renewable energy technologies. Similarly, there is progress 
for the generation of new data to improve the understanding of the feasibility to generate 
electricity with renewable energy. The promotion of renewable energy has become an 
important part of the evolution of the energy sector in both countries. However, my analysis 
shows that, even though the fossil fuel reserves are declining in Mexico and Colombia, new 
policies related to extractive activities and fossil fuels continue to emerge.  
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In the case of the public budget, the dependency that both countries have on fossil fuels to 
raise revenue puts a lot of pressure on their public finance system. In this sense, both 
countries have implemented fiscal reforms to generate more income from different sources 
including through carbon taxes. In Colombia, the carbon tax is more successful because the 
earned funds are allocated into the Colombia Sustainable Fund, while in Mexico the money 
generated from the carbon tax is part of the general income and does not necessarily go to 
sustainable measures. Besides that, the resources coming from both countries are still highly 
limited in comparison to what is needed. 
 
Nonetheless, the production of renewable energy is slowly gathering momentum and is in the 
first stages of solid growth. In Mexico, this progress is more evident than in Colombia. Notably, 
production in Mexico grew at 4.3% per year during the period of 2006-2016 (SENER, 2018), 
while in Colombia the production of wind power was only 2%, mostly thanks to the project in 
la Guajira (UPME, 2015a). Although in 2019, in the context of the Climate Action Summit 
President Duque said that the aim is to have 10% by 22 and 20% by the 2030 (Colombian 
Government, 2019). Further progress in renewable energy will be challenging and become 
more complex because the new governments in both countries wish to continue activities in 
the fossil fuel and extractive industries. Besides that, research shows that the evolution that 
has taken place in relation to renewable energy in both countries is not correlated to public 
finance, but rather to private and multilateral investments, which means that the government 
was not contributing to the energy transition. Although regulation and policies from the 
governmental sectors are needed, as well as incentives, the main financial support is not 
coming from the government. 
 
Regarding the conditions that promote and hinder the mainstreaming process, 
representatives from both governmental and non-governmental sectors found that there are 
conditions that hinder progress in general, such as insecurity from drug trade, which affects 
both countries. Insecurity and drug issues have monopolized the priorities of the government, 
particularly in Colombia. Even during the government of Calderon in Mexico, there was a 
frontal fight against the drug trade that created uncertainty in his government, impacting the 
efforts put into other agendas such as climate change.  
 
Besides these general conditions, there are specific conditions that promote and hinder the 
climate change mainstreaming process and are common findings in both applied methods. In 
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the next section I will further analyse the condition that appears to be a major promoter of 
this process, the role of international cooperation, and the condition is a major hindrance, the 
public finance dependence on fossil fuels.  
 
8.3. The role of international cooperation as a promoter of climate change mainstreaming 
in the public budget in developing countries: neo colonization tactics or altruistic low 
carbon pathway support?  
 
The ODA flows studied in the OECD databases report general aid that has been distributed in 
different categories, such as environment. When allocation varies among regions, in LAC for 
instance, the ODA represents 0.2% of the PIB of the region, which is less than the 0.4% that 
was registered in past decades (ECLAC, 2018b, p. 5). According to the Adaptation Watch ODA 
totalled USD$135 billion in 2013 (2015, p. 18). Michaelowa and Michalowa, point out that 
between 1998 and 2000, the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the OECD, spent USD 2.7 billion or 7.2% of total ODA for climate change related activities; in 
the case of Finland, Germany and Japan, this share exceeded 10% (2007, p. 7). Additionally, 
around 320 million USD were spent as multilateral ODA for the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF), which uses about one third of its funds for climate change related projects.  
 
The Climate Funds Update30 also presents information about climate change dedicated funds 
that receive resources from OECD members. This update points out that regions receive 
different levels of international support. In the case of LAC, the resources are highly 
concentrated in a few countries: Brazil and Mexico receive the bulk of the financial support, 
representing a total of 49% of all climate finance approved for the region (Bird, et al., 2017, 
p. 3). Colombia is among the five main recipients of climate funds, while also appearing as the 
major recipient of general ODA, with Brazil and Mexico, also being major recipients of ODA, 
although their contributions have been decreasing in recent years.  
 
The fsQCA results suggested that the absence of ODA influences the absence of public budget 
to deal with climate change, while the case studies confirmed that international cooperation 
enables countries to implement more climate change actions, because their national budgets 
are insufficient to do so. This is reflected within the submission of NDCs, where many 
 
30 This report contains information of: Adaptation Fund, Special Climate Change Fund, and Least Development 
Countries Fund and the Green Climate Fund. Available from https://climatefundsupdate.org/ 
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countries included conditional and unconditional measures. Conditional measures required 
international support while unconditional measures could be accomplished with their own 
resources.  
 
International debate surrounds the historic responsibility of developed countries in causing 
climate change, and Article 9 of the Paris Agreement also recognizes the leadership that 
developed countries should provide to mobilize climate finance to support mitigation and 
adaptation measures in developing countries. Then, what is the role of international 
cooperation in this transition? There are scholars studying the role of cooperation that claim 
that cooperation is another way to keep controlling the action of developing states, as a neo-
colonization tool (Easterly, 2009; Wainwright, 2008). This has been supported by many 
studies that show that developed countries tend to “invest” where they will have trade 
benefits (Klöck, et al., 2018; Younas, 2008). 
 
What these studies have revealed is that ODA is not a charity box, but rather a box of interest. 
Coronado (2008) considers that it is relevant “to evoke that the ethical-rhetorical principle of 
foreign aid is to assist and help those that are in need” (p. 197). However, the main concern 
is that, so far, ODA has not aligned with its mission, which was “to promote the economic-
development and welfare of developing countries” with key interest in the reduction of 
poverty (OECD, 2019). ODA evolved and it was associated later with the compliance of the 
Millennium Development Goals, whose main goal was to reduce poverty, although also 
included other goals related gender equity, water access, and others. Meanwhile, ODA does 
not primarily go to those countries with higher levels of poverty (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 
2007).  
 
On this point, Alesina and Dollar (2000), ask, “is the patter of aid flows dictated by political 
and strategic considerations which have little to do with rewarding good policies and helping 
the more efficient and less corrupt regimes in developing countries?” (p. 3). To answer that 
question, analysis conducted by Klöck et al (2018), show that aid is not always related to 
willingness to help, but sometimes to greening their actions and to comply with the self-
interest of donors, although this varies from donor to donor.  
 
On this, Berthélemy (2006) demonstrated that indeed some developed countries use ODA to 
further “control” the actions of countries where they have an interest. His study shows that 
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countries that act egoistically are Australia, France and Italy, while Japan and the United States 
are moderately egoistic; and countries that act in a more altruist way include Switzerland, 
Austria, Ireland and most Nordic countries.  
 
In this context, it is relevant to analyse the case of climate finance, since according to the 
UNFCCC “should” be “new and additional” to ODA, although in practice it has been included 
in the ODA allocation. Indeed, in the Paris Agreement, there is no language about additionality. 
Besides that, the Sustainable Development Goals signed in 2015, which replaced the 
Millennium Goals, included climate change as goal number 13. This suggests that ODA also 
includes climate finance (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007; Adaptation Watch, 2015). 
Although the provision of climate finance as part of the ODA has been working in practice, 
with this new international framework, its inclusion now seems to be justified. 
 
The last point is highly criticized by developing countries (Huq & Reid, 2004). While climate 
adaptation is highly related to the development agenda, and in fact mainstreaming adaptation 
has been promoted in the development agenda (Gupta, 2009), the question is to what extent 
developed countries want to solve all problems with the same bag of money to avoid further 
investments? Or to what extent they are increasing climate finance but reducing attention in 
other development issues? Or to what extent they are increasing ODA to tackle both 
development issues and other additional issues that climate change brings with it?  
 
On this issue, Huq and Reid (2004) deliver two arguments. The first is mainstreaming 
adaptation into development work, with all the institutional arrangements that it requires. 
The second is to pretend that mainstreaming adaptation funding within development funding 
will be enough to tackle the problem, because there is no clarity about new or additional 
resources. Roberts and Weikmans (2015, p. 14), point out that “new and additional” funding 
promised in 2009 in Copenhagen never materialized. 
  
Furthermore, other challenges have been identified related to ODA and climate finance 
allocation. Betzold and Weiler (2017) consider that adaptation support should go to countries 
that are more exposed to climate change risk, such as extreme weather events or sea level 
rise; however, most of the money goes to middle-income countries, to democracies and to 
countries with small populations, which are not always the poorest or most vulnerable.   
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Within Latin America, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia are the major recipients of climate funds, 
yet, according to the Paris Agreement, adaptation should be prioritized, which would suggest 
that countries such as Honduras should be receiving the most aid. So why are Mexico and 
Colombia major recipients? 
 
I provide some possible explanations. First, Mexico and Colombia are emerging economies 
that are now part of OECD, which has strengthened ties with developed countries. This 
relationship could explain why these two countries are major recipients of support. 
Additionally, Berthélemy (2006) points out that developed countries use ODA to intervene 
when there are security issues, while observes that “environmental aid does not target the 
nations that are most in need or abating local pollution, but rather those with whom they have 
had prior relations (economy and security), nations that are democratic, and nations with 
unexploited natural resource” (p. 144). Colombia and Mexico both have security issues 
because of the drug trafficking and are two of the countries with major biodiversity in the 
world (LMMC, n.d.).  
 
For instance, these factors may explain the interest of countries like United States in the 
provision of support in these countries. Nevertheless, with the arrival of Donald Trump as US 
president, USAID, the cooperation arm of USA, decided to close their climate change programs 
in both countries establishing instead smaller green growth programs (Interview 7FGC). This 
is related to what Tingley (2010) points out, that when governments become more 
conservative, their foreign aid efforts are likely to decline. The influence of USA is still there, 
but just not with the same name and the same resources. The study conducted by Berthélemy 
(2006) concluded “Given this observation, it is safe to conclude that Japan and United States 
are more egoistic that the other countries in the “moderately egoistic” cluster. Their regional 
biases, respectively in favour of Asia and Latin America, cannot be considered as undoubtedly 
independent of commercial objectives” (p. 192).  
 
Other countries such as Germany are supporting Mexico and Colombia in the construction of 
their carbon markets through their development and cooperation agencies. According to 
Michaelowa and Michaelowa (2007), developed countries also use ODA to offset or to explain 
to their citizens the failure of their national climate policies. Yet, it is important to analyze why 
adaptation receives less money than mitigation in Latin America, which contributes “only” 8% 
of the emissions and has highly vulnerable countries? According to Ayers and Huq (2009), the 
 215 
key answer could be that adaptation measures, which are processes that take too long to 
show results, are less attractive than specific mitigation actions that might have quicker 
results and are measurable, even if they are measured ex ante.  
 
There are several measures, such as the CDM, that claimed to reduce emissions when they 
were first proposed but in practice did not deliver (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007; 
Dutschke & Michealowa, 2006). According to Coronado (2008), in a context where political 
decisions determine the allocation of aid, “the success then appears to be irrelevant, as well 
as its failure”, the author continues, “what truly matters is the ability to keep the funds flowing, 
even if that requires made-up projects results, a privilege for action, spending and short-term 
outcomes instead of focus on learning and long term planning” (p. 200).  
 
It was observed that in the case of Latin America the principle of conditionality appears to be 
decisive as well, not only to explain the aid allocation schemes that are in place among states 
and foreign donors, but among non-governmental organizations that rely on international 
cooperation as well (Coronado, 2008). In this point is important to say that while Colombia 
and Mexico are major recipients of international cooperation, it is important to differentiate 
the type of cooperation, since the number of grants in the countries has been reduced, and 
they are rather receptors of other instruments such as loans (Interview 8FGM, 4R). As was 
stated before in this thesis, the reception of loans can also contribute to increasing the public 
debt that in the end will be paid with public money. Furthermore, access to loans and other 
financial mechanisms also require a level of governance and institutional work, which is a 
major condition to receive sources from multilateral banks and other types of international 
funds, such as the GCF (Interviews 15OIM, 4R).  
 
International cooperation then is an important instrument, and it has been helping countries 
such as Colombia and Mexico to design and implement climate policies. However, it is also 
observed that environmental priorities differ between the north and the south countries 
(Lewis, 2009). For that reason, my argument is that states shouldn’t rely only on international 
cooperation to address the impacts of climate change. Furthermore, according to Coronado 
(2008), the key aspect of ODA was to support countries in difficult situations to help them to 
find stabilization until they were ready to keep their own progress, which means that the idea 
behind ODA is to provide temporary support.  
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It is true that the situation in the region is complex, which is related to the fact that many 
countries in Latin America have weak public finance systems, with limited capacity at the 
governmental level to raise revenues, which in turn reflects their limited capacity to spend 
(Giraldo, 2009). Furthermore, the public budget debate is always contentious and highly 
politicized, as it is the primary mechanism by which all the ministries and local governments 
compete for “limited” financial resources (Interviews 1FGC, 1FGM, 5FGM). This is especially 
pertinent in a region that suffers from high poverty, lack of education, insecurity, 
unemployment, external debt and other social problems that have been treated in isolation 
without thinking about the relationship that they have with the environmental crisis.  
 
In this context, although international cooperation to deal with environmental problems is 
even more relevant, developing countries must also seek structural changes at the public 
finance system level. This is needed to address two challenges: reliance on fossil fuel revenues, 
which I will discuss in the next section, and, facing the impacts of climate change through 
climate change adaptation finance. 
 
In this sense, the existence of ODA in countries is positive because it is pushing countries to 
deal with climate matters, and in a way that creates a mutual conditionality, because 
developing countries rely on this resources to act while developed countries gain capacity to 
“participate” in the acceleration of actions. In fact, according to the Adaptation Watch (2015) 
this climate finance exchange is a tool to increase mutual accountability, to be able to sit at 
the same table to negotiate things that represent completely different priorities in these 
countries. In this regard, the active participation of Mexico and Colombia in the context of the 
UNFCCC is a key factor for constructing a national narrative on climate change. Here, 
negotiators have actively positioned the leadership of both countries to articulate this role, 
nationally and internationally. However, this articulation hasn’t always been successful, 
because although these countries are very active at the international level, this is not always 
reflected in better climate policies.  
 
Nevertheless, the efforts of these countries at the international level, and the establishment 
of key goals to reduce emissions, have raised the attention of developed countries that have 
the responsibility to transfer financial support. Interviewed governmental representatives 
consider international support important and necessary, but they agree with the claim that in 
many cases such support responds to the interests of the developed countries rather than to 
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the needs at the national level (Interview 14FGC). Some authors such as Stewart et al., (2009) 
suggest that recipient countries will demand in exchange stronger commitments from private 
and public sources as “the price of their participation in mitigation, and greater voice in the 
governance of funding mechanism and how the funds are used” (p. 7). This is a debate that 
has been taking place at the international level and is the reason why the NDCs are called 
nationally determined contributions, because the definition of sectors and actions should be 
country driven.  
 
Developing countries claim that the provision of financial resources is an obligation of the 
developed countries in the context of the UNFCCC, and that it shouldn’t be conditional on the 
actions at the national level (Huq & Reid, 2004).  
 
The argument is not to put the responsibility only on developing countries, but rather to 
encourage developing countries to implement deep changes to leapfrog the development 
pathways of developed countries (Perkins, 2003). This because, according to Bodnar et al, 
(2018), to achieve a trajectory to avoid 1.5o warming will require innovative public financial 
instruments designed to mobilize trillions of dollars of private investments. Limiting warming 
to 1.5o C will cost roughly “1.5-2.1 times” more than a 2o C scenario between 2010 and 2100 
(Rogelj et al., 2015, p. 525). 
 
While this discussion will continue in the context of the SDGs and in the context of the 
implementation of the Paris Agreement and the effectiveness of the support (Chaum, et al., 
2011) in this research I want to highlight that while developing countries wait their turn to 
receive funds from the GCF or to catch the attention from bilateral donors, if they do not 
transform national financial structures, the fight against climate change will be more 
expensive for them. This increasing cost of climate change will impact their public budget 
further as countries will have to pay or ask for further money, which is always easy when it 
comes in a format of loan. Yet, countries in the region have a very high external debt, which 
in the context of climate change might increase. In general, climate change must be treated 
as a national security problem that requires serious national transformation (Barnett, 2007).   
 
In conclusion, the literature suggests that international cooperation has been used to exert a 
certain type of control over the actions of recipient countries, which can operate as neo 
colonialist actions (Coronado, 2008), however, studies conducted by Klöck et al., (2018) and 
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Berthélemy (2008), suggest that this is not the case of all donors, and that there are countries 
that have a genuine interest in supporting actions at the national level. The case of Mexico 
and Colombia showed that the role of international cooperation is highly relevant for climate 
action. Representatives of government and non-governmental organizations consider that, 
while cooperation is highly relevant, the donors primarily establish the lines and the topics 
where they want to support, even if these are not the main lines of interest of the countries 
(1FGM, 8FGM, 14 IOM, 15 IOM, 4FGC, 6CSC, 7FGC, 14FGC). 
 
In terms of the energy transition, this research has shown that international cooperation has 
also played an important role in the development of renewable energy projects, however it is 
not as critical as the role of other financial support from multilateral banks and the private 
sector. The fsQCA also showed that ODA could be used to further fossil fuel investments, 
which is explained in the next section.  
 
8.4. The role of fossil fuel finance as a hindrance to mainstreaming climate change 
budgeting: is it possible to break the dependency on fossil fuels?  
 
Scholars have been analysing the influence of fossil fuel and extractive activities in the 
revenues of Latin American countries (Campodonico, 2008). While there is recognition that 
the fossil fuel reserves are decreasing in the region, which has been analysed since the early 
years of the 21st century, many Latin American states have maintained a focus on pro-fossil 
fuel policies. The dependency on these resources became a “Dutch disease”, referring to the 
phenomenon where the rapid development of one sector of the economy (particularly natural 
resources) precipitates a decline in other sectors. For instance, with the growth of oil and 
extractive activities, agriculture and other primary sectors suffered in Latin America and Africa, 
producing a dependency on this sector to “alleviate” the economy, creating a cycle that is very 
difficult to escape (Benjamin, et al., 1989).  
 
For many decades Latin American countries relied on the production of coal, oil and other 
minerals to increase their revenues to fund social demands. In many countries the revenue 
from oil, manufacturing and construction, accounted for more than 30% of total government 
spending in the past (Fan & Rao, 2003).  Mexico clearly shows this pattern: in 2006 its total 
revenue was USD$158,940 million, while the revenue from the oil sector was USD$58,127 
million, 36% of the total revenue. This tendency has been changing with the reduction of oil 
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reserves in the region (EPE, 2013) - although Venezuela might have reserves for more than 
100 years according to Campodonico (2008), this is not the case for most countries.  
 
The claim of some governments is that there are important reserves that have been not 
discovered yet, and that further technologies and investments are needed to keep exploring 
and extracting fossil fuels. The key concern in Latin America is that most of these reserves are 
not easy to extract, as articulated by a former representative of the energy sector in Mexico, 
who stated “the easy and cheap oil is finished” (interview 5FGM). This means that countries 
have to use methods, such as fracking, to access unconventional oil and gas, but this has 
environmental impacts, such as the use of chemicals and the impact on water reserves as a 
large amount of water is needed in the process (Guzman, 2015). In Argentina, for example, 
fracking the reserves in “Vaca Muerta” (Dead Cow) could satisfy energy demand for the next 
150 years, with an estimated production of 27 billions of barrels of oil and 802 trillions of cubic 
feet of shale gas, according to the US Energy Information Administration. However, the 
question that remains is what are the externalities and what additional costs will it bring to 
countries in the context of climate change? (Guzman, 2015).  
 
Another concern is related to the places where oil reserves are placed. For instance, there are 
several efforts to keep exploring the resources that are in the Amazon in Colombia, Brazil, and 
Ecuador (WWF, n.d.). The dilemma that these countries have is, to what extent must they 
protect this ecosystem, or to what extent should they keep extracting resources to raise 
revenue to pay for their bills, even if this extraction intensifies climate change?  
 
This dilemma has brought proposals such as the Yasuni project in Ecuador. The project aimed 
to emit bonds and then sell them to developed countries or international organizations that 
would be willing to invest to ensure that the oil would remain in the ground. In this way the 
government could commit to avoiding further exploitation of those reserves to protect the 
National Park Yasuni without "losing" the income that they would receive for such exploitation. 
The president, Rafael Correa, wanted to raise at least 50% of the resources that they would 
receive if they would extract oil from that park (Oilwatch, 2007, p. 4). The aim was to collect 
USD$3,600 million in 13 years in compensation to avoid the exploitation of around 846 million 
barrels of oil (Mena, 2013). However, they only collected USD$13.3 million, and the president 
claimed “the world has defrauded us”, and he decided to exploit the park, arguing that the 
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additional USD$18.292 million that could be raised by doing so could help reduce poverty and 
misery in the country and the Amazon (Mena, 2013).  
 
The dependence on fossil fuels is one of the constant factors in many countries in the region, 
including Colombia and Mexico. While it was possible to observe that some politicians have 
shown interest in climate change, this does not change the growing and “stable” interest on 
fossil fuels (Interview 18IOC). This was even more evident when investments in fossil fuels 
versus investments in renewable energy in the region were analysed.   
 
In Mexico and Colombia, the political, fiscal and regulatory frameworks are still powering fossil 
fuel development. This dependency on fossil fuel may explain why there is limited progress in 
the use of renewable energy for the generation of electricity, where public investments are 
extremely limited. In this regard, the claim of some experts is that “it is ok if the government 
does not invest in renewable energy, as long as it does not create barriers” (Interview 22JM). 
Nevertheless, some consider that public financial support can create a change in the 
investment trajectory, since “a signal to the market has to be clear” (Interview 24CM). Many 
experts agree that a key element to ensure the transition is to reduce investments in fossil 
fuel and to disconnect the economy from fossil fuel dependency, which at the same time will 
be helpful for energy security (Interviews 3R, 9CSM, 10CSM, 11CSM, 1FGM, 4LPM, 1FGC, 3AC, 
6CSC; Oilwatch, 2019).  
 
A major debate in both countries is now in regards to the role of the fracking as a method to 
continue with the exploitation and production of fossil fuels, while the governments remain 
interested on this practice to maximize the production, civil society movements have been 
created to oppose to this expansion, through alliances of organizations and local communities 
(AMCF, n.d.). 
 
According to a recent study by CEPAL (2019), the key element that is needed in the region is 
a comprehensive fiscal reform that can diversify the region’s revenue to avoid a path of 
cyclical dependency that ends up strengthening this carbon lock-in (Unruh, 2000). If countries 
remain dependent on fossil fuel income to pay for their government expenditure programs 




The critical factor here, which my research demonstrates, is that there are major trade-offs in 
the short and medium-term that countries will have to endure as they adapt to a changing 
climate, mitigate its impact, and transition to a low carbon and resilient development. Indeed, 
countries are already experiencing budgetary challenges owing to losses resulting from 
climate impacts. In all scenarios, investing early in actions will always be cheaper than paying 
the cost of the impacts (Galindo, 2015; Stern, 2009). 
 
An important observation highlighted by this study, which requires future research, is the 
actual role of ODA in the energy sector. One of the results identified in the fsQCA method is 
that the absence of ODA relates to the absence of a public budget on fossil fuels. While ODA 
might be a way to help countries to reduce emissions and comply with their climate 
commitments, this research suggests that ODA might also incentivize the promotion of 
industries that are important for trade purposes, but that developed countries do not want 
located in their own territories - what some authors call, “pollution havens” (Cole, 2004).   
 
Although it was not possible to know how much, if any, of the ODA provided goes to specific 
fossil fuel activities, the amount that goes to the energy sector is relevant in many countries. 
It is possible that ODA itself is not investing in specific technologies related to fossil fuels, but, 
based on other studies, the countries that belong to the OECD and are also part of the G20, 
are still major investors in fossil fuels.  
 
In the report “G20 coal subsidies”, Oil Watch and other organizations, it is stated that the G20 
provided “at least US$63.9 billions per year in government support to the production and 
consumption of coal alone” (2019, p. 4). The paradox is that these countries are responsible 
for 79% of the global emissions. These investments are not only national but also international 
investments, contributing to the development of this industry overseas, with a sum of 
USD$27.6 billion. These countries also have USD$15.4 billion in fiscal support and USD$20.9 
billion in state-owned enterprise (SOE) investment per year across the G20 countries (Gencsü, 
et al., 2019, p. 4). In this sense there is an increase in the G20 support to produce coal-fired 
electricity, going from over USD$17.2 billion per year (average 2013-2014) to nearly USD47.3 
billion per year (2016-2017) (Gencsü, et al., 2019, p. 4).  
 
In the case of Mexico and Colombia, there are also limited efforts to mainstream climate 
change in the energy sector. These efforts haven’t been successful or perhaps they were 
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implemented to falsely prove that they care about climate change, when in reality the 
dynamic of the economy is highly driven for the interest and dependency on fossil fuels. 
Therefore, the energy and climate policies are pulling in opposite directions. 
 
In this sense, the diversification of the energy matrix is desirable in the context of climate 
change, but to what extent is it desirable in the economic model that exists now, which is 
based on the unlimited extraction of natural resources to generate capital? Fossil fuels are 
limited resources. The question is, to what extent should states rely on them to ensure future 
development (Sohr, 2011). Even though in capitalism the market has power, the state plays 
an important role.  In LAC there is constant debate about the role of the state as owner or as 
a partner of oil companies. This tendency has been divided, between those that aim to control 
the oil companies, such as Mexico and Venezuela, and those that are rather partners of private 
companies, such as Colombia, as shown in Chapter 7.  On this point, the discussion should also 
go towards the diversification of the energy sector.  
 
In the case of Mexico and Colombia, the state is not leading the energy transition, but neither 
is the development assistance which has been investing in renewable energy and energy 
efficiency projects but is also necessary to adapt to the new context and necessities of the 
countries (OECD, 2019b). In reaction to this, the private sector has gained power in the 
expansion of renewable energy in the world, but to what extent is it desirable that the state 
does not play a protagonist role in the energy transition?  
 
While the free market offers opportunities to expand investments where the states cannot, 
the idea from scholars was not to give the market the right to decide the pathway, but rather 
for it to follow government rules and support where government is lacking. Issues such as 
environmental damages, education and others, cannot fall in the free market rules, because 
free market is “brutally unsentimental” (Sachs, 2011).  Free market will not end poverty, 
unless the reduction of poverty generates a significant profit.  According to Sachs (2011, pp. 
38-39), “free market needs regulation to best serve public interest”.  
 
Therefore, public finance is an important area of the state that requires strengthening to 
support the actions of the government. I found a gap in the literature regarding the role of 
public budget in developing countries to tackle climate change. Most climate finance refers to 
the financial support provided through developed countries; however, this research suggests 
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that in the context of the climate emergency, both developed and developing countries have 
to invest in climate change action. My argument is that international cooperation will not be 
enough if it does not help to leverage public finance at the national level to tackle the problem.   
 
In this thesis, I have explained that the provision of ODA and climate finance is unbalanced.  
In Latin America, mainly Brazil and Mexico are major recipients of climate finance while, 
Colombia is the major recipient of ODA. If we extrapolate this to the rest of the world, the 
country that receives more international support is China. From the 34% of resources going 
through the GEF to Asian countries, China receives half (Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2007, p. 
13). Meanwhile, Latin America receives 23% and Africa receives 19% of these resources. In 
this context, should Latin American and Caribbean countries rely only on international 
resources, or should they also start mainstreaming climate change in their public budgets to 
directly face the problem, comply with national and international goals and, in particular, to 
protect their populations from the impacts of climate change? 
 
My answer is that countries should be mainstreaming climate change within their planning 
and budgetary processes, in order to better allocate the “limited resources” that they have, 
and to create conditions to leverage potential international support. The state must continue 
playing an important role. As Eckersley (2004) suggests, the state can guide countries towards 
a “green state” that understands that the protection of the environment is related, and 
necessary, to ensure the social protection.  
 
This research does not suggest that the developing countries have to pay for the 
consequences of climate change by themselves, but I suggest that developing countries also 
have a role to play, in a moment when climate change is progressing rapidly. The states have 
the responsibility to keep strengthening national structures such as their public finance 
systems, where the diversification of income sources is a key measure to generate enough 
budget to invest in adaptation and mitigation actions as well as other social and economic 
activities. Cutting fossil fuel dependency is key to ensure a transition; otherwise any effort to 
mainstream climate change will fail.  
 
In this context developed countries also have to take responsibility and should provide 
support to all countries in the same way, without looking only to their own interests, 
otherwise the countries that suffer deep levels of poverty will never be able to escape from 
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it, and the purpose of the ODA and the purpose of the SDGs and the Paris Agreement will not 
be achieved.   
 
8.5. Conclusions  
 
The allocation of public resources to deal with climate change in Latin American and the 
Caribbean countries remains as a major challenge because of the limited resources that these 
countries have and the number of problems they must face. Nevertheless, countries such as 
Mexico and Colombia have been progressing towards a climate change mainstreaming 
process in their planning and budgeting processes, although are still limited efforts.  
 
The two methods applied in this research, the fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and 
the case studies method, share some conclusions regarding the conditions that promote and 
hinder such limited process. They share the conclusion that the reception of international 
cooperation is a promoter of mainstreaming climate change in the planning and budgeting 
process of countries, while the dependence on fossil fuels in the public finances is a major 
hindrance.  
 
This chapter further discussed what is then the role of international cooperation and the fossil 
fuels in this process. The literature suggests that, while international cooperation is relevant 
to help comply with international agreements, it is not always a charity box, but rather reflects 
the actual interests of donor countries. While ODA is supposed to support countries in need, 
primarily to reduce poverty, it is highly concentrated in middle-income countries. In the case 
of climate finance, which according to the UNFCCC should support more adaptation actions, 
it is highly concentrated on major emitters of GHGs and not to the most vulnerable countries.  
  
Some scholars suggest that the main issue with international cooperation in the form of ODA, 
is that it is allocated where donor countries have interest, such as trade and security interests, 
although this is not the case with all donors. However, this conditional attitude has been seen 
in Mexico and Colombia, where donor’s countries behave differently. In this sense, the 
provision of ODA could be a way to create mutual trust as some authors suggest, or to create 
mutual conditionality, however this can vary significantly between donors and recipients. The 
take-home message is that priorities between these two sides are not always the same. 
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Regarding the fossil fuels role, this thesis has shown that there have been limited efforts to 
mainstream climate change in the energy sector, because countries remain dependent on 
fossil fuels. So far, little public money is invested in the energy transition, and although 
international cooperation can play a role in supporting this transition, it is not always clear if 
this support is “carbon-free” or if it is another means of "greening" to cover up fossil fuel 
investments from OECD and G20 countries.   
 
The argument presented in this research is that mainstreaming climate change in the planning 
and budgetary process as a way to comply with national and international commitments, will 
not be effective if countries do not end their dependency on fossil fuels, even in the presence 
of international cooperation. While international cooperation is putting pressure on recipient 
countries to deal with climate change, these resources are not going to be enough to cover all 
the adaptation and mitigation needs in all developing countries. For this reason, it is essential 
that developing countries keep strengthening national structures, such as the public finance 
systems, to be able to raise revenue from alternative sources to fulfil important social and 
environmental demands. If countries keep investing in fossil fuels to produce revenue, any 
effort financed by private and international resources will not be successful to achieve 
































CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The allocation of public funding to tackling climate change is limited in developing countries.  
In this thesis I analysed the conditions and combinations of conditions that promote or hinder 
climate change mainstreaming in planning and budgetary processes in 21 major emitter 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with a more detailed analysis of Mexico and 
Colombia. The analysis showed that whilst mainstreaming is limited, international 
cooperation is an important promoter of the climate change mainstreaming process, while 
dependency on oil revenue to generate budget is a major constraint. 
 
This thesis builds on the idea that, in order to tackle climate change, it is necessary to 
mainstream the problem to bring it to the heart of policy; a process that has started in some 
countries. In this context the research question established was, under what conditions are 
developing countries willing to mainstream climate change in their public budget to comply 
with national and international commitments, and what factors promote and hinder such a 
process?  
 
The thesis used two main approaches in order to address the question. The first was a 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis with its fuzzy set format, where five conditions were 
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analysed (levels of climate risk, receipt of Overseas Development Aid, levels of human 
development, governance effectiveness, and number of climate policies); and the second a 
comparative analysis using two case studies and interviews, Mexico and Colombia. Based on 
data generated by these methods, several observations were obtained, but there are four 
findings that are the most relevant to answer the research question. 
 
The first finding is related to the actual existence of a public budget. There is evidence of only 
a limited allocation of public budget to tackle climate change in in Latin America and the 
Caribbean countries, even in those contributing the highest GHG emissions in the region and 
even in those that are highly vulnerable. Although the number of countries allocating public 
resources in 2016 compared to 2010 doubled, increasing the allocation of public budget from 
average of 0.89% (including only the countries that allocated resources) to 5.8% of the total 
of the environmental ministries’ budgets. This proportion is minor, when we realize that the 
budget of the environmental ministries went from average 1.0% of the total of the central 
government’s budget (including only the countries that allocated resources) in 2010, to 0.46% 
in 2016. Overall, this demonstrates limited effort by countries to mainstream climate change 
in the planning and budgetary process, which limits the capacity of the state to deal with the 
problem. 
 
The second finding is that countries such as Mexico and Colombia are nonetheless attempting 
to mainstream climate change in their planning and budgetary process. They both have 
created institutional arrangements, policies and even legal frameworks to tackle climate 
change. However, their efforts to mainstream climate change in the environmental sector and 
in the energy sector have limited progress so far.  
 
The third finding identified by the two methods is that the international cooperation in form 
of Overseas Development Aid and climate finance has an influence in the budget behaviour 
of developing countries. The fsQCA identified that the absence of ODA is necessary to explain 
the absence of a climate and renewable energy budget. Countries that do not receive ODA 
tend to invest less in climate change and renewable energy than those that receive ODA. This 
condition was highly necessary although not sufficient, which means that other conditions 
have to be in place as well. Nevertheless, this condition was a large determinant for explaining 
the amount of environmental budget in relation to the central budget of governments, 
meaning that countries that receive ODA tend to invest more in environmental matters. This 
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was confirmed by several of the interviews conducted in the case studies, where international 
cooperation is recognized as a major catalyst to tackle climate change as national resources 
are rather limited.    
 
The fourth finding is that the role of ODA is relevant to explain the levels of fossil fuel budget 
in the energy ministry as well. While the fsQCA showed that the absence of ODA also leads to 
the absence of a fossil fuel budget, the model also showed that the former is also related to 
the allocation of climate budget. For instance, it was shown that the presence of fossil fuel is 
necessary to explain the presence of climate budget in certain countries, while the presence 
of fossil fuels is also necessary to explain the absence of climate budget in others. This could 
mean that some countries invest in climate matters to compensate their activities in fossil 
fuels, while others that are highly driven by fossil fuels do not have high interests in climate 
actions.  
 
The analysis based on the case studies showed that the dependency on fossil fuel in the public 
finance system, including the collection of revenue and the generation of budget, acts as a 
constraint on the climate change mainstreaming process. It creates a vicious cycle, where 
more fossil revenues lead to an increased fossil fuel budget and this leads to opposition 
against policies that aim to change the behaviour of the energy sector, such as climate policies, 
since the energy sector is the major emitter of greenhouse gases.  
 
In conclusion, some developing countries such as Mexico and Colombia are mainstreaming 
climate change in their public budgets as a response, or as part of the dynamics that the 
reception of international support brings to them; and these developing countries are willing 
to keep doing so as long as they further received international cooperation, in the form of 
ODA or climate finance. However, this climate change mainstreaming process will be always 
limited if the public finance system of these countries remains dependants on fossil fuels, 
where the energy policies pull in the opposite direction of the climate goals. 
 
While the presence of international cooperation is important, it is not enough to deal with the 
structural needs that countries have. In addition, international cooperation does not 
necessarily go where the funding is most needed. This is why it is important to strength the 
national public finance systems, to better leverage and guide international cooperation. 
However, if countries keep relying on fossil fuels to generate revenue and budget to cover 
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their social and economic needs, including dealing with climate change, it will be difficult to 
achieve an energy transition that will allow countries to build a low carbon and resilient future.  
 
The analyses conducted helped to further understand the conditions that influence 
developing countries in tackling climate change domestically. From these, I highlight some 
policy implications of the analysis.   
  
The first is related to the actual political process of mainstreaming climate change, which must 
take lessons from gender mainstreaming. Subsequently, the role of environmental ministries 
remains relevant, but to tackle climate change effectively the role of the central government 
must be reconsidered, bringing on board other ministries, such as energy and agriculture 
ministries, in a more proactive way, particularly the role of the finance ministries in areas such 
as revenue and public budget. In general, the role of the finance sectors, public and private, 
is important, but their work must be connected to the compliance of the goals of countries. 
Furthermore, the engagement of local governments is still a major requirement in countries 
like Mexico and Colombia. This process, however, cannot be separated from the main goal to 
reduce emissions and vulnerability, and further engagement of non-governmental actors is 
needed to have an effective mainstreaming approach.  
 
Secondly, strengthening the role of the state to focus on climate change also requires making 
its systems stronger. The public finance systems in LAC require more balanced attention, 
where diversification of revenue is needed to stop relying on fossil fuels due to its contribution 
to GHG emissions, but also because fossil fuels are becoming scarce. Mexico and Colombia, 
as well as other countries in LAC, require strong fiscal reforms that can achieve this 
diversification to transit into low carbon pathways, as well as rethinking the destination of the 
limited resources available to address social and environmental problems.  It is important to 
work on subsidy policies, including the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies and their potential 
reallocation to technologies that emit less GHGs and thus have lower environmental impacts.  
 
Thirdly, a thorough analysis of the implications of relying on fossil fuel must be done in 
Mexico and Colombia because the reduction of reserves and the fluctuation of global prices 
place a lot of pressure on the economy of these countries. Along the same lines, increased 
transparency regarding revenue, but also the allocation of public resources, is needed, 
improving the systemization and access to budgetary information to identify gaps and areas 
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of opportunity to rethink the use of available public resources. This transparency framework 
will become –or already is– an important element to receive international cooperation as a 
key condition to access finance. The creation of a public budget index in LAC is desirable to 
track the evolution of flows towards climate change and other activities.  
 
Finally, an agreement regarding the definition of what constitutes climate finance in theory 
and practice is needed. The definition should settle the argument regarding whether or not 
to include climate finance within the general ODA and, if it is included, whether the few 
resources supplied by the ODA are enough to combat climate change challenges in all 
developing countries as well as the rest of the SDGs. Furthermore, it is important that donors 
and recipients of this international cooperation improve the analysis of the effectiveness of 
international support, to ensure that it goes where it is most needed and that it is having a 
real impact. Meanwhile, donors must demonstrate that their resources are being used for 
reasons beyond their own self-interest, promoting a more balanced distribution among 
developing countries.  
 
Mainstreaming climate change in the public expenditure is neccesary, and this research has 
contributed to our knowledge about the relationship that exists between international 
cooperation and public budget allocation as mechanisms for delivering climate change policy.  
The provision of international support was shown to have important impacts, although not 
always the most desirable for recipient countries, which calls for further analysis regarding 
the effectiveness of such resources.  
 
In addition, the analysis of the energy transition pathways highlighted the limited role that 
governments currently have in LAC, but the necessity to ensure their engagement to transit 
towards a low carbon and resilient pathway to be able to achieve structural changes. 
 
While international cooperation remains key for developing countries, this will not be enough 
if national resources are continuing to propagate the problem, such as through fossil fuel 
investments. Furthermore, both national and international resources will be needed for the 
transformation towards low carbon and resilient pathways or developing and developed 
countries will end up paying more, in both money and human lives. The investment decisions 
made today will determine the future that we want for our economies and societies, 
particularly for future generations. The question is, as Figueres and Rivertt-Carnac (2020) 
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Appendix 1 Public budget labelled as climate change in environmental ministries (in 
percentage) 
Country % OF THE PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
FOR CC IN 






SECTOR OUT OF THE 
TOTAL OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT 2010 
% OF THE PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE FOR 
CC IN RELATION TO 





SECTOR OUT OF 




Argentina 0 2.02 0 0.25 
Bolivia 2.99 0.21 2.60 0.27 
Brazil 0 0.13 0.25 0.11 
Chile 0 0.03 0 0.12 
Colombia 0.05 1.15 2.58 0.03 
Costa Rica 0.07 5.7 7.2 0.70 
Cuba NA   NA  NA NA  
Dominican 
Republic  0 1.4 0  1.02 
Ecuador  NA NA  NA NA  
El Salvador 0 0.51 6.7 0.51 
Guatemala 0.0032 0.19 18.70 0.20 
Honduras  0.09 0.64 0.9 0.13 
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Jamaica  0 0 4.45 0.7 
México  2.14 0.57 0.10 0.37 
Nicaragua 0 0.40 26.4 0.44 
Panama 0 0.67  0 0.51 
Paraguay 0 0.08 0 0.12 





Uruguay 0 2.3 0.06 1.9 
Venezuela NA  NA 0 0.77 
NA: Not available 
Sources: Own elaboration with information of 21 public expenditures. 
 
 
Appendix 2 Public budget labelled as renewable energy in energy ministries (in 
percentage) 
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Argentina  0 0 0.32 0 0 50.0 
Bolivia  1 68.99 1.48 1 0.18 0.087 
Brazil 0 0 4.9 0 0 0.58 
Chile  1 5.3 19.74 1 4.55 49.03 
Colombia 0 0 2.39 1 0.05 6.97 
Costa Rica  0 0 1.65 0 0 0.75 
Cuba NA  NA NA NA NA NA 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 22.45 
Ecuador  NA NA NA NA NA NA 
El Salvador  1 0.1 0.49 0 0 4.32 
Guatemala 1 2.6 12.49 1 4.05 25.8 
Honduras 0 0 0 1 0.76 0 
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Jamaica 0 0 0 1 13.3 0 
Mexico 0 0 4.75 1 31.2 13.79 
Nicaragua 1 85.6 2.46 1 83.92 1.94 
Panamá 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 1 1.04 0.36 1 1.03 0.54 
Trinidad y 
Tobago  
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Venezuela  NA NA NA 0 0 25.76 




Appendix 3 Sources of information for the budgetary analysis per country 
Country Ministry of Finance information (2010) Ministry of Finance information 
(2016) 


























































Cuba Not available the website is on 
construction 
http://www.mfp.cu/under/under.php 
Not available the website is on 
construction 
http://www.mfp.cu/under/under.php 
Ecuador   Not available  Not available  





































































Uruguay Not available  https://www.mef.gub.uy/18296/1/m
ef/presupuesto-nacional-2015---
2019.html 


























Appendix 4 List of interviews 
Interviews in México 
# Code Sector Profile 
1 1FGM Federal Government  Representative of the Environmental Ministry 
(SEMARNAT) 
2 2LPM Legislative power Representative of the Climate Change 
Commission (Deputies Chamber) 
3 3LPM Legislative power Representative of the Budget Commission 
(Deputies Chamber) 
4 4LPM Legislative power Representative of the Climate Change 
Commission Deputies Chamber) 
5 5FGM Federal Government Representative of the Ministry of Energy (SENER) 
6 6FGM Federal Government Representative of the Finance Ministry (SHCP) 
7 7FGM Federal Government Representative of the Energy Efficiency 
Commission (CONUEE) 
8 8FGM Federal Government Representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(SRE) 
9 9CSM Civil Society Representative of the Environmental NGO 
10 10CSM Civil Society Representative of Research NGO 
11 11CSM Civil Society Representative of Transparency NGO 
12 12FGM Federal Government Representative of the Finance Ministry (SHCP) 
13 13FGM Federal Government Representative of the Finance Ministry, Direction 
of Revenue Hydrocarbons (SHCP) 
14 14IOM International organization Representative of International Organization 
15 15IOM International organization Representative of International Organization,  
16 16FGM Federal Government Representative of the National Institute of 
Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) 
17 17CSM Civil Society Representative of the Environmental NGO 
18 18AM Academia  Representative of the National University of 
Mexico (UNAM) 
19 19LPM Legislative power Advisor of the Climate Change Commission 
(Senates Chamber) 
20 20SGM Sub national government  Advisor Sub national government 
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21 21FGM Federal Government Representative of the Energy Ministry (SENER)  
22 22JM Journalist  Expert journalist on energy  
23 23PSM Private Sector Advisor of the Private Sector (CEMEX) 
24 24CM Consultant  Expert consultant on climate change  
Interviews in Colombia   
 Code Sector  
1 1FGC Federal Government Representative of the Environmental Ministry 
(MADS)  
2 2FGC Federal Government Representative of the Finance Ministry 
(MinHacienda) 
3 3AC Academia  Representative of the Academia (Universidad del 
Rosario) 
4 4FGC Federal Government Representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
(Cancillería) 
5 5OIC International organization Representative of the International Organization 
(UN body) 
6 6CSC Civil Society Representative of the Environmental NGO 
7 7FGC Federal Government Representative of the National Planning 
Department (DNP) 
8 8CSC Civil Society Representative of the Environmental NGO 
9 9FGC Federal Government Representative of the Environmental Ministry 
(MADS)  
10 10AC Academia  Representative of the Academia (Universidad de 
Antoquia) 
11 11CSC Civil Society Representative of the Environmental NGO 
12 12OIC International organization Representative of the International Organization 
(Multilateral Development Bank) 
13 13FGC Federal Government Representative of the Environmental Ministry 
(MADS)  
14 14FGC Federal Government Representative of the Environmental Ministry 
(MADS)  
15 15FGC Federal Government Representative of the National Planning 
Department (DNP) 
16 16LGC Legislative power Representative of Sub national government  
17 17LPC Legislative power Representative of the legislative power 
18 18OIC International Organization Former governmental representative, now 
representative of an International Organization 
Regional Interviews  
 Code Sector  
1 1R Regional  Expert on climate negotiations 
2 2R Regional  Representative of the regional foundation 
3 3R Regional Former Representative of the UNFCCC 
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